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Defense Attache Office-Saigon
RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY74/2
1 Oct 73 - 31 Dec 73

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RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

2nd QTR FY 74

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(6) Defense Attache Saigon: RVNAF

DAO QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT . 2nd Quarter
1974.

1) F. P. T. from 1 Oct - 1 Dec 74

(11) 1 Feb 74

10) John R. Hanna

Walter A. Williams

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
FPO San Francisco 96620

AOSOP-OR

1 February 1974

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - RVNAF Quarterly
Assessment

Commander
U.S. Support Activities Group
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with
JCS Secret message, 072105Z Mar 73, subject: Continuing
SEA Reports (U).

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WALTER A. WILLIAMS
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

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FOREWORD

One year after the Cease-Fire. There is an uneasy equilibrium.

The dominant fact is the enemy's strength. Positioned better. Structured better. Unharassed by U.S. air. Supported with: better roads, longer pipelines, larger stockpiles, more guns and tanks and sophisticated equipment. And he has what he didn't have a year ago.

A year ago he had no reserves. Now he has six divisions poised in the North. And they can ride quickly, not walk slowly, to wherever he opts to fight. His sophistication, however, no doubt caused troubles. For he sacrifices what he had before. Logistic simplicity. His radars, his SAMs, and his proliferation of tanks and guns weight him with logistic complexity. He is troubled with the vagaries of mechanical, electric and electronic paraphernalia. Vanishing is the enviable logistic simplicity of a bag of rice and a bandolier of bullets.*

In addition to building up his reserve stockpiles, and materiel and manpower, he is ominously clearing his field hospitals and sending his wounded North.

And he is training his troops to breach the tank barriers that ARVN has dug and erected.

Meanwhile, the RVNAF has not been idle. While half the VNAF is still in training, the VNAF has provided the mobility, both logistic and tactical, to offset the enemy's major moves. And the Vietnamese Navy controls the waters, one might say, except for the Paracels. But even here, though out-gunned and out-classed by a larger PRC fleet, the Vietnamese Navy gave a feisty account of itself.

ARVN expelled the enemy First Division from Chau Doc in the Delta, broke the sudden Division-size onslaught in Quang Duc, retook Kien Duc and Dak Song, but lost the

*Even shifting from radio to wire communications has caused new problems: washouts, line security and switching complications among them.

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Bach Ma Heights overlooking Route One north of the Hai Van Pass, and were stalled in attempting to open the roads to An Loc and Song Be.

Paradoxes are prevalent. While each side witnessed an escalation of venomous accusations, prisoner exchanges continue, and each side blundered into score-evening ambushes.

The war on the economic scale may ultimately cause more total anguish than on the battle field. But one suffering for the GVN is less. Traffic congestion is disappearing with the energy crisis. Regular gasoline is \$1.59 a gallon. Bicycles are proliferating and pedicabs are making a comeback.

The 65% inflation in the year of the Cease-Fire has caused no end of distress and as the Buddhist Chief of Chaplains told me yesterday, "for the soldier, tomorrow is worse than today".

The deprivation grows daily. The enemy strategists may think that waiting equates to winning. As there is more woe in want than in war. But this strategy is a two-edged knife that cuts both ways. Hanoi feels the same indigent thrust at its vitals.

Despite the strains, there is resilience in the GVN economy. Its exports rose from \$23 million in 72 to \$60 million in 73 and is shooting for \$100 million in 74. An overhaul of the tax machinery resulted in almost 100% increase in tax collections during the year of the Cease-Fire. The free market is contributing to the people's freedom. And there is high hope that in seven months the drills will start the spouting of off-shore oil.

Progress of Vietnamization is evident from declining U.S. support. Since the Cease-Fire, and in the face of continuing combat, U.S. contractors were reduced 48%, and Third Country Nationals 81%.

The Vietnamese Navy did not overhaul all its ships one year ago. Now it does. The Vietnamese Air Force did not overhaul all its jet aircraft engines a year ago. Now it does. And the ARVN had but a \$50 thousand ammo renovation program a year ago. Now it is \$3 million.

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
It was also heartening to have two highly professional technical assistance teams from CONUS: one for anti-tank assistance and one for anti-aircraft. Both remarked favorably on improvements in basic soldiering, maintenance and élan.

Help has been given in the marshalling, protection of, and diversion of stocks to Cambodian convoys. For ten months, no ships in GVN territory have been lost or even hit by the enemy on the waters of the Mekong.

In short, it has been a tense year. But while tense, not as intense as it could have been. True, the enemy is becoming stronger, but also more wary and respectful of the RVNAF strength.

Will the enemy make a big move? No doubt. He is not sending his soldiers down improved roads just to devour nuoc mam. It's more to devour the country.

When? Maybe, not now, because the entrails of the animal that will give the fatal signal are still safe in secrecy within skin. But the handwriting is on the wall. The enemy build-up is for a windup. One more try.


JOHN E. MURRAY
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

	PAGE
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS	v-xxvi
CHAPTER 1 - THREAT ASSESSMENT;	
1. Background	1-1
2. Developments Since the Cease-fire	1-1
3. Logistics	1-1
4. Infiltration Activity	1-4
5. NVN Strategic Reserve	1-5
6. Air Defense	1-7
7. NVN Air Force Threat	1-7
8. Enemy Threat and Intentions by Region	1-9
9. Enemy Strength	1-21
10. Enemy Intentions	1-22
CHAPTER 2 - FRIENDLY SITUATION;	
1. Overview	2-1
2. Military Region 1	2-1
3. Military Region 2	2-2
4. Military Region 3	2-4
5. Military Region 4	2-6
6. Summary/Conclusions	2-8
CHAPTER 3 - RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY;	
1. J2/Joint Chiefs of Staff	3-1
2. Unit 306	3-1
3. Capital Military District	3-7
4. Corps and Division G2s	3-8
5. Military Security Service	3-9
6. Unit 101	3-11
7. Vietnamese Navy Intelligence Organization	3-13
8. Vietnamese Air Force	3-16
9. SIGINT	3-17
10. National Police Command	3-18
11. Intelligence Training	3-18
12. Summary	3-19

1
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CHAPTER 4 - RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE ;

Combined JGS/DAO FY 75 Force
Structure Review 4-1

CHAPTER 5 - VIETNAMESE ARMY ;

1. Authorized and Assigned Strength 5-1
2. Areas of Operation and Unit Locations 5-1
3. Combat Arms 5-1
4. Training 5-30
5. Supply/Logistics 5-30
6. Maintenance 5-36
7. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 5-40
8. Port Operations 5-42
9. Facilities Engineering Self Sufficiency Program 5-43
10. Dependent Shelter Program 5-45
11. ARVN-LOC Program 5-47
12. MASF/MILCON 5-56
13. Summary/Conclusions 5-56

CHAPTER 6 - VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

1. Introductions 6-1
2. Authorized Strength and Assigned Personnel Readiness 6-1
3. Areas of Responsibility 6-1
4. VNAF Aircraft Inventory 6-14
5. Major Equipment Status 6-15
6. Air Technical Logistics Command 6-50
7. VNAF Bases 6-66
8. Conclusions 6-84

CHAPTER 7 - VIETNAMESE NAVY

1. Personnel 7-1
2. Personnel Readiness 7-1
3. Equipment Status of Ships and Craft 7-2
4. Logistics 7-2
5. Supply 7-8
6. Operations 7-9
7. Shortfalls 7-11
8. Conclusions 7-11

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CHAPTER 8 - VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS

1. Personnel	8-1
2. Personnel Readiness	8-1
3. Equipment Status	8-2
4. Logistics	8-2
5. Operations	8-3
6. Shortfalls	8-4
7. Conclusions	8-5

CHAPTER 9 - TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. Regional Force/Popular Force	9-1
2. Regional Forces	9-1
3. Popular Force	9-13
4. Equipment Status and Maintenance	9-16
5. Logistics	9-16
6. Training	9-16
7. Desertions	9-16
8. RF/PF Recruitment	9-17
9. Morale	9-17
10. Shortfalls	9-17
11. Summary	9-18

CHAPTER 10 - RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CAPABILITY

1. Single Integrated Military System	10-1
2. Logistics	10-5
3. End Item Surveillance	10-22
4. Conclusions	10-26
5. Summary	10-27

CHAPTER 11 - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES TRAINING

1. Offshore Training	11-1
2. In-country Training	11-11
3. In-country English Language Training Program	11-30
4. Central Training Command/DAO Technical Translation Branch	11-34
5. Contract Training	11-35
6. Regional Forces and Popular Forces	11-45

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CHAPTER 12 - RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. Introduction 12-1
2. Lines of Communication 12-1
3. Military Construction
4. Dependent Shelter Program
5. RVNAF Retirement Plan for CY 74
6. Reduction Program - Bulk Petroleum
7. RVNAF Morale

CHAPTER 13 - JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Chain of Command 13-1
2. Shortfalls and Assessment 13-20

CHAPTER 14 - DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

CHAPTER 15 - DATT ASSESSMENT

1. General
2. Indicators of Improvement
3. Problem Areas
4. Summary

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Antiaircraft
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
AAD-LB	ARVN Associated Depot Long Binh
AAG	Army Advisory Group
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
ABN	Airborne
ACA	Aircraft Clearance Authority
ACAD	Academy
ACC	Army Calibration Center
ACFT-A/C	Aircraft
ACI	Analytical Critical Inspection
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
AD	Air Division
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADMIN & FIN	Administration and Finance
ADPS	Automatic Data Processing System
A&E	Architectural and Engineering
AFB	Air Force Base
AFDL	Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFLS	Armed Forces Language School

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AFLST	Armed Forces Language Screening Test
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Directive
AFM	Air Force Manual
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGP	Auxiliary General Purpose
AI	Assistant Instructor
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
AIMI	Army Intensified Management Item
ALC	Area/Air/Army Logistics Command
ALCC	Air Lift Control Center
ALO	Air Force Liaison Officer
AMA	Air Materiel Area
AMC	Air/Army Materiel Command
AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam
ANGLCO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOSAF-E	DAO Air Force Division Civil Engineering Branch
AOSOP-OT	DAO Operations & Plans Division Training Management Branch
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter

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APQ	Airborne Target Tracking Radar
AR	Accommodation Rate
ARDF	Airborne Radar Direction Finding
ARL	Auxiliary Landing Craft Repair
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASB	Advanced Support Base
ASL	Authorized Stock List
ASPB	Advanced Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Air Training Command/Center
ATLC	Air Technical Logistic Command
ATT	Army Training Test
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Integrated Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communication
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
BBLs	Barrels
BCE	Base Civil Engineer/Bulk Construction Equipment
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BCM	Bulk Construction Material
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BEMO	Base Equipment Management Office
BIIL	Basic Issue Item List
BLDG	Building

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BMT	Basic Military Training
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill of Materiel
BNH	Bien Hoa
BS	Bachelor of Science
BTY	Binh Tuy
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine
BW	Boston Whaler
C	Cargo
CAF	China Air Force
CA/RI	Custodian Authorization/Receipt Listing
CBD	Combat Battle Damage
CBD	Contract Base Development
CCB	Command Communications Boat
CCTS	Combat Crew Training School
C&E	Communications and Electronics
CEM	Communications Electronic Meteorological Equipment
CE	Civil Engineer
CENCOM	Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee
CEIMP	Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program
CETS	Contract Engineering Technical Services
CEMP	Communications-Electronics Master Program

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CEMT	Command Equipment Management Team
CF	Correlation Factor
CFST	Contract Field Service Team
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CH-47	Cargo Helicopter
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CI	Criminal Investigation
CIC	Combat Information Center
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CINCPAC	Commander-In-Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CLD	Central Logistics Detachment
CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMD	Command
CND	Chief, Navy Division
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COL	Colonel
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam
COMUSMACV	Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
COPARS	Contractor Operated Parts System

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C&P	Care and Preservation
CP	Command Post
CPX	Command Post Exercise
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
COSAL	Consolidated Allowance List
COSVN	Central Office South Vietnam
CRC	Combat Reporting Central
CIR	Carrier Intensity Recorder
CRIP	Coastal Radar Improvement Plan
CRS	Coastal Radar System/Site
CSAF/LG	Chief of Staff, Air Force Logistics
CTC	Central Training Command
CTF	Commander Task Force
CWE	Construction Work Estimate
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DAME	Defense Against Mechanical Entry
DASE	Defense Against Sound Equipment
DATT	Defense Attache
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DED	Document Exploitation Division
DER	Destroyer Escort Radar Picket

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DGTS	Director General Technical Services
DI	Drill Instructor
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIFM	Due In for Maintenance
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DIV	Division
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLM	Depot Level Maintenance
DMJM	Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Card
DRA	Dead Reckoning Analyzer
DRT	Dead Reckoning Tracer
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DSP	Dependent Shelter Program
DS	Direct Support Unit
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DX	Direct Exchange
E/RC-47	Electronics/Reconnaissance
EBD	Engineer Base Depot

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ECL	English Comprehension Level
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated
EDD	Estimated Delivery Date
ECM/EC	Electronic Countermeasures
ELEX	Electronics
ELST	English Language Screening Test
ELT/P	English Language Training/Program
EM	Enlisted Man
ENGR	Engineer
EOQ	Economic Order Quantity
EOSM	Emergency On-Site Maintenance
ESR	Equipment Status Report
ESS	Equipment Status Summary
EST	Estimate
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAST	Field Assistance Support Team
FB	Fuel Barge
FM	Field Manual/Maintenance
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
FPJMC/FPJMT	Four Power Joint Military Commission/Team
FPS	Azimuth Search and Height Radar
FSR	Force Structure
FTR/F	Fighter
FTX	Field Training Exercise

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FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GAF	Ground to Air Fire
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GNORS	Grounded Not Operationally Ready Supply
GOA	SA-3 Low Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GS	General Support
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HALO	High Altitude Low Opening
HAZCON	Hazardous Condition
HELO	Helicopter
HO-51	Computer System
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Hour
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBM	International Business Machines
ICCS	International Commission for Control and Supervision
ICN	Idle Channel Noise
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
ID	Intelligence Division
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary

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ISSL	Initial Spares Support List
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEIM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JFO	Junior Foreign Officer
JGS	Joint General Staff
JLG	Joint Liaison Group
JMA-P	Junior Military Academy - Pleiku
JMS-VT	Junior Military School - Vung Tau
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JP-4	Aviation Turbine Fuel, Type 4
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTS	Joint Table of Standards
KIA	Killed in Action
KM	Kilometer
LASS	Lockheed Air Services Singapore
LAW	Light Anti-Tank Weapon
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCMM	LCM Mine Sweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Vehicle/Personnel Landing Craft
LDNN	SEAL Support Ships
LDPC	Logistics Data Processing Center
L/I	Line Item

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LN	Local National
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOGAIR	Logistic Air Support
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LOG MGT	Logistics Management
LQM	Link Quality Monitor
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSB/ISB	Logistics Support Base/Intermediate Support Base
LSI	Lear Siegler Incorporated
LSIL	Large Infantry Landing Ship
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSMH	Landing Ship Hospital
LSSL	Large Support Landing Ship
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTJG	Lieutenant Junior Grade
LTL	Interprovincial Road
LVT	Landing Vehicle Tracked
LVTC	Landing Vehicle Tracked Command
LVTP	Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel
LVTR	Landing Vehicle Tracked Retriever
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program

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MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MATT	Military Air Transportation Terminal
MATTS	Military Air Terminal Transportation Service
MBBLS	Thousand Barrels
MCAF	Military Construction Air Force .
MCDEC	Marine Corps Development and Education Command
MCN	Military Construction Navy
MCP	Military Construction Program
MED	Materiel Exploitation Division/Medical
MEE	Mission Essential Equipment
MEW	Maintenance Engineering Wing
MG	Major General
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MI	Military Intelligence
MIC	Military Intelligence Center
MID	Military Interrogation Division
MILSTD	Military Standard
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation Movement Procedure
MILCON	Military Construction
MM	Millimeter
MMC	Materiel Management Center/Medium Maintenance Center
MOD	Modification/Mobilization Directorate
MOGAS	Motor Gasoline

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MOI	Ministry of Interior
MON	Monitor
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
MP	Military Police
MPCO	Military Property and Construction Office
MR	Military Region
MRL	Materiel Requirements List
MRO	Manual Release Order
MRMC	Maintenance Repair & Minor Construction Program
MRTTH	Military Region: Tri Thien-Hue
MS	Master of Science
M&S	Maintenance and Supply
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSRCO	Master Ship Repair Contract Office
MSS	Military Security Service
MT&P	Ministry of Transportation & Post
MT	Metric/Measurement Ton
MTS	Mobile Training Set
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MVW	Ministry of War Veterans
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NAVAIDS	Navigational Aids
NILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office

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NAVEEACTPHIL	Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity - Philippines
NAVEEAPAC	Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Agency - Pacific
NAVSHIPS	Naval Ships System Command
NC	Not Carried
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer In Charge
NHA	Nha Trang
NDI	Non-Destructive Inspection
NDPS	National Defense Planning System
NEC	Navy Enlisted Classification
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
NIS	Not In Stock
NLT	Not Later Than
NM	Nautical Miles
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NMASF	Navy Military Assistance Service Funded
NORM	Not Operational Ready - Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready - Supply
NPC	National Police Command
NRTD	Not Repairable This Depot
NRTS	Not Repairable This Station
NSC	Naval Supply Center
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum

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NSN	No Stock Number
NSRP	Non-Standard Repair Parts
NTC	National Training Center/Naval Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnamese Air Force
NVN	North Vietnam
OB/GYN	Obstetrics/Gynecology
OCE	Office of the Chief of Engineers
OIC	Officer in Charge
OJT	On-the-Job-Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OM	Organizational Maintenance
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OOMA	Ogden Air Materiel Area
OPCON	Operational Control
ORPS	Overseas and Return Placement Staff
OR	Operational Ready/Operational Readiness
OR/TNG	Operational Ready/Training
ORD	Ordnance
OST	Order and Shipping Time
(P)	Province
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PA&E	Pacific Architects and Engineers

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PBR	Patrol Boat River
PEC	Patrol Craft Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PDM	Periodic Depot Maintenance
PE	Periodic Inspection
PF	Popular Force
PG	Post Graduate
PGM	Patrol Gun Boat Motor
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
PI	Photo Interpretation/Philippines
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMEL	Precision Measuring Equipment Laboratory
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POPAT	Protection of People Against Terrorism
PRB	Publications Review Board
PRC	Portable Radio Communications
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
PROG	Program
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
PT	Physical Training
PW	Prisoner of War
QA	Quality Assurance

xx

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QBD	Quartermaster Base Depot
QL	National Road
QM	Quartermaster
QTR	Quarter
RAMMS	RVNAF Automated Material Management System
RAV	Restricted Availability
RBD	Ranger Border Defense
RC-47	Reconnaissance C-47
RCMOD	Reconnaissance Modification
RCN	Reference Control Number
RECCE	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
REMAN	Resource Management
RF	Regional Forces
RF-5	Reconnaissance F-5
RHAW	Radar Hooming and Warning
R&I	Recruitment and Induction
RLOW	Radar Lock on Warning
RO	Requisitioning Objective/Requirement Objective
ROH	Regular Overhaul
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPC	Reparable Processing Center
RPIE	Real Property Installed Equipment

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RR	Recoilless Rifle
RTV	Return to Village
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
SA	Surface to Air
SAAMA	San Antonio Air Material Area
SAFFO	Special Assistant for Field Operations
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SBD	Signal Base Depot
SCD	Special Collection Department
SCH	School
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEAL	Sea Air Land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGNINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMS	Single Integrated Military System
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SMAMA	Sacramento Air Materiel Area
SMAR	Special Mission Airlift Request
S/NFD	Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
SOW	Statement of Work
SQ	Site Qualified

xxii

CONFIDENTIAL

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SOC SVC	Social Service
SRA	Special Repair Activity
SRT	Satellite Repair Team
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STD	Standard
STS	Specialty Training Standards
STYX	North Vietnamese Navy Missile
SUB-TECH SCH	Subsidiary Technical School
SVN	South Vietnam
TA	Table of Authorization
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation System
TACC	Tactical Air Coordination Center
TAOR	Tactical Area of Operations
TC	Training Center
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Order
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Territorial Forces
TL	Total
TM	Training Manual
TMDE	Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TMS	Training Management Section
TNG	Training
TO	Technical Order

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TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile
TRAPAC	Training Pacific
TRANS	Transportation
TSN	Tan Son Nhut
TTB	Technical Translation Branch
(U)	Unclassified
UE	Unit Equipment
UHT	Undergraduate Helicopter Training
UMD	Unit Management Document
UNS	Unserviceable
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
URN	Fixed Tactical Navigation System
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID/AID	United States Agency for Internal Development
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USN	United States Navy
USSAG	United States Support Activities Group
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong

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VC-47	Very Important Person C-47
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VDA	Vietnam Dredging Agency
VDP	Vehicle Deadlined Parts
VIC	Vicinity
V-LOG	Vietnamese Logistics
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAFM	Vietnamese Air Force Manual
VNAF-ELS	Vietnamese Air Force English Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNDPC	Vietnamese Navy Data Processing Center
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
VNOSEP	Vietnamese Navy Officer Special Education Program
WAC	Womans Army Corps
WHEC	High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded In Action
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WAFC	Womens armed forces corps
WPB	Patrol Boat
WRAMA	Warner Robins Air Material Area

XXV

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WRM	War Reserve Material
YD	Floating Crane
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter
YOG	Oiler
YR	Floating Repair
YRBN	Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug
YW	Barge Water

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CHAPTER 1

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (C) BACKGROUND: Since the Ceasefire, Hanoi has developed its strongest military position in the history of the war. The enemy's objective remains the complete takeover of South Vietnam. There is contradictory information, however, as to how and when the enemy plans to accomplish this objective.

2. (C) DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE: Hanoi has improved its military position in South Vietnam by:

a. Adding eight AA and one SA-2 regiments to MR-1, two AA regiments to MR-2 and one AA regiment to MR-3.

b. Deploying the equivalent of four armored regiments.

c. Deploying the equivalent of five artillery regiments.

d. Extending and improving LOC's toward primary objective areas.

e. Establishing new and expanding old base areas.

f. Prepositioning sufficient supplies to support and sustain a major countrywide offensive.

3. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. About 12,200 short tons of supplies entered the South from NVN during December. From 4,000 to 5,000 short tons consisting of weapons, ammunition, food, engineer and construction equipment, were moved into the Laos Panhandle. How much of the Laos tonnage has been or will be moved into SVN is unknown. The following tonnages were shipped directly into the South during the last quarter:

1973	OCT	NOV	DEC
DMZ	2,200	2,200	2,200
DONG HA	<u>6,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
TOTAL	8,200	12,200	12,200

1-1

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b. The dual-lane highway through Southern Laos is complete. In late November, as the weather cleared, the NVA began to push supplies south. From 1,000 to 1,500 trucks were seen in the initial surge; convoys of over 200 were photographed. Pontoon bridges were constructed over major streams and new storage areas appeared. By 13 December, convoys had crossed the tri-border area and were struck by VNAF in Kontum Province. By the end of December, the initial surge leveled and we saw the development of a steady, long-range, shuttle operation. Elements of at least five transportation regiments are involved. Cargo includes rice, other foodstuffs and weapons.

c. The Communists apparently are not experiencing POL shortages. They expanded the pipeline system and began construction of large POL storage areas in S. Laos. The pipeline is now completed to within 20 miles of the tri-border area; further extension is anticipated. We expect the pipeline to be extended in SVN along Route 14 from its present terminus near A Luoi to at least as far south as the tri-border area. Here it will link up with the new extension from Laos. This interlinked, parallel system provides great flexibility in support of logistics along Route 14 and the Laos highway.

d. To facilitate movement southward, the North Vietnamese plan to construct a major road from north of the Mu Gia Pass, along the eastern slope of the Annamite Mountain chain, to just north of the DMZ. The road will be more than 150 KMS long. By avoiding the frequently flooded coastal strip, this road would be a major step toward the creation of an all-weather system through the mountains of the NVN Panhandle. It would also permit bypassing the Laos infiltration and logistics corridors and could be extended to connect with the Route 14 complex in South Vietnam.

e. The NVA in northern MR-1 has significantly expanded its storage facilities, as well as its capability to transship goods overland and through port facilities.

(1) Over 3,100 buildings have been constructed in the Cam Lo/Dong Ha areas and in the Ba Long Valley. Some 1,800 of these structures are suitable for storing over 400,000 short tons.

(2) The NVA has made a major effort to improve facilities in the Dong Ha area where it has constructed port facilities and improved roads. A dual-lane bridge over the Cua Viet River has recently been completed.

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(3) To handle the overland shipment, numerous truck parks and maintenance facilities have been constructed along the principal transportation routes. Photography has identified over 425 trucks in two adjacent truck parks at Cam Lo. This is the largest concentration of enemy vehicles yet photographed inside South Vietnam.

f. In Southern Laos, the NVA has established in the MR 559 area of operations its most capable and efficient rear service system to date. NVN dispatched over 23,000 men to the MR 559 system beginning in mid-September. Since MR 559 is now responsible for the new Route 14 complex in the highlands of South Vietnam and the new highway in the Lao Panhandle, its need for construction engineers is significant. Now that the road through Laos is completed, these engineer troops could be used to extend the route into bordering countries or could be employed as combat replacements.

g. The Communists have also undertaken a large-scale road construction and improvement program within South Vietnam since January. Most of the work has been done in northern MR-1, in the B-3 Front, and in northern MR-3. The most significant road construction has been the development of the Route 14 complex which is a series of previously existing routes that have been upgraded and some new connecting links. The Communists use Route 14 as their prime avenue for the movement of men and materiel through northern MR-3. At least five engineer regiments are working on this route. The latest addition is the section from southern Pleiku Province, through western Darlac to the vicinity of Bu Prang. From that point, they will be able to use other existing routes which connect with the significant LOC's in MR-3. The Route 14 complex, using bypass Route 615 in the highlands, now provides a network within South Vietnam from the DMZ to northern MR-3.

h. Improvement of the network of secondary roads, trails, and inland waterways that augment the major enemy LOC's has also been noted. This network facilitates distribution to forward units.

i. The LOC system developed since the Ceasefire provides these new advantages:

(a) complimentary Laos road and Route 14 provide an all-weather capability to and within South Vietnam;

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(b) facilitates movement and distribution from base areas to forward units;

(c) facilitates the movement of supplies obtained through illegal trading in GVN-controlled lowland areas.

4. (S) INFILTRATION ACTIVITY:

a. The NVA resumed the infiltration of battalion-sized groups in late November. Destinations, as expected, were to the B-3 Front and COSVN. The enemy plans to send nineteen 600-man groups per month from December through the end of May, a total of over 68,000 men. Thus far, a total of 14,500 men from 27 regular groups has been accepted in our 1973-1974 dry season infiltration estimate, with indications of an additional 4,400 COSVN bound personnel in eight groups in the system. Confirmation of the latter would mean that the Communists are ahead of their schedule. Since the enemy already has the resources to defend the areas he considers important, we conclude that his infiltration and logistics efforts constitute preparations for renewal of main force warfare in the South in the near future.

b. Within or adjacent to South Vietnam, the enemy has deployed over 600 tanks, some 500 of which have infiltrated since the Ceasefire. To support and control this force, the Communists have also deployed regimental and battalion-size headquarters elements throughout South Vietnam. In MR-1, we estimate that the NVA has about 300 tanks. There are 11 battalions and three regimental-level armor commands deployed in the region. In MR-2, there are four tank battalion headquarters and about 125 tanks. Farther south in MR-3, there is one regimental-level command, five tank battalion headquarters and approximately 200 tanks. No armor is accepted in GVN MR-4.

(1) During December, the NVA resumed infiltration of armor through Southern Laos. To date, at least 24 tanks have been detected. It is still too early to determine the magnitude of the current effort.

(2) The previous DAO estimates of armor infiltration and the total Communist armor force in RVN are as follows:

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	<u>DMZ/MRTTH</u>	<u>MR-5</u>	<u>B-3 FRONT</u>	<u>COSVN</u>	<u>NATIONAL</u>
In-Country 1972	60-65	5-10	10-15	25-30	100-120
Infiltrated	115-180	90-100	90-100	165-170	460-550
Total	175-245	95-110	100-115	190-200	560-670

c. Since the Ceasefire, the Communists have also infiltrated large quantities of artillery, especially to the COSVN area.

NVA ARTILLERY TOTALS (122-130MM)

DMZ-MRTTH	180-200
MR-5	70- 80
B-3 FRONT	40- 50
COSVN	80- 90
TOTAL IN-COUNTRY	370-420

5. (S) NVN STRATEGIC RESERVE:

a. There have been significant developments regarding the status of Hanoi's strategic reserve. The HQ, 316th Division was located in NVN in mid-December. While one of its subordinate regiments has remained in Laos, the other two are believed to be refitting in NVN. This division is available for refitting and subsequent assignment to the general reserve or for redeployment to SVN.

b. In early December, the 320B Division was apparently withdrawn from the Quang Tri area to Thanh Hoa (P), NVN.

c. Further south, the 341st Division, which was disbanded in 1966, apparently has been reactivated in southern Quang Binh Province. This division was never identified as a regular, full-strength division but had consisted of one infantry regiment and a number of AAA, chemical, and engineer battalions as well as some local forces. It remains to be seen what the disposition, strength and mission of this new division will be.

d. The NVA has one other division, the 968th, which is currently operating in Southern Laos but which could be considered a reserve for contingencies in SVN.

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The 308th, 312th and 308B Divisions remain in their respective areas of operations in NVN.

e. Seven divisions now constitute Hanoi's capability to reinforce the South Vietnam battlefield with division-sized forces. Three of these divisions - the 308th, 312th and 320B - have fought previously in the south.

<u>DIV</u>	<u>EST STR</u>	<u>HISTORY</u>	<u>CURRENT LOCATION</u>
308	8,500*	Previously Deployed SVN	Hanoi Area
308B	6,500	2 Regts Previously Deployed Laos	NVN Panhandle
312	8,500*	Previously Deployed SVN	NVN Panhandle
316	5,500	Laos Only	NVN Panhandle
320B	8,500*	Previously Deployed SVN	Upper NVN Panhandle
341	6,500	NVN Only	Southern NVN
968	6,800	Laos Only	Southern Laos
TOTAL	50,800		

* Deployment Strengths

f. Hanoi's manpower reserve, including the seven divisions, is as follows:

Infantry Divisions	50,800
Other Infantry Troops	27,500
Regional Forces	51,000
Militia and Self Defense	1,600,000
Armed Public Security	16,500+
Admin and Support	102,600
TOTAL	1,848,400

g. Militia and self-defense forces are part-time and consist primarily of farmers and factory workers of both sexes.

h. Non-availability of trained military manpower is not a limitation on NVN's capability to reinforce its forces in South Vietnam. Studies of NVN manpower resources in 1970 concluded that Hanoi could dispatch, indefinitely, from 100,000 to 125,000 personnel each year without seriously taxing the infiltration or training system, or depleting the pool of able-bodied manpower. Hanoi could

1-6
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dispatch 250,000 personnel, similar to its Tet '68 effort, for one or two years but could not continue such an effort indefinitely. Trained manpower could be drawn from garrison troops, regional forces and militia, as was done in 1972. The Communists have the manpower resources, the system, and the ability to significantly augment their forces in the South.

6. (S) AIR DEFENSE:

a. The Communists have doubled the size of the air defense force within the Republic. They have added new weapons and expanded the air defense system into new areas. At the time of the Ceasefire, the Communists had 12 AAA regiments deployed or in the process of deploying in northern MR-1 and one in MR-3. Since that time, 11 AAA regiments and one SAM regiment (SA-2) have deployed into SVN. Extension of AA coverage into the A Shau Valley and along internal LOC's has forced VNAF up to altitudes where interdiction is of questionable effectiveness. The introduction of the SA-3 GOA has increased the capability in NVN.

b. In Military Region 1, the air defenses now include 20 AAA regiments and one SAM regiment. The total threat in the area now includes over 1,200 guns ranging from 12.7MM to 100MM with an effective AAA threat up to 41,000 feet. The AA threat in Quang Tri is such that it is doubtful that VNAF could survive an attempt to destroy enemy supply and military bases in this area. Two AA regiments each are currently deployed in MR-2 and MR-3.

7. (S) NVN AIR FORCE THREAT:

a. The offensive air threat to SVN consists of MIG aircraft deployed in a counter-air role and MIG's, jet light bombers, and some light transports configured for ground attack. The use of MIG aircraft in a counter-air role is the most likely one at the present time for these reasons:

- (1) Combat experienced NVN pilots.
- (2) Psychological impact of MIG operations.
- (3) Protection of NVN SAM and AAA defenses.
- (4) Suitable Ground Control Intercept (GCI) facilities.

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21 11 11

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b. Aircraft and armaments which could be used from Dong Hoi, NVN are as follows:

	<u>MIG-15</u>	<u>MIG-17</u>	<u>MIG-19</u>	<u>MIG-21</u>
Combat Radius	330NM	280NM	310NM	360NM
GCI Control	120NM	120NM	120NM	120NM
Maximum Armament	1X37MM Gun	2XAtoll Missiles	2XAtoll Missiles	4XAtoll Missiles
	2X23MM Guns	1X37MM Gun	3X30MM Guns	1X23MM Gun
		2X23MM Guns		

c. The maximum combat radius for aircraft operating against targets inside South Vietnam is dependent upon such factors as combat load, flight profile, and location of staging airfields. The primary constraint on NVN aircraft is the effective range of GCI facilities. The southernmost GCI facility - at Dong Hoi - provides the NVAF with a counter-air defense capability over northern MR-1. This capability could be extended further south, if aircraft and air-control facilities were moved accordingly. The combination of NVN air and air defense forces could provide the Communists with a significant degree of aerial superiority in northern MR-1.

d. The air-to-ground role for NVAF is secondary for these reasons:

- (1) Less than 10% of training is devoted to this type of activity.
- (2) Lack of an effective air navigation system.
- (3) Unfamiliarity with target terrain.
- (4) Lack of recent activity by bomber and transport ground attack force.

e. NVAF could, however, use low-level approaches to attack some targets in MR-1. The combat radii and maximum armament of MIG aircraft are as follows:

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	<u>MIG-17</u>	<u>MIG-19</u>	<u>MIG-21</u>
Combat Radius			
Optimum	95NM	140NM	330NM
Low Altitude	--	--	180NM
Maximum Armament	2X550LB Bombs	2X550LB Bombs	2X1100LB Bombs

f. The MIG-21 is the only aircraft with an extended low-altitude radius which could be used in air-to-ground operations. The IL-28 jet light bomber with MIG-21 escorts could also bomb as far south as MR-4. Missions would be primarily for psychological impact. This is because of the limited number of IL-28's in the NVN inventory and their vulnerability.

g. The NVN MIG Order of Battle is as follows:

<u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>MIG-21</u>	<u>MIG-19</u>	<u>MIG-15/17</u>
Bai Thuong	0	0	12
Dong Suong	7	0	0
Hoa Lac	0	0	2
Kep	0	0	52
Kien An	0	0	2
Phuc Yen	65	0	1
Yen Bai	0	39	22
Yunnan, China	0	0	22
Total	72	39	113

8. (S) ENEMY THREAT AND INTENTIONS BY REGION:

a. MR-1.

(1) Logistics: Improvements since the Ceasefire have given the enemy significant advantages. Many LOC's have been improved or newly-constructed, providing greatly improved flexibility in deployment. There are numerous new storage facilities close to forward positions. New POL dumps and the pipeline enhance mobility. Several tank parks provide forward positions for armor deployment. Together, these improvements provide the enemy with an improved ability to support a major offensive.

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(2) Summary of Enemy Order of Battle:

Divisions	5 (+1 AA)
Regiments	32 (+20 AA)
Combat Troops	85-105,000
Guerrillas	5-10,000
Admin Services	30-35,000

Total	120-150,000
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(3) Threat Areas: The traditional enemy threat areas have been Quang Tri, Hue and the Que Son Valley. Danang may be developing as an additional problem for RVNAF. The enemy in MR-1 currently has all the arms, equipment and supplies necessary to conduct and sustain a major offensive of the 1972 level.

(a) The greatest threat is in Quang Tri. The threat north of the city consists of approximately 20,000 combat personnel in five infantry regiments, supported by five artillery regiments and one tank regiment. To the west and southwest, the enemy has four infantry regiments supported by two artillery regiments and armor. During December, the 320B NVA Division was withdrawn from SVN. This move, however, does not degrade the capability of the NVA to conduct a major offensive in the region. The total enemy assets in Quang Tri are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
2 Infantry Divisions	16,200
4 Independent Infantry Regiments	5,300
7 Artillery Regiments	4,900
1 Armor Regiment (-)	1,400
13 Independent Battalions	3,000
Total	30,800

Armor	175-245 (T-34/54 Tanks)
Artillery	180-200 (122/130MM)

(b) The second area of major concern is the threat to Hue. The enemy has some 15,000 combat troops in the area, in five infantry regiments, supported by an artillery regiment and possibly two tank battalions. Although the enemy lacks the capability of launching a sustained offensive to capture or isolate the city, recent reporting has indicated a growing threat. An additional division would have to be moved into the area

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prior to a decisive attack on Hue and there are no indications that the enemy is reinforcing. Total enemy assets in the Hue area are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
324B NVA Div (HQ)	2,000
29th NVA Regt	2,000
803rd NVA Regt	2,000
812th NVA Regt	2,000
4th NVA Regt	1,000
6th NVA Regt	1,500
675B NVA Arty Regt	900
201st NVA Tank Regt (-)	650
Independent Bns (11)	<u>3,200</u>
Total	15,250
Armor	20-40
Artillery	30-40

(c) The third area of major concern is the Que Son Valley on the border of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Enemy forces in the valley are approximately 12,000 combat personnel in three infantry regiments, supported by one artillery regiment and one tank regiment. Major Units are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
711th NVA Div (HQ)	2,000
31st NVA Regt	2,000
38th NVA Regt	1,800
270th NVA Regt	1,800
572nd NVA Arty Regt	900
573rd NVA Tank Regt	900
Independent Bns (17)	<u>3,000</u>
Total	12,400
Armor	70-90
Artillery	50-60

(d) The newest area of concern is Danang. Although the enemy does not pose a serious threat, there are indications that he feels that cutting the Hai Van Pass to the north and LOC's southwest of Danang could force ARVN to relinquish control of areas north of the pass and eventually cause the fall of the city. While enemy

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forces in this area are inferior to ARVN, the enemy could shift additional units to create a credible threat to Danang. Recent activity, reorganization of forces and LOC improvements along the axes leading to Danang offer the enemy an improved position and greater tactical flexibility. The enemy's capture of Bach Ma Mountain leaves only the ARVN outpost at Deo Hai Van capable of observing enemy activity along Route 548, one of the principal approaches to the city. The following enemy assets are in the general area:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
4th Regiment	1,000
6th Regiment	1,500
4th (Quang Da) Regiment	1,000
Independent Bns (8)	<u>1,400</u>
Total	4,900

(4) The near term outlook for MR-1:

- (a) Gradual increase in level of activity.
- (b) Improvement of enemy's LOC's.
- (c) Continued rebuilding of local forces.
- (d) Continued resupply and stockpiling.

b. MR-2.

(1) Logistics: Recently-constructed roads provide the enhanced resupply and infiltration capabilities. The enemy's Route 14 complex has now been extended southward from Pleiku Province through Darlac to northern Quang Duc Province. Enemy activity in Quang Duc since early November was intended to eliminate the last GVN outposts on the RVN/Khmer border and extend the Route 14 complex into COSVN. The enemy is also extending and improving his east-west supply capabilities to link more effectively the central highlands and the central coast. B-3 Front engineer elements have recently completed a new road linking the Dak To logistics site in Kontum Province with Son Ha District in Quang Ngai which will join the enemy's new Route 517 into Ba To District in Quang Ngai and the northern An Lao Valley in Binh Dinh. He also has improved secondary roads to create a new "Highway 5" linking the northern An Lao

1-12

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logistics complex with the lowlands of Tam Quan District in Binh Dinh. Concurrently, the 470th Transportation Group has begun construction on a new road which will eventually link the Duc Co logistics site in Pleiku Province with central Binh Dinh. To complete this road, however, the enemy would have to cut and hold QL-14 and QL-19. Group 470 also has constructed a secondary road linking Base Area 701 in Pleiku and Base Area 238 in Darlac Province. These new roads link-up with previously existing LOC's to give the enemy a vastly-improved potential to resupply his forces in critical areas throughout the region.

(2) Summary of Enemy Order of Battle:

Divisions	3 (+1 Equiv)
Regiments	16 (+2 AA)
Combat Troops	30-35,000
Guerrillas	5-10,000
Admin Services	15-20,000
Total	50-65,000

(3) Threat Areas: The enemy threat in MR-2 is in four major areas: Binh Dinh, Kontum, Pleiku, and Quang Duc.

(a) In the Binh Dinh/Quang Ngai area, enemy activity has been relatively high during the past 90 days, primarily in reaction to ARVN clearing and resource-denial operations. Enemy assets are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
2nd NVA Div (HQ)	2,000
1st NVA Regt	1,700
52nd NVA Regt	1,700
141st NVA Regt	1,700
3rd NVA Div (HQ)	1,400
2nd NVA Regt	900
12th NVA Regt	1,200
21st NVA Regt	800
Independent Bns (17)	<u>4,000</u>
Total	15,400
Armor	20-25
Artillery	20-25

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(b) In Kontum, the enemy threat consists of the 10th NVA Division, an independent infantry regiment, one artillery regiment, and one AA regiment. Most enemy elements have withdrawn from contact since the end of the Trung Nghia/Polei Krong Campaign in early September. Since that time, only one regiment has been in sporadic contact at any given time. Enemy forces in Kontum could be prepared to renew limited offensive action within the next 30-60 days. Enemy assets in Kontum are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
10th NVA Div (HQ)	1,900
28th NVA Regt	700
66th NVA Regt	900
40th NVA Arty Regt/B-3	1,400
24th NVA Regt/B-3	900
593rd AAA Regt	900
Independent Bns (6)	<u>1,100</u>
Total	7,800
Armor	70-80
Artillery	30-35

(c) The primary threat in Pleiku is the 320th NVA Division. Following nearly a year's standdown from combat, the enemy in Pleiku seemed to be preparing for a renewal of activity and a limited offensive in late September. ARVN reaction and redeployments apparently forced the enemy to deploy prematurely and in a more widely-dispersed manner than he had planned. Thus, the enemy's ability to mass adequate forces for an offensive seems to be blunted for the present. Enemy assets are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
320th NVA Div (HQ)	2,000
48th NVA Regt	1,150
64th NVA Regt	1,250
26th NVA Regt/B-3 Front	1,000
46th AAA Regt/Group 470	900
95B Regt/10th Div	900
Independent Bns (4)	<u>800</u>
Total	8,000

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(d) Quang Duc: The newly-formed enemy threat in Quang Duc Province consists of an approximate one division-equivalent, supported by AAA, armor, and artillery. Following four years of relatively low-level local force activity, the enemy moved elements of four regiments into Quang Duc Province from MR-3 to close the RVN/Khmer border in November and December 1973. Following his initial success in this mission, the enemy assumed a defensive posture against an ARVN counter-thrust with sizeable reinforcements. The enemy currently possesses only a limited offensive capability, unless reinforced, within the next 30 days. Enemy assets in Quang Duc Province are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
174th Regt/5th NVA Div (-)	500
205th NVA Regt	1,000
271st NVA Regt	800
T-29 Sapper Regt/429th Sapper Group	800
Independent Bns (4)	600
Total	3,700
Armor	20
Artillery	4-6 (105/155)

(4) The near term outlook for MR-2:

Enemy intentions in the short term are to defend "liberated areas" and lines of communications, conduct harassing attacks, and prepare for major offensive action. The enemy currently has only a relatively limited capability of launching a major offensive. This results from a lack of personnel which could be offset by March if current infiltration trends continue. The possibility of limited but very serious offensive action remains, however, in the major threat areas during the next 30-60 days. ARVN assets are spread thin and the enemy retains his traditional option of choosing the location and timing of offensive action. This advantage may have been tempered somewhat by ARVN operations in Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. Nevertheless, enemy orchestration of his actions throughout the region could produce considerable strain on ARVN's ability to react adequately, particularly in northern Binh Dinh Province.

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c. MR-3.

(1) Logistics: Communist forces continue to improve and expand already existing routes and build new routes throughout the northern part of the region. Recent indicators suggest that the Route 14B complex will be the principal route for moving supplies into COSVN, thus providing the probable reason for the high COSVN interest in the Bu Prang area. Despite fairly extensive VNAF bombing, they continue to enlarge and upgrade logistical bases near the SVN/Cambodia border such as Loc Ninh, Katum and Thien Ngon special logistical centers. Improvements have been noted in forward base areas, such as those in the Michelin Plantation, near the Tay Ninh/Hau Nghia/Binh Duong Province border areas, and east of Phu Giao. These bases and routes are protected by newly deployed anti-aircraft defenses. Rear service elements, supported by local and main force units, have been engaged in a concerted, and at least partially successful campaign, despite GVN countermeasures, to obtain maximum amounts of the current rice harvest to supply their ever-increasing needs in the region. Taken together, logistics improvements in MR-3 have alleviated most of the serious distribution problems that have inhibited enemy operations in the past.

(2) Summary of Enemy Order of Battle:

Divisions	3 (+1 AD)
Regiments	20 (+2 AA)
Combat Personnel	33-36,000
Guerrillas	2-5,000
Admin Services	<u>28-33,000</u>
Total	63-74,000
Armor	190-200
Artillery	80-90

(3) Threat Areas: The major threat is to the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, with a secondary threat to Tay Ninh and its LOC's. The isolated and semi-isolated enclaves in Binh Duong, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces are also very vulnerable, especially if stated Communist intentions of eliminating these outposts in the "liberated" areas come to fruition. Key civilian oriented installations and LOC's in the southern part of the region could also be targeted, as was the case in the sapper attack against Nha Be POL dump in early December.

1-16

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(a) The principal threat to the Saigon-Bien Hoa area comes from the northern part of the region, although enemy forces could also stage out of the Parrot's Beak to move on the city from the west. Infantry would be supported by tanks, artillery and AA weapons. Bien Hoa Air Base would be particularly susceptible to artillery attacks from enemy positions east of Phu Giao. Although all forces in the military region would have supportive missions in any attack on the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, the principal enemy threat is:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
3 Inf Divisions (5,7,9)	11,000
4 Inf Regiments (101,C-50, 201,274)	3,500
2 Arty Regiments (42,208)	1,700
5 Sapper Groups (367,429,113, 115,117)	5,300
Independent Bns (16)	<u>2,500</u>
Total	24,000
Armor	100-150
Artillery	50- 60

(b) The secondary threat area is Tay Ninh and the LOC's linking the Cao Dai Holy See with Saigon. Communist forces are currently deployed in forward staging areas to the north and east, and could also deploy a major unit from the Parrot's Beak to strike along key LOC's in Hau Nghia Province. The principal enemy threat is:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
5th NVA Division (HQ) (-)	900
E-1 NVA Regiment	800
E-6 NVA Regiment	800
6th Bn, 174th NVA Regiment	200
271st NVA Regiment/9th NVA Division	1,000
C-50 NVA Regiment	800
3 Sapper Groups (367,429,117)	4,300
101 NVA Regiment	800
1 Artillery Regiment (42)	800
10 LF Battalions	<u>1,500</u>
Total	11,900

1-17

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Armor
Artillery

60-80
20-30

(c) There are several isolated or semi-isolated GVN enclaves in the region which are extremely vulnerable. The Communists could easily mass large infantry formations, supported by armor and artillery, to seize any of these isolated posts. At least one NVA regiment is currently deployed around each of these camps. Elements of the 9th NVA Division reportedly are preparing fighting positions for future attacks against Tri Tam and Tonle Cham. Along Route 13, RVNAF has isolated outposts at An Loc and Chon Thanh. Well prepared positions manned by the 7th and 9th NVA Divisions, have prevented ARVN movement north from Lai Khe along this important route. In early January, elements of the 209th NVA Regiment ambushed an ARVN unit near Chon Thanh. Chon Thanh has been mentioned in several reports as a target for early 1974. Since the departure of some ranger units, An Loc may now be more vulnerable, especially if more AA units are moved into the area. The largest isolated enclave is the Song Be/Phuoc Binh area of Phuoc Long Province. Should the Communists decide to attempt to overrun a province capital, this one might be the logical choice. Success in attacks against these isolated camps would provide the Communists with free movement along important routes and would accomplish the stated intention of eliminating GVN presence in the "liberated" areas.

(d) The final threat area is the series of important GVN installations and LOC's in the southern part of the region. Attacks along important routes from Saigon to Vung Tau, or Route 4 to the Delta, or such GVN installations as POL dumps or power stations could serve the purpose of undermining civilian support for the government, tie down ARVN forces and exacerbate current GVN economic problems. There are nearly 5,000 enemy forces in the southern part of the region, including the 274th and 33d NVA Regiments.

(4) The Near Term Outlook for MR-3: Communist forces still lack the necessary manpower to bring units up to the desired strength for a major offensive but the current infiltration effort to COSVN could eliminate this shortcoming by March. Available evidence does not point to a major offensive in MR-3 for the next 60 days. But Communist forces may attempt to eliminate GVN positions in and on the fringes of the "liberated" areas, while also improving their offensive capabilities. Their near-term objectives probably are:

1-18
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(a) Increase combat unit strengths and offensive capabilities.

(b) Strengthen defenses and control in the "liberated areas."

(c) Enlarge rear and forward base areas.

(d) Procure rice supplies.

(e) Develop resettlement communities in the "liberated areas."

(f) Undermine GVN influence and economy.

(g) Eliminate isolated ARVN bases and outposts.

d. MR-4.

(1) Logistics: Despite continuing GVN harassments against base areas and along major resupply routes into and throughout the Delta, and a concerted GVN campaign to limit trading with the Communists, NVA/VC forces have still been able to move and acquire supplies sufficient to replace expenditures. Delta forces obtain most of their foodstuffs and medicines locally. Their munitions are moved from Cambodian base areas along Infiltration Routes 1-A and 1-B into Dinh Tuong, and along Route 1-C from the Seven Mountains area through Kien Giang into the U-Minh Forest and Chuong Thien Province. With increasing risk, forces in the northern Delta can move supplies along 1-A and 1-B, but the movement of supplies down 1-C has become more difficult due to RVNAF successes in the Seven Mountains last fall. The secondary method of procurement is from RVNAF, either by sweeping up battlefield losses or by accommodation. The third method is seaborne infiltration. This method may assume greater importance if RVNAF operations along major infiltration corridors makes movement along those routes more hazardous. Most seaborne infiltration reportedly occurs on the western coast, although some sources have mentioned the eastern coast of An Xuyen, Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa. The recent reports of increased seaborne off-loading on the western coast may reflect the RVNAF successes in interdicting transport along 1-C. Overall, the VC/NVA logistical system in the Delta has provided sufficient supplies to meet current requirements and to stockpile for brief, Delta-wide flare-ups.

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(2) Summary of Enemy Order of Battle:

Divisions	1
Regiments	14
Combat Personnel	19-21,000
Guerrillas	10-13,000
Admin Services	<u>8-10,000</u>
Total	37-44,000

(3) Threat Areas: In Military Region 4, the principal threats are in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc, and in Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong Provinces. The enemy's capability in Chau Doc has been diminished, but in the other areas Communist forces have been husbanding their resources, while applying maximum harassment measures.

(a) Chau Doc: After serious setbacks at the hands of ARVN rangers last fall, the 1st NVA Divisional forces in Chau Doc have been regrouping. They now appear to be in the initial stages of reestablishing positions in order to support infiltration into the lower Delta via Route 1-C. Enemy strength in Chau Doc is:

1st NVA Div (HQ)	400
101D Regiment	800
(44th Regiment) Believed Disbanded	
(52nd Regiment) Believed Disbanded	
Total	<u>1,200</u>

(b) Chuong Thien remains a problem area for the GVN. Neither RVNAF nor the VC/NVA has gained momentum in securing territory in contested areas and no major departures from this pattern are foreseen within the short term. The enemy threat in Chuong Thien is as follows:

95A NVA Regiment	900
18B NVA Regiment	1,100
D-1 NVA Regiment	1,100
D-2 NVA Regiment	1,150
Independent Battalions	<u>500</u>
Total	4,650

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(c) In Dinh Tuong Province, enemy forces appear to be approaching the end of a recuperative period necessitated by a series of major RVNAF victories in early December. During this phase Communist forces south of QL-4 have maintained a relatively low profile, while those units to the north of QL-4 have continued to reduce RVNAF critical observation posts. The enemy threat in Dinh Tuong is as follows:

24th NVA Regiment	800
DT.1 NVA Regiment	900
Z.15 NVA Regiment	850
Z.18 NVA Regiment	900
207th NVA Regiment (-)	400
Independent Battalions (5)	<u>750</u>

Total 4,600

(4) The Near Term Enemy Outlook for MR-4:

(a) Maintain, consolidate and defend "liberated areas" and infiltration corridors.

(b) Attack RVNAF outposts and troop locations which impede logistical movements.

(c) Conduct attacks by fire, sappers and sabotage on critical lines of communication, supply points, power stations and fuel dumps.

(d) Continue supply and procurement activities to maintain combat readiness.

(e) Pursue civilian and military proselyting campaigns.

(f) Disrupt the rice harvest and exploit GVN economic problems.

(g) React vigorously to RVNAF probes into sensitive areas.

(h) Prepare for possible highpoint near end of January.

9. (S) ENEMY STRENGTH:

a. Throughout the Republic, the enemy has all the armor, artillery and supplies to launch and sustain a major offensive of the 1972 level. He probably lacks

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the manpower in all areas except MR-1. Current infiltration trends indicate that he will alleviate the most significant shortages by the end of February 1974 at the latest. The total enemy strength in SVN is estimated as follows:

	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>
Divisions	5 (+1 AD)	3 (+1 Equiv)	3 (+1 AD)
Regiments	32 (+20 AA)	16 (+2 AA)	21 (+2 AA)
Combat Personnel	85-105,000	30-35,000	37-39,000
Guerrilla	5-10,000	5-10,000	2-5,000
Admin Services	30-35,000	15-20,000	28-33,000
Total	120-150,000	50-65,000	67-77,000

	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>National</u>
Divisions	1	12 (+2 AD +1 Equiv)
Regiments	14	83 (+24 AA)
Combat Personnel	19-21,000	171-200,000
Guerrilla	10-13,000	22-38,000
Admin Services	8-10,000	81-98,000
Total	37-44,000	274-336,000

b. The enemy's capabilities permit him to pursue any of the following courses of action:

(1) Political: To create a government within SVN capable of competing with GVN economically and politically.

(2) Limited Military Offensive: To conduct a phased-military offensive designed to create a military, economic and political situation beyond the capability of GVN to manage.

(3) Major Military Offensive: To cause the immediate collapse of the government and the armed forces. The enemy is committing the manpower to raise his combat forces to levels that will permit initiation of either of the military options.

10. (S) ENEMY INTENTIONS:

a. Concerning the prospects for a major offensive in 1974, there is no question that, since the January Ceasefire, the Communists have developed, and still are developing their strongest position in the history of

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the war. The following factors have significantly increased the capability of enemy forces to launch a sustained, country-wide offensive:

- (1) Infiltration of men and materiel, including tanks and artillery.
- (2) Development of a coordinated LOC network.
- (3) Development of major logistics complexes within SVN.
- (4) Upgrading of air defense system.
- (5) Reconstitution of the strategic reserve in NVN.

b. The Communists have abandoned any illusions that primarily political actions can secure their overall goal. A return to a military solution is considered inevitable. The Communists have the capability and intention of eventually escalating combat activity into a decisive country-wide offensive. The major question is the timing for such an offensive.

c. Despite the enemy's capability to launch a decisive offensive in the near future, available evidence does not suggest that one is imminent. The preponderance of evidence suggests that, at least for the first quarter of 1974, Communist forces will conduct their activities along the lines of a limited, phased offensive, focusing on the elimination of isolated ARVN outposts and attacks on main LOC's preparatory to possible later attacks on major province capitals. Such activities could gradually escalate into a major country-wide offensive. One high level COSVN rallier referred to this 1974 policy as a "strategic raids campaign", designed to strike RVNAF on a selective basis.

d. The Communists apparently believe that a phased offensive will not result in direct U.S. intervention. A phased offensive also could be rationalized within the framework of the Ceasefire Agreement. Current propaganda still seems to indicate Communist willingness to operate, at this time, within the broadly developed outlines of the agreement. This phased activity would be aimed at weakening the GVN politically and economically by applying selective military pressure, forcing the GVN to "properly" implement the Peace Agreement. A phased

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campaign would permit the Communists to improve their position in preparation for a decisive confrontation by building and strengthening their infrastructure, improving and expanding their combat capability, improving military and civilian proselyting efforts, continuing to solidify their control within the "liberated areas", and continuing to tie down and immobilize RVNAF.

e. In conclusion, the Communists have developed their strongest military posture yet in South Vietnam but available intelligence indicates they will not launch a decisive offensive in the immediate future. Instead, they will continue to operate within the framework of the phased offensive. Given their advanced state of preparedness for a decisive offensive, however, the situation could change radically very quickly. Beyond the first quarter of 1974, the possibility of an offensive depends on the Communist interpretation of a complex set of factors:

- (1) The degree of success of the phased offensive.
- (2) The readiness of combat forces in the south.
- (3) The readiness of the strategic reserve in the north.
- (4) Perception of U.S. response.
- (5) Perception of ARVN capabilities.

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CHAPTER 2

FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. OVERVIEW: Overall activity has increased during this Quarter. In the highlands of MR 2, Quang Duc was the scene of heavy fighting. Sharp contacts continued in Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Tay Ninh Provinces. In December enemy activity increased to the highest levels since the Ceasefire in MR 4. A decrease in activity was noted only in MR 1. VNAF has conducted heavy pre-emptive strikes in MR 2 and 3 and continues to support ground combat operations in all MRs except MR 1. Sapper and terrorist activity continues in all regions.

2. MILITARY REGION 1:

Activity in MR 1 generally decreased during the period. Weather conditions were unfavorable during most of the October-December time frame as Typhoon Opal swept over the northern half of the Republic. Flooding caused extensive damage to Lines of Communication (LOC) and to the rice crop. North of the Hai Van Pass, activity was concentrated in the Bo River corridor SW of Hue. Elements of the Third Regiment were subjected to ground probes and major ABF throughout the Quarter. Several outposts were abandoned due to flood waters from Typhoon Opal. Airborne units were harassed by ABF during early October but since then, the AO has been quiet. Bach Ma Mountain was lost to the enemy on 12 October. This high ground overlooks QL-1, Hue Phu Bai and Danang. Using Bach Ma as an observation point, the enemy could direct fire on any one of the three areas. ARVN has no plans to retake Bach Ma until late March because cloud will limit observation until then.

In southern MR 1, the Que Son Valley and the Arizona Territory in Quang Nam Province, as well as the length of QL-1 in Quang Ngai Province were moderately active, although activity declined during December. Regional Force (RF) units carried most of the load in RVN's attempt to salvage the remainder of the rice crop and prevent Communist cadre from confiscating/reaping any of the harvest. As the flood waters receded, incidents increased but are currently below August-September levels.

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The Ranger Reorganization in MR 1 had little effect on existing units. The 14th and 15th Rgr Grp Hqs were activated, the 1st Rgr Grp was redesignated as the 12th Rgr Grp, and the 94th Rgr Bn was redeployed from MR 4 to Phu Bai.

(FIGURE 2-1)


3. MILITARY REGION 2:

The Le Minh Ranger Camp in western Pleiku Province remains in enemy hands. ARVN units are occupying defensive positions west of Pleiku City, ostensibly because of the fighting in Quang Duc Province. Quang Duc was the center of activity as Communist units, supported with armor, overran Bu Prang and Bu Bong Camps. Dak Song, to the North was taken 6 November. LTL 8B and QL-14 into MR-3 were cut until elements of the 96th Rgr Bn retook Dak Song on 28 November. Again on 4 December, Kien Duc, at the junction of QL-14 and Rt 344, was leveled and taken by armor supported Communist troops. The entire 23D Division was moved into Quang Duc Province while the 22D Division was shifted into Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. Kien Duc was reoccupied 10 December by 3/45th Inf and 23D Div Recon Company using intensive Tac Air support and artillery. Resupply of the 23D Division is being accomplished by road from Ban Me Thuot to Dak Song on QL-14, thence LTL 8B to Gia Nghia, the Division headquarters. Some airlift to Nhon Co and Gia Nghia airfields is being utilized. VNAF Tac Air dealt major blows to Communist resupply efforts 13-14 Dec when 40 trucks were destroyed in western Kontum Province. Also on 14 Dec, 22 trucks were destroyed and 50 en KBA 22 KM north of Kontum City when an enemy supply column was attacked in the open. The VNAF has given a good account of itself in MR 2 during this quarter. A number of tanks and over 150 trucks have been destroyed by VNAF Tacair. The 4th and 6th Rgr Groups are providing security for Binh Dinh Province. The remaining seaboard of MR 2 is held by RF/PF units, with all regular ARVN troops located in the western provinces.

2-2

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2-3

Figure 2-1

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Typhoon Opal ravaged much of the MR 2 lowlands as she did in MR 1. The eastern provinces are still drying out and this probably accounts for the lack of Communist activity in this area. ARVN's ability to retain this territory under heavy enemy pressure is fair, at best.

The Ranger Reorganization was evident in MR 2. The 2D Rgr Grp was redesignated the 23D Rgr Grp, the 25th Rgr Grp Hq and 67 Rgr Bn were redeployed from MR 4, and the 4th and 6th Rgr Grps (JGS Reserve) were assigned to Binh Dinh Province.


(FIGURE 2-2)

4. MILITARY REGION 3:

Activity in MR 3 increased steadily during this period. Southern Tay Ninh, Hau Nghai (north of QL-1) and southern Binh Duong Provinces reported the majority of ground action. This area is a principal infiltration route into Saigon. Government and military leaders believe that the Communist forces have the capability for executing an all-out push at any time. Beginning in mid-October, ARVN Commanders, fearful of Communist materiel buildup in northern MR 3, called intense pre-emptive air strikes against targets in Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. The Bien Hoa - Xuan Loc Railroad was interdicted frequently and for the first time, river activity was significant; four PBRs and two LCM-6 crafts were sunk by enemy mines or sappers. Song Be became more isolated because of the Quang Duc operations. Song Be has been completely dependent upon aerial resupply since 14 Nov. Bien Hoa AB was attacked 6 Nov with 122MM rockets, resulting in three F5A aircraft destroyed and one damaged. Miscellaneous structures and the runway were also damaged in the attack. Subsequent sweep operations in the suspected rocket-launching area were unfruitful. The Shell POL storage area at Nha Be was destroyed 2 Dec by a sapper attack. Although originally thought to be a rocket attack, photos taken clearly show that the damage was caused by well placed charges, not random rocket hits.

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2-5

Figure 2-2

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A well publicized Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) operation was ambushed 15 Dec southwest of Saigon. The JCRC team and equipment were marked with international colors and unarmed. Nevertheless, they were fired upon with automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. One US and one RVN were killed and seven US/RVN wounded. The Province Chiefs of Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia were replaced during the quarter. The Hau Nghia Province Chief was believed to be corrupt while the Tay Ninh Province Chief's removal was more politically oriented. Commanders of the 5th and 25th Divisions were relieved due to unaggressive tactics against the VC/NVA. The Corps Commander was also replaced during the period. The 3rd and 5th Ranger Groups were redesignated the 31st and 32nd Ranger Groups respectively, and the 33d Ranger Group was formed. The 7th Ranger Group (with 3BNs), a part of the JGS reserve, was moved to MR 3.

(FIGURE 2-3)

5. MILITARY REGION 4:

Activity in MR 4 increased to the highest levels in December since the initial cease fire accord. Instances of terrorism and assassination continue to rise along with main force attacks on RVNAF.

Dinh Tuong, Chuong Thien, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong and Kien Giang Provinces were the most active, in that order. Chau Doc Province has been quiet since Ranger elements forced the enemy off the high ground at Nui Gial in late October. A change from stationary to mobile defense operations has enabled RVN to seize the initiative in those provinces principally defended by territorial forces and to slow down infiltration and protect the rice harvest. Approximately 30 percent of MR 4 incidents occurred in Dinh Tuong. The areas south of QL 4 and adjacent to TL-20/LTL-29 in Cai Lay and Cai Be Districts were especially active and short term interdictions of the routes occurred during the quarter. Activity in the Tri Phap area (NW Dinh Tuong/SE Kien Phong Provinces) continued at past levels as ARVN probed the periphery of the

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


Figure 2-3

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Communist controlled sector. Chuong Thien and eastern Kien Giang Provinces reported relatively heavy activity. As in MR 3, river incidents increased, the naval base at Kien An was attacked 10 Nov 73 and four NVV vessels were sunk on the Cai Lon River vicinity Kien Hung 6 Aug 73. RF operations in Kien Hoa prompted sharp reaction from local force VC/NVA. The remaining provinces reported increased activity as RVNAF stepped up operations to assure that harvested rice did not find its way into enemy hands. Binh Thuy AB was attacked with 122MM rockets 29 Nov 73. This is the first time rockets have been used against the Can Tho/Binh Thuy area since Cease Fire I. Areas of Operation (AO) have been changed as a result of the Ranger reorganization. The 44th Special Tactical Zone was eliminated and the 7th, 9th and 21st Div AO were altered. All Ranger elements are now located in MRs 1, 2, and 3. The Province Chiefs of Phong Dinh, Kien Tuong, Kien Phong and Kien Giang were replaced during the Quarter.

(FIGURE 2-4)

6. SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS: Fighting continues with little adherence to the accords by either signatory. Speculation on a new enemy offensive is prevalent. Preparations are being made to protect Saigon from the North and North-west. Government tactics currently include large scale TACAIR strikes in MRs 2, 3, and 4 to preclude massing of the enemy. Enemy air defenses limit VNAF capabilities in all MRs. Figure 2-5 is a listing of SA-7 firings and results since 28 Jan 73. VNN riverine patrolling increased and some losses were suffered during the Quarter. Sapper activity is on the upsurge. Losses since Cease Fire I due to sappers are shown in Figure 2-6. Terrorist acts, political assassinations and harassment by local elements will continue to cause uneasiness among government and military officials. Since the Cease Fire, major battles have been fought in all regions. A summary of selected battles is shown in Figure 2-7. Statistical data including trends for the reporting period are shown in Figures 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-16 (A and B), 2-17 (A and B), 2-18 (A and B), and 2-19 (A and B).

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


Figure 2-4

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SA-7 CEASEFIRE RECAP

DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-1	QUANG TRI	A-37	5KM SW QUANG TRI	A/C DEST
	QUANG TRI	2 ICCS UH-1	VIC LAO BAO	1 A/C DAM; 1 A/C DEST, SEVEN KIA
	THUA THIEN	U-17	21KM SW HUE	NEG
	THUA THIEN	UH-1	18KM SW HUE	NEG

DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-2	QUANG DUC	A-37	8KM NW BU PRANG	A/C DEST: PILOT RECOVERED
	QUANG DUC	AC-47	29KM NW GIA NGHIA	NEG
	QUANG DUC	AL-H	VIC DAK SONG	NEG
	QUANG DUC	AC-47	VIC KIEN DUC	NEG
	QUANG DUC	AC-47	4KM SW KIEN DUC	NEG
	QUANG DUC	A-37	5KM NW KIEN DUC	A/C DEST: PILOT RECOVERED
	QUANG DUC	AC-47	5KM NE BU PRANG	NEG

DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-3	BINH DUONG	UH-1	13KM N CU CHI	NEG
	TAY NINH	CH-47	2KMS NUI BA DEN	NEG
	BINH LONG	AL-H	VIC TONLE CHAM	A/C DEST, 1 MIA
	BINH LONG	AC-119	VIC TONLE CHAM	NEG
	BINH LONG	AL-H	VIC TONLE CHAM	A/C DEST: 1 MIA
	BINH LONG	F-5	16KM SW AN LOC	A/C DEST: 1 MIA
	TAY NINH	L-19	VIC TONLE CHAM	NEG
	TAY NINH	UH-1H	10KM SE NUI BA DEN	NEG
	TAY NINH	CH-47	2KM SE NUI BA DEN	A/C DEST: 5 KIA
	TAY NINH	2 UH-1H	13KM NE TAY NINH	NEG
	BIEN HOA	AC-119	15 KM NE CONG THANH	NEG
	TAY NINH	CH-47	12KM NE TAY NINH	NEG
	TAY NINH	UH-1H/CH-47	VIC NUI BA DEN	NEG
	LONG KHANH	AC-119	10KM S RANG RANG	NEG
	LONG AN	UH-1	11KM NW TAN AN	NEG

Figure 2-5A

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DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-3 Con't				
220130 NOV	BINH DUONG	AC-119K	2 KM NW CU CHI	NEG
230415 NOV	BINH DUONG	AC-119K	4 KM N CU CHI	NEG
231308 NOV	TAY NINH	RC-47	VIC KA TJM	NEG
301700 NOV	GIA DINH	AC-119	11 KM SE NHON TRACH	NEG
100120 DEC	HAU NGHIA	AC-119	8 KM E GO DAU HA	NEG
122045 DEC	HAU NGHIA	AC-119	3 KM S CU CHI	NEG
192030 DEC	HAU NGHIA	AC-119	7 KM SE TRANG BANG	NEG
260010 DEC	BINH LONG	AC-119K	7 KM E AN LOC	NEG
DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-4				
251045 FEB	DINH TUONG	UH-1H	4 KM NW CAI LAY	NEG
031730 MAR	DINH TUONG	Al-H	5 KM CAI LAY	NEG
032045 MAR	DINH TUONG	AC-119	9 KM CAI LAY	NEG
061100 MAR	DINH TUONG	UH-1	11 KM CAI LAY	NEG
201230 MAR	DINH TUONG	A-37	9 KM CAI LAY	NEG
241130 MAR	AN XUYEN	UH-1	18 KM SW CA MAU	NEG
201230 APR	KIEN PHONG	A-1G	15 KM NW HONG NGU	A/C DEST
021730 APR	KIEN HOA	UH-1	4 KM HAM LONG	A/C DEST, 1 KIA, 3 WIA
291010 APR	KIEN PHONG	L-19	4 KM N KIEN VAN	NEG
301050 APR	KIEN PHONG	L-19	10 KM NW HONG NL	NEG
040415 AUG	KIEN TUONG	L-19	5 KM KIEN BINH	NEG
041405 AUG	KIEN TUONG	L-19	5 KM SW KIEN BINH	NEG
081550 SEP	KIEN PHONG	HELO	10 KM N KIEN VAN	1 WIA, A/C DAM
072025 OCT	DINH TUONG	AC-119	2 KM NW CAI LAY	NEG
181945 OCT	DINH TUONG	AC-119	16 KM NW BEN TRANH	NEG
251705 OCT	DINH TUONG	2 A-37	3 KM SW SAM GIANG	NEG
251735 OCT	VINH LONG	2 A-37	7 KM SE CHO LACH	NEG
082050 NOV	DINH TUONG	AC-119	5 KM E CAI BE	NEG
101200 NOV	DINH TUONG	AC-119	6 KM E CAI BE	NEG
111200 NOV	DINH TUONG	HELO	5 KM SW CAI LAY	NEG
181200 NOV	DINH TUONG	AC-119	7 KM NE GIAO DUC	NEG
230015 NOV	CHUONG THIEN	AC-119G	8 KM NW KIEN HUNG	NEG

Figure 2-5B

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RVN LOSSES DUE TO SAPPER ATTACKS

<u>ARVN</u>	<u>MATERIAL LOSS</u>	<u>\$LOSS</u>
Long Binh Ammo Storage Area	3547ST Ammo	7,094,000
Pleiku Ammo Storage Area	250ST Ammo	509,000
3 Storage Igloos @60,000		180,000
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	\$7,783,000

<u>VNAF</u>		
3 F5A @ 756,000	TOTAL	\$2,268,000

<u>VNN</u>		
1	LCPL	\$55,000
1	WPB	740,000
7	PBR @110,000	770,000
1	LCM-6 (Monitor)	500,000
2	ATC @100,000	200,000
3	LCM-6 @75,000	225,000
3	LCVP @ 38,000	114,000
1	STCAN	25,000
1	YR	1,000,000
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	\$3,629,000

<u>GVN</u>		
Railroad (Bridges, Line) Track		\$13,200
2 Locomotives		300,000
3 Railway cars		75,000
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	\$388,200

Highway Bridges		
312 meters @ \$3,000/meter		\$936,000
Nha Be Oil Storage facility	27,000,000	1,600,000
gals fuel		
Pleiku (Camp Holloway) Airfield	192,000	
gals fuel		88,243
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	\$2,624,243

GRAND TOTAL \$16,692,443

Overall Personnel Losses

GVN - 29 KIA, 105 WIA, Nine MIA
CIV - 86 KILLED, 350 WOUNDED

Figure 2-6

2-15
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1973

MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WON-LOST LEDGER

<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
1	<u>Cua Viet River</u>	loss
	VNMC units secured area surrounding mouth of the Cua Viet River 26 Jan. NVA counter-attack, supported by artillery and armor, recaptured lost area and pushed Marines back to original positions with heavy personnel and equipment losses.	
	<u>Thach Han River Area</u>	loss
	Shortly after ceasefire I, NVA forces attacked across Thach Han River and occupied salient on south bank. Airborne Division resisted strongly but could not dislodge bridgehead. After a month of failure, area was conceded to NVA.	
	<u>Song Bo Corridor</u>	draw
	The ARVN 1st Div occupied key terrain and established observation posts overlooking the Song Bo Corridor at the outset of CF-1. Enemy forces, reacting to denial of traditional infiltration routes, initiated heavy activity. The Airborne Division captured and held the posts E of the river, but the ARVN 1st Div has been unable to retake posts W of the river.	
	<u>Sa Huynh Port, Salt Flats</u>	win
	Enemy forces seized the port and surrounding area from territorial and ranger units 27 Jan. The 2d ARVN Div deployed to area and recaptured port and area in late February.	
	<u>Bach Ma Mountain, Thua Thien</u>	

Figure 2-7A

2-17

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Enemy forces captured the isolated ARVN outpost on Bach Ma Mountain 12 Oct. The action, against an RF Battalion, provided the enemy with an important observation post, during periods of good visibility, of a wide area north and south of the Hai Van Pass area. loss

2 Polei Krong and Trung Nghia Villages, Kontum (P)

Enemy forces occupied the two villages, NW of Kontum City, 8 June. Two days of heavy attacks, supported by artillery, overcame territorial forces in the villages. The ARVN 23d Division deployed to the area and conducted counteroffensive operations for two months without success. Finally, in a shift to small unit actions against enemy observation posts and units, and heavily supported by artillery and air, the villages were reoccupied in mid-September. draw

Buon Ho, Darlac (P)

win

Enemy forces occupied eight Buon Ho hamlets and interdicted QL-14 between Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku City 27 Jan. Territorial forces began clearing operations in early February. The last hamlet was successfully recaptured and QL-14 was reopened 27 Feb.

Plei D'Jereng, Pleiku (P)

loss

The 80th RBD Bn, occupying a base camp at Le Minh, (Plei D'Jereng), was overrun by the newly formed 26th NVA Regiment 22 September. The enemy attack supported by tanks and artillery, destroyed the camp and resulted in loss of the battalion. Three escapees reported 124 80th RBD Bn members are being held by the NVA.

Kontum (P)

loss

Elements of the 45th Inf Regt, while participating in operations in the vicinity of Hill 727, SW of Kontum City, was hit by enemy forces during

Figure 2-7B

2-19

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period 30 October-2 November with attacks by fire (RR, mortars) and ground attacks. Over the three day period, 2/45 suffered 24 KIA, 27 WIA, and 29 MIA.

Pleiku (P)

loss

The 2/40 Infantry, conducting operations 20 kilometers SW of Pleiku City, sustained heavy mortar, ground probes, and finally a tank-supported ground attack by enemy forces on 23 Oct. Attempting to conduct an orderly withdrawal, 2/40 was hit from enemy blocking positions to their rear and flanks. The battalion suffered 30 KIA, 12 WIA and 65 MIA.

Quang Duc (P)

draw

Enemy forces attacked and occupied Bu Prang, Bu Bong, and Dak Song camps in early November. These successes were followed by a successful enemy attack against ARVN forces defending Kien Duc District Town in early December. Initially deployed to the province in early November, the 23D ARVN Division, supported by heavy VNAF air strikes, retook Dak Song and Kien Duc, and neutralized enemy forces in the Bu Prang/Bu Bong areas.

3 Tonle Cham Ranger Camp Tay Ninh (P)

win

The ranger camp, situated in NE Tay Ninh, along the Saigon River infiltration-resupply corridor, sustained heavy artillery, rocket and mortar attacks, eight attempted infiltrations, and 42 minor contacts 1 Mar - 30 Apr. The 92d RBD Bn withstood all attacks and continues to occupy the camp. However, aerial resupply by parachute is necessary.

Northern Hau Nghia (P)

win

The area in the vicinity of QL-1 included six

Figure 2-7C

2-21

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contested hamlets at the outset of CF-1. Elements of the 25th ARVN Division and territorial forces conducted successful clearing operations. All the hamlets were secured 4 Feb and QL-1 was kept open.

LTL-1A, Binh Duong (P)

loss

In late May, ARVN 5th Division elements attempted to convoy resupplies to Phuoc Vinh via LTL-1A. The ultimate objective was Phuoc Binh/Song Be area resupply. Elements of the 7th NVA Division intercepted the convoy in the Phu Giao area of Binh Duong and inflicted heavy losses on the ARVN forces, including territory. Elements of the ARVN 18th Division deployed, regained the lost territory, and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. However, LTL-1A. was not cleared.

Rach Bap, Binh Duong (P)

win

During late February and early March, 7th NVA elements surrounded the Rach Bap outposts in western Binh Duong Province. Ground probes and attacks by fire were utilized in an attempt to force ARVN units to abandon the area. The ARVN 5th and 25th Divisions deployed elements into the area, succeeded in relieving the outposts, and forced the NVA to withdraw.

Khiem Hanh (D), Tay Ninh (P)

loss

The 2/49 Infantry, 25th ARVN Division was ambushed in a rubber plantation area N of QL-22 in SE Tay Ninh 29 Sep. The unit, attempting to flush out enemy forces, was ambushed and rendered ineffective, suffering 13 KIA (including the Bn XO and two company commanders), 124 WIA, and 274 missing. Estimated enemy casualties were 183 KIA.

Figure 2-7D

2-23

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QL-13, Binh Long/Binh Duong (P)

loss

QL-13 between An Loc, Binh Long and Lai Khe, Binh Duong had been interdicted since CF-1. The 9th Inf, reinforced with two 7th Inf Bns, a tank troop, and a Ranger battalion, deployed during the 1st two weeks of June. Operations for two weeks against enemy forces failed to clear QL-13.

Binh Duong (P)

loss

On 8 July, the 1/9 Infantry, conducting operations to clear LTL-1A NE of Phuoc Vinh, was surprised in their night defensive position by enemy forces. The heavy ground attack, supported by mortars and rockets, resulted in 21 friendly WIA and 139 MIA. Additionally, 1/9 lost a mortar and 161 small arms and failed to clear LTL-1A.

Ben Luc District Town, Long An (P)

win

From 16-18 Aug 73, territorial forces conducted ground operations against enemy forces attempting to transit across QL-4 to Cambodia. Engaging the enemy three kilometers NE of Ben Luc, 101 enemy were killed and 12 detained, with light friendly casualties.

Bien Hoa (P)

loss

Enemy forces fired 35 122MM rockets into Bien Hoa Airbase from a position 15km N of the base. The 81st Ranger Forward Command Post, located in the MR3 Hqs vicinity was hit by one rocket and three F-5 aircraft were destroyed while a fourth was damaged. A runway, engine test stand, and several structures were damaged. Two RF companies conducted a sweep operation of the suspected firing area but reported no contacts.

Figure 2-7E

2-25

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Nha Be (D), Gia Dinh (P)

loss

The Shell Oil POL Storage Facility was hit by sappers on the evening of 2 Dec. The storage portion of the facility was virtually destroyed with approximately 600,000 barrels of oil lost. However, the pumping equipment and some tanks escaped damage. Neither contiguous facility, Esso or Caltex, was damaged.

4 Chuong Thien (P)

loss

On 5 June, the 86th RBD Bn, occupying a bivouac position, was surprised by an enemy attack by fire and ground attack. The Battalion suffered 37 KIA, 35 WIA and 19 MIA. Equipment lost was reported as: 6 crew served, 82 small arms and 19 PRC 25 radios. The 67th RBD was used as a relief force and suffered two WIA while reporting 36 Enemy killed.

Long My (D), Chuong Thien (P)

loss

On 27 Aug, the VC D-1 Regiment inflicted heavy casualties on the 3/16 Infantry in Long My (D). The enemy force surprised the 3/16, killing 25 and wounding over 50. The Battalion CO was among the KIA.

An Xuyen (P)

loss

While moving on foot along LTL-12 in northern An Xuyen 16 June, the 1/32 Infantry was ambushed by an enemy force. The 1/32 sustained 24 KIA, including the Battalion CO and 80 WIA.

Hong Ngu (D), Kien Phong (P)

win

The 15th Infantry, reinforced with 2d Armed Cav Sqdn and a RF Group, conducted operations in April to clear and secure the east bank of the Mekong between Hong Ngu and the Cambodian frontier. Supported by VNN and VNAF, the ARVN, suffering heavy casualties, cleared the area of enemy and assured safe passage of Mekong convoys.

Figure 2-7F

2-27

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Seven Mountians Area, Chau Doc (P)

win

During September/October, ten ranger battalions, reinforced by territorial forces, conducted operations to isolate and destroy enemy forces in the Seven Mountains Area. Although heavy casualties were sustained by both sides, the rangers have gained control of the area, entrapped remaining enemy elements in caves, and occupied the highest peak, Nui Giai.

Dinh Tuong (P)

loss

The 3/10 Infantry, conducting operations in Dinh Tuong to eliminate enemy base areas and halt infiltration into the Delta, made heavy contact with elements of the probable, 4th NVA Regiment 25 Oct 73. 7th ARVN Division reinforced with two battalions supported by air and artillery. The 3/10 lost 32 KIA, 43 WIA and 5 MIA, including a company commander. The enemy exfiltrated the area, leaving 40 KIA.

Kien Tuong (P)

win

The 3/10 Infantry, in response to intelligence, deployed into eastern Kien Tuong province to intercept an enemy infiltration unit. Contact was established 30 Nov. and continued through 1 Dec. The 3/10 killed 47 and detained one enemy, and captured 70 small arms. There were no friendly casualties.

Dinh Tuong (P)

win

The 424 and 427 RF Battalions, conducting coordinated sweep operations, made contact with an enemy force three kilometers west of Sam Giang District Town on 7 December. The two battalions killed 68 enemy and captured 28 small arms, an RPG and a 12.7mm MG. The RF sustained five KIA and 28 WIA.

Figure 2-7G

2-29

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Vi Thanh (C), Chuong Thien (P)

loss

On 25 December, elements of the 31st Inf were ambushed and seriously defeated in a fire fight five kilometers NW Vi Thanh. Cas: 89 WIA and 26 MIA. Four crew-served and 41 small arms weapons were lost.

Sam Giang Village, Dinh Tuong (P)

win

On 6 Dec, elements of the 424 and 427 RF Bn were ambushed by an unidentified enemy force three km W of Sam Giang in Dinh Tuong (P). In the ensuing fire fight, 88 enemy were killed, while Territorial Forces lost five KIA and 24 WIA. Twenty-eight small arms and two crew-served weapons were captured.

Kien Thanh Village, Kien Giang (P)

win

On 10 Dec, elements of the 1/31st Inf were attacked by an unknown size enemy force eight km SE of Kien Thanh. The enemy force was repulsed with 32 killed plus 20 crew-served and five small arms weapons captured. Friendly forces lost one KIA and five WIA.

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


Figure 2-8

2-33

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


Figure 2-9

2-35

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


Figure 2-10

2-37

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


Figure 2-11

2-39

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


Figure 2-12

2-41

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MAJOR CONTACTS BY MR

--- MR 1
 - - - MR 2
 MR 3
 — MR 4




Figure 2-13

2-43

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CEASE FIRE CASUALTIES (FRIENDLY KIA)

04 OCT - 31 DEC 1973




Figure 2-14

2-45

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FRIENDLY ARTILLERY EXPENDED

04 OCT - 31 DEC 1973




Figure 2-15

2-47

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 1

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WEEK	JUN 21 - JUN 28		JUN 29 - JUL 5		JUL 6 - JUL 12		JUL 13 - JUL 19		JUL 20 - JUL 26		AUG 27 - AUG 3		AUG 4 - AUG 10		AUG 11 - AUG 17		AUG 18 - AUG 24		AUG 25 - SEP 1		SEP 2 - SEP 8		SEP 9 - SEP 15		SEP 16 - SEP 22		SEP 23 - SEP 29		OCT 1 - OCT 7		OCT 8 - OCT 14		OCT 15 - OCT 21		OCT 22 - OCT 28		OCT 29 - NOV 4		
	INCIDENTS	93	59	57	40	51	69	83	132	81	125	136	161	155	85	118	153	113	130	128	109																		
MAJ/ MIN ABF	22	6	11	25	4	10	13	10	23	8	29	25	49	29	19	20	35	30	27	19	8																		
MAJ/ MIN CTX	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	2	2	3	2	3	5	0	4	2	3																		
EN ARTY INCOMING	2,210	346	543	253	442	845	845	606	1,715	539	2,894	2,521	2,853	1,659	1,850	1,727	1,823	1,460	1,565	1,178	768																		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	5,580	1,238	1,567	1,603	1,700	1,987	2,847	6,878	4,731	6,543	8,560	8,865	6,868	4,017	6,213	7,940	5,640	11,418	10,017	9,104																			
SCH/ FLN SORTIES	68	126	154	21	4	0	37	56	126	126	126	122	98	100	110	126	124	126	126	126	130																		
K/ W FRD CAS	38	5	15	30	8	13	72	78	42	25	33	48	37	22	8	31	64	78	65	96	61																		
K/ EN CAS	79	39	29	36	41	69	21	72	72	53	44	95	70	38	41	70	179	208	200	192	118																		
K/ W CIV CAS	15	9	2	0	2	0	0	1	9	3	0	21	4	12	19	20	5	6	7	19	11																		

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Figure 2-16A

SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 1

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WEEK														
	NOV 2	NOV 9	NOV 15	NOV 16	NOV 22	NOV 23	NOV 29	NOV 30	DEC 6	DEC 7	DEC 13	DEC 14	DEC 20	DEC 21
INCIDENTS	113	79	70	116	94	58	97	84	81					
MAV MIN	15	9	7	17	17	6	14	7	11	27				
MAV MIN	5	1	1	5	0	2	7	5	2	41				
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,068	718	548	1,694	1,356	293	917	421	545					
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	6,932	3,932	3,537	7,305	4,753	2,383	5,389	4,659	3,006					
SCH FLM SORTIES	126	126	138	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	18
K W	60	18	25	76	37	17	63	32	27					
K D	145	55	120	174	100	80	141	120	122					
K W	11	2	3	10	5	1	8	16	9	13				
CIV CAS	38	16	5	14	21	3	21	29	13					

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 2

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WEEK	NOV 1																				
	15 JUN 21	22 JUN 28	29 JUN 5	6 JUL 12	13 JUL 19	20 JUL 26	27 JUL 2	3 AUG 9	10 AUG 16	17 AUG 23	24 AUG 30	31 SEP 6	7 SEP 13	14 SEP 20	21 SEP 27	28 OCT 4	5 OCT 11	12 OCT 18	19 OCT 25	26 OCT 31	
INCIDENTS	70	113	121	131	100	126	113	130	143	150	116	115	154	121	148	118	100	132	148	124	
MAJ MIN	ABF	10	4	13	9	8	12	9	18	23	14	12	15	19	9	23	14	13	15	18	11
MAJ MIN	CTX	3	2	8	6	2	5	4	10	6	6	6	2	4	5	8	2	2	4	8	2
EN ARTY INCOMING		528	315	633	351	566	583	329	631	1402	1096	751	695	860	840	871	526	961	937	901	780
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES		11,144	15,908	19,991	21,235	9,571	18,677	12,592	22,734	27,361	26,681	26,091	24,027	23,996	29,188	30,917	23,105	20,312	37,788	56,815	36,547
SCH FLN	VNAF SORTIES	232	280	315	280	280	280	362	532	450	450	448	478	440	454	384	364	366	420	395	
K W	FRD CAS	18	38	50	44	25	52	35	59	77	61	41	42	45	46	48	28	52	79	57	
K D	EN CAS	127	85	250	253	121	157	149	263	520	385	179	196	411	310	293	171	161	172	325	179
K W	CIV CAS	2	1	4	2	0	2	3	5	2	1	12	0	1	6	3	2	0	6	1	3
		1	5	12	6	0	0	23	24	19	5	30	3	7	13	31	3	0	1	9	10

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 2

WEEK	15 MAR 14														INCIDENTS
	15 MAR 14	8 MAR 7	1 MAR 28	22 FEB 21	15 FEB 14	8 FEB 7	1 FEB 31	25 JAN 24	18 JAN 17	11 JAN 10	4 JAN 3	28 DEC 27	21 DEC 20	14 DEC 13	
MAJ/ MIN	10	17	20	12	10	21	18	10	21	15	25	5	10	8	MAJ/ MIN
ABF	29	4	0	5	59	68	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	ABF
CTX	4	0	5	59	68	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	CTX
EN ARTY INCOMING	834	604	623	530	1058	150	449	560	244						EN ARTY INCOMING
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	27757	26151	20975	22870	27635	26852	24226	25227	18781						FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES
SCM/ FLN SORTIES	426	426	496	532	408	604	399	342	212	353	550	526	496	486	SCM/ FLN SORTIES
K/ W	35	37	39	55	211	213	180	99	116	153	42	59	42	35	K/ W
FRD CAS	106	90	176	211	213	180	99	116	153	42	59	42	35	35	FRD CAS
EN CAS	144	111	257	139	281	260	154	135	247	4	0	0	0	0	EN CAS
CIV CAS	0	2	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	CIV CAS

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 3

WEEK		CONFIDENTIAL																				
		15 JUN - 21 JUN	22 JUN - 28 JUN	29 JUN - 5 JUL	6 JUL - 12 JUL	13 JUL - 19 JUL	20 JUL - 26 JUL	27 JUL - 3 AUG	3 AUG - 9 AUG	10 AUG - 16 AUG	17 AUG - 23 AUG	24 AUG - 30 AUG	31 AUG - 6 SEP	7 SEP - 13 SEP	14 SEP - 20 SEP	21 SEP - 27 SEP	28 SEP - 4 OCT	5 OCT - 11 OCT	12 OCT - 18 OCT	19 OCT - 25 OCT	26 OCT - 1 NOV	
INCIDENTS		97	84	67	86	147	146	123	133	96	84	86	71	71	53	63	64	68	100	106	90	
MAJ MIN ABF		6	33	9	5	7	20	13	9	8	8	7	6	2	3	4	4	4	6	6	2	
MAJ MIN CTX		0	1	0	1	3	2	3	5	C	3	3	1	0	4	3	4	0	2	2	5	
EN ARTY INCOMING		327	328	302	339	1,418	959	547	690	423	406	444	333	140	125	110	256	299	306	237	232	
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES		3,712	5,781	5,100	18,658	17,683	15,983	12,189	9,778	7,028	7,796	9,578	7,228	6,122	4,143	6,096	12,005	7,373	9,745	23,953	13,713	
SCH TLN VNAF		285	216	200	266	614	614	600	580	432	356	324	332	328	304	332	448	397	326	384	359	
TLN SORTIES		0	4	6	30	217	174	196	274	190	100	121	152	107	74	60	276	69	195	307	258	
K W FRD CAS		4	18	17	14	22	24	32	39	7	12	21	11	19	12	17	59	13	13	11	4	
		46	91	53	102	163	108	113	79	60	72	54	56	48	71	56	172	26	64	83	39	
K D EN CAS		31	66	30	37	98	131	195	49	49	134	33	56	50	41	18	220	30	62	84	56	
		2	0	1	6	2	2	2	3	4	13	1	0	2	0	4	4	3	3	0	3	
K W CIV CAS		2	4	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	2	5	6	4	0	6	5	7	
		7	4	1	1	9	4	13	9	4	1	1	5	10	15	24	10	2	17	17	9	

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 3

WEEK	15 MAR - 14 MAR													
	15 MAR	8 MAR	1 MAR	22 FEB	15 FEB	8 FEB	1 FEB	25 JAN	18 JAN	11 JAN	4 JAN	28 JAN	21 DEC	14 DEC
INCIDENTS	108	87	117	122	168	128	129	134						
MAJ/ABF	9	1	7	4	10	7	9	7	10	51				
MIN	28	20	21	35	48	35	46	45	51					
MAJ/CTX	3	1	5	1	3	3	6	3	3	70				
MIN	68	60	54	77	61	123	67	74	70					
EN ARTY INCOMING	374	75	278	237	542	356	484	573	667					
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	14,022	13,106	17,484	13,060	14,510	15,013	32,023	13,635	15,527					
SCH/VNAF	372	470	432	548	477	336	476	514	463					
FLY SORTIES	300	253	295	438	363	308	369	358	273					
K/FRD CAS	22	0	33	32	41	59	66	50	52					
W	65	36	99	127	120	200	186	143	124					
K/EN CAS	51	36	64	78	65	146	115	77	97					
D	2	9	3	3	3	3	5	1	5					
K/CIV CAS	7	4	4	13	12	15	15	4	10					
W	20	14	6	35	22	40	40	11	17					

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 4

WEEK	CONFIDENTIAL															
	15 JUN	22 JUN	29 JUN	6 JUL	13 JUL	20 JUL	27 JUL	3 AUG	10 AUG	17 AUG	24 AUG	31 AUG	7 SEP	14 SEP	21 SEP	28 SEP
INCIDENTS	267	199	225	138	172	210	279	258	200	192	222	264	292	232	247	238
MAJ MIN ABF	25	15	13	7	11	16	25	25	15	21	27	27	33	23	24	25
MAJ MIN CTX	2	8	3	3	2	6	6	5	4	7	2	5	2	8	14	6
EN ARTY INCOMING	1428	1036	873	635	876	785	1463	1514	1005	975	1404	1480	1352	1167	1161	1016
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	22,038	16,511	19,054	15,790	14,027	15,156	20,635	25,418	14,723	15,256	15,602	20,376	18,272	13,804	15,320	16,686
SCH FLN SORTIES	94	154	146	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154
K W FRD CAS	70	93	69	46	56	73	51	62	39	68	59	82	48	46	74	103
K D EN CAS	133	113	50	103	112	173	113	61	112	172	61	129	83	81	135	273
K W CIV CAS	15	8	5	5	0	5	8	5	7	2	4	32	17	17	5	12

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 4

WEEK	2 NOV - 8	9 NOV - 15	16 NOV - 22	23 NOV - 29	30 DEC - 6	7 DEC - 13	14 DEC - 20	21 DEC - 27	28 DEC - 3	4 JAN - 10	1 JAN - 17	18 JAN - 24	25 JAN - 31	1 FEB - 7	8 FEB - 14	15 FEB - 21	22 FEB - 28	1 MAR - 7	8 MAR - 14	15 MAR - 15
INCIDENTS	305	257	331	387	328	226	442	564	355											
MAJ / MIN ABF	24 / 105	19 / 75	26 / 150	28 / 147	16 / 132	11 / 97	15 / 207	35 / 234	20 / 178											
MAJ / MIN CTX	7 / 169	3 / 160	7 / 148	6 / 206	10 / 170	11 / 107	8 / 212	13 / 282	7 / 150											
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,140	1,078	1,658	1,540	1,477	847	1,653	2,553	1,639											
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	20,030	15,108	19,295	16,035	17,758	14,236	20,223	31,193	24,639											
SCH / FLIN VNAF SORTIES	170 / 129	154 / 68	206 / 48	184 / 152	178 / 121	178 / 119	241 / 178	193 / 169	170 / 124											
K / W FRD CAS	56 / 225	43 / 207	92 / 339	58 / 350	38 / 281	82 / 275	93 / 300	182 / 576	76 / 272											
K / D EN CAS	150 / 6	266 / 3	145 / 0	217 / 2	382 / 1	270 / 3	270 / 0	240 / 1	96 / 0											
K / W CIV CAS	22 / 89	8 / 45	20 / 52	23 / 19	16 / 40	5 / 23	13 / 42	20 / 54	1 / 5											

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Figure 2-19B

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CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

1. (S/NFD) J2/JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Organization.

Figure 3-1

b. Personnel. The authorized strength of J2 was reduced from 320 to 289, and actual strength showed a decrease of 14 officers and one NCO from the last reporting period.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	157	121
NCOs	102	87
EM	<u>30</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	289	240

c. Operational Effectiveness.

The operational effectiveness of the Office of the J2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J2 who has been in office since May 1971. He has effectively organized his staff and manned it with experienced, competent personnel. Due to the continuing high level of hostile action, the J2 has placed emphasis on tactical intelligence production to the detriment of strategic production. Reporting on the enemy situation in Cambodia and Laos improved during the reporting period; the J2 and Chief of Staff, JCS now receive frequent briefings on these areas.

2. (S/NFD) UNIT 306:

Figure 3-2

a. Organization. The Military Intelligence Center established on 1 July was redesignated Unit 306.

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J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES





Figure 3-1

3-3

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3-5

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It is headed by the Deputy J2 and has five divisions: Intelligence, Document Exploitation, Materiel Exploitation, Military Interrogation, and Administrative/Support. As reported during the last quarter, morale was adversely affected by the downgrading of the former Intelligence Centers to divisional level within Unit 306; however, the impact was short-lived, and morale has returned to its former high level.

b. Personnel. The actual strength figures listed below represent a loss of 31 officers and NCO's and a gain of seven enlisted personnel since the last quarter:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	169	133
NCOs	164	128
EM	<u>124</u>	<u>126</u>
TOTAL	457	387

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) The Intelligence Division (ID): The Intelligence Division is the most effectively managed and productive element of Unit 306; its Target Branch is particularly outstanding. The Chief of the Target Branch is hard-working, aggressive, and technically qualified. His subordinates are well-trained, competent and motivated. The Branch is largely dependent on US photographic missions which have been reduced since the cease-fire. The Area Analysis Branch Chief is weak. The Division Chief personally devotes a great deal of time to this Branch. Its products are professional. The Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Branch is still undergoing transitional problems caused by the change from the 360-30 IBM computer (which was withdrawn when US Forces left Vietnam) to the 360-50 IBM computer. All material programmed into the 360-30 has to be reprogrammed and updated to accommodate the 360-50. The Branch has a strength of only two officers, six NCO's and one EM. The two officers are receiving training on the 360-50. At least two additional

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experienced programmers are needed and steps are being taken to hire them.

(2) Document Exploitation Division (DED): The decline in the level of enemy contacts has reduced the number of documents available for exploitation. Also, ARVN field elements have been giving less priority to the acquisition and timely transmittal of documents to higher headquarters for exploitation. However, the assignment of officers specifically to the task of document collection is helping to alleviate the problem.

(3) Materiel Exploitation Division (MED): MED personnel are well-trained and technically qualified but the Division reflects the lack of motivation and dedication of the Chief. Field elements frequently hold captured materiel without thoroughly exploiting or forwarding it to higher headquarters. This fact, along with the indifference of the Branch Chief, has had an adverse effect on the MED. The recent move of MED from Tan Son Nhut to the JGS compound has been beneficial since it brings the Division under closer observation and control. The policy initiated during this reporting period of sending officers to the field on special assignments has resulted in more timely information on the capture of new types of weapons.

(4) Military Interrogation Division (MID): The MID is effectively led and managed. It has competent, experienced personnel. During this quarter, the MID processed prisoners of war through its interrogation facilities for the first time since the cease-fire. The acquisition of limited funds to provide subsistence for the PWs during interrogation made this possible. The Military Regions have the capability to handle their own interrogations and have shown some reluctance to transport PWs to Saigon. Two or three-man MID interrogation teams are dispatched to the regions to pursue special J2 requirements or to assist centers with heavy workloads.

3. (S/NFD) CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD):

The CMD includes Saigon City and Hoc Mon, Go Vap,

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personnel. Coordination between the Corps G2 staffs and J2 is good, although it sometimes breaks down at critical times. The G2's liaison with military and civilian intelligence services within the Corps is satisfactory. However, inter-corps intelligence coordination is poor. Corps files and holdings are generally complete, accurate, and maintained on a timely basis. While their order of battle holdings vary from those maintained at the J2 level, the differences are not significant.

(2) At the Division level, the collection and analytical functions are fairly well coordinated. Intelligence is disseminated to tactical consumers on a timely basis and it is accepted with due credibility. Briefing and situation rooms are well equipped in comparison to other staff offices. Files and holdings in general are accurately and effectively organized and maintained. A shortage of funds to pay for agents is another problem faced at Division level. Division G2's are giving less than full support to the exploitation of captured documents and materiel. Units capturing documents and materiel frequently hold on for excessive periods of time which precludes more thorough and effective exploitation at higher echelons.

5. (S/NFD) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS):

a. Organization. The MSS is commanded by Brigadier General Vu Duc Nhuan. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the Joint General Staff (JGS). Despite MSS subordination to a staff element within the Ministry of Defense, it reports directly to, or receives tasking directly from, the highest levels, including the Office of the President and the Prime Minister. The Headquarters element (Military Security Directorate) is located in Saigon and is composed of 662 officers and men. The remainder of the personnel are assigned to either military units or to regular MSS units throughout South Vietnam. There is a detachment of 50 officers and men at the Headquarters of each Military Region and in the Capital District. A field office of 30 personnel is maintained in each province and in the major cities. There is a contingent of six personnel who make up the

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sub-field offices within each district. Also, organic units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to Corps and Divisions, respectively. MSS personnel are attached to regiment, battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	1,107	1,034
NCOs	2,455	2,126
Enlisted	<u>1,263</u>	<u>1,225</u>
TOTAL	4,825	4,385

There have been no significant strength changes since last quarter.

c. Equipment and Facilities.

The Central Records Facility represents a new effort to combine background information and the results of investigations at one central location as well as at the MSS Military Region Headquarters. The Facility is not a modern, automated system, but it makes possible the expediting of national-level name trace actions. The MSS wanted to exchange ten two-way Mustang radios, which are too bulky and heavy for surveillance purposes, for smaller, compact radios which cost approximately \$1,000 each. The MSS was informed that it would have to submit its requirement, with appropriate justification, through the Military Assistance Program. MSS also ordered a 35mm slide projector and two camera flash attachments for which it will pay in cash.

d. Operational Effectiveness.

MSS efforts have been successful in assisting the government in maintaining a level of political stability. Through its field components, it has greatly enhanced internal security through overt as well as covert counterintelligence operations. In

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furtherance of the counter-subversive mission, MSS has provided valuable information concerning identification of the VC infrastructure. It has the capability to detect and report imminence of hostility information in any of the four Military Regions. The MSS is co-equal in power and prestige with the National Police and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).

It has a decentralized organization which exercises considerable autonomy and flexibility in providing lateral support to tactical elements. For example, when the MSS at the MR level provides information to the Corps Commander, it generally informs the Directorate but at a later date and without all the details. If the information is of interest to other Military Regions, the Directorate publishes a report. Reporting sometimes lacks source data and fails to answer "who, what, where, why, how and when". However, continuing efforts to improve the timeliness and completeness of information are beginning to show results. Some key MSS personnel (excluding the Commander) have been reluctant to delegate authority. This has impeded the flow of papers and slowed production.

The goodwill of MSS is essential for successful bilateral operations by US military intelligence elements in RVN. In addition to supplying information, the MSS has provided many special services to US intelligence, including the issuance of MSS passes, performance of national level file checks, and coordinating clearances of indigenous personnel.

Although MSS is a counterintelligence organization, it obtains order of battle information as a by-product of its activities. During the reporting period, MSS has been developing and implementing plans for bilateral operations to satisfy OB collection requirements.

6. (S/NFD) UNIT 101:

a. Organization. Under the operational control of J2, Unit 101, JGS/RVNAF, organizes, directs and

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controls in-country and cross-border military intelligence collection operations. The unit consists of a Headquarters in Saigon headed by a Colonel, an Administration Section, and Operations, Support and Political Warfare Branches. Unit 101 has six field detachments and 27 teams operating throughout the country which control 92 agent nets and 272 coded assets. Approximately one-third of the coded assets are VC/NVA defectors-in-place. Detachment 60, with headquarters in Saigon, is responsible for coverage of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). Detachments 65 and 66, with headquarters in Danang and Dalat, cover MR-1 and MR-2, respectively. Detachment 67, Saigon, provides coverage for MR-3 with the exception of the Capital Military District. Detachment 68 has headquarters in Can Tho and is responsible for MR-4. Detachment 69, with headquarters at Thu Duc, provides coverage for the Capital Military District and conducts cross-border, third-country operations.

b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	429	330
NCOs	255	198
EM	<u>236</u>	<u>198</u>
TOTAL	920	726

c. Equipment and Facilities. Most of the Unit's equipment is serviceable and replacement spare parts are available. The Unit has second echelon maintenance capability for all its equipment. Maintenance above that level is obtained through ARVN support channels. Unit facilities both at headquarters level in Saigon and at detachment and team locations throughout the country are excellent.

d. Operational Effectiveness. Unit 101 maintains liaison with US Army Special Activities, Thailand. One Project Officer is assigned at the headquarters level and provides technical and financial assistance. The

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Unit's monthly production of intelligence reports is approximately 1,500. The Unit is responsive to requirements from all consumers. In response to ARVN requirements, the Unit has started to place additional emphasis on the collection of tactical intelligence to support and satisfy local combat requirements. This added emphasis has not adversely affected the Unit's ability to collect strategic intelligence which continues to receive primary emphasis. The Unit receives financial assistance through US Military Intelligence Contingency Funds which amount to approximately \$6,000 monthly. Cost effectiveness is excellent. However, Unit 101 could not continue to function without this US financial assistance.

7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION:

a. N-2.

(1) Organization. The N-2 is an operational staff for the Chief of Naval Operations with four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence, and Exploitation. Its mission is to analyze information received from the Special Collection Detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of Communist intentions.

(2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	20	42
Petty Officers	18	48
Seamen	<u>14</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTAL	52	100

(3) Equipment and Facilities. The N-2 lacks the required equipment for professional photo interpretation (PI). It has the following equipment: One (1) Richards Light Table, Model No. GFL-918 LW, with a

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Bausch and Lomb stereoscope, which is used for aerial photo interpretation; two (2) Abrams 2-4 Stereoscope, Model No. CB-1, one of which is inoperable. Their hydrographic chart section is well-supplied.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. Most of the individuals in PI work are poorly trained and lack the necessary equipment. Adequate aerial photography of such targets as port installations is lacking. One PI officer from N-2 works at Unit 306 in an effort to make up for the loss of the US Naval Advisory Team support. The N-2 organization has continued to produce good quality briefings, reports, and studies. One of the most significant reports is their weekly intelligence summary. It is based on information obtained from the Special Collection Detachment, naval forces at sea, Naval Coastal Zone Headquarters, riverine forces, and other RVN intelligence agencies, and analyzes Communist operations and plans.

b. Special Collection Detachment (SCD).

(1) Organization. The headquarters element of the Detachment consists of a command section and three branches: Operations, Signal, and Support. It has two field elements. The covert element has six collection teams composed of agent handlers and informants. Because of the mounting Communist threat to Vietnamese Navy warships anchored in the Saigon Port, SCD plans to establish a seventh collection team which will be responsible for the Capital Military District (CMD). At the present time, the CMD is covered by Collection Team 6 which is also responsible for the Rung Sat Special Zone. The overt element consists of 28 Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers who are assigned to the various military regions, sector and/or sub-sector headquarters. In many cases the Liaison Officers function in a dual capacity. In addition to contact with official intelligence collection sources, they also work as covert collection officers and manage the agent handlers in their area. The covert activities will be taken over by Intelligence Collection Officers when SCD has sufficient trained personnel. This should improve the effectiveness of

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the collection activity and operational security.

(2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	--	50
Petty Officers	--	126
Seamen	--	19
TOTAL	121	195

The increased effectiveness of SCD in recent months has pleased the Chief, Naval Operations who has authorized the assignment of the additional personnel by borrowing spaces from other units. SCD now has 74 more personnel than the authorized TO&E of 121. It is planned to increase actual strength still further to 235. In December, SCD received 30 new Petty Officers. In addition, seven officers were assigned to SCD upon graduation from the Gay Hai Intelligence School.

(3) Equipment and Facilities. The SCD internal communications system was improved during this quarter. All collection teams now have single sideband FM radios permitting voice communication with Headquarters. But this equipment is not adequate for transmission of lengthy intelligence reports. The teletypes of Naval Coastal Zone and Riverine Force Headquarters are available to the Collection Teams, but other traffic frequently holds up intelligence reports. This affects the timeliness of the intelligence reports, which in many cases is critical. Efforts are being made to secure teletype equipment for SCD.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The Detachment has reacted quickly to requirements of US intelligence, but in some cases the reports have lacked detail and proper sourcing. But during this quarter, the sourcing of reports improved considerably and a source data file is now being prepared. The assignment of trained collection personnel to the field should improve the quality of reporting. Plans are now underway to terminate

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low-level informants with limited access to information on infiltration and order of battle. Emphasis will be placed on recruiting new and better sources, such as VC cadre. A plan recently has been approved by the CNO and the JGS which would place petty officers in the countryside under civilian cover. They would live in fishing villages and coastal areas and collect information on infiltration of war materiel and enemy personnel. Identification of smugglers also would be part of their responsibilities.

8. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE:

a. HUMINT Collection.

(1) The VNAF Director of Intelligence and the Chief of the VNAF Special Collection Unit are strong, capable leaders and have shown a keen interest in the direction and development of their collection assets. The majority of the VNAF officers have developed skills to a point where they can successfully operate on a unilateral basis.

(2) A major weakness is Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) reporting. Pilots' debriefings and HUMINT supplement the limited air photo coverage of air strikes. Efforts made during this quarter to direct HUMINT sources to meet BDA requirements on some pre-planned target areas in the northern sector of MR-3 are beginning to prove productive.

(3) The Unit has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of nine.

(4) The US provides all of the Unit's operational funds. Without this financial assistance, the Unit could not operate.

b. PHOTINT.

(1) VNAF's photo intelligence is limited by the number of aircraft and their susceptibility to ground fire. Six RF-5s and four of the 12 authorized RC-47s are assigned to photo collection. These aircraft

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provide minimum coverage of MRs 2, 3, and 4. The RC-47 can obtain good photography but is too vulnerable to ground fire in most target areas to be used for BDA. The RF-5 operates under the major handicap of its 70mm camera, which is unsuitable for BDA. There is little or no coverage of MR-1 due to the high air defense threat. The RVN relies on the US for photo coverage of MR-1.

(2) VNAF can produce duplicate positives, select prints and photo mosaics. Its capacity to produce paper prints is limited. Laboratory standards have deteriorated in recent months. The poor quality of VNAF aerial photo prints have resulted in unsatisfactory imagery interpretation. US technical assistance has been requested. VNAF imagery interpretation personnel meet US professional standards.

(3) No VNAF aircraft possess Radar Look on Warning (RLOW) gear. This limits operations in high threat areas. VNAF recon could function in Cambodia and possibly in the Laos Panhandle.

9. (S/NFD) SIGINT.

a. The J7, Directorate General of Technical Services (DGTS), is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT. This agency provides relatively timely tactical intelligence through the use of its 11 ARVN Special Technical Detachments assigned to the 11 ARVN Infantry Divisions. SIGINT support teams have been assigned to Ranger, Airborne, and Marine units. The DGTS controls 32 EC-47 aircraft in its Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) program. Twenty-three aircraft are based in Saigon and are flying an average of 11 missions per day in RVN Military Regions 3 and 4. Maintenance due to the age of the aircraft is a continuing problem. The 10 EC-47's based at Danang are flying three missions per day in MR's 1 and 2.

b. RVNAF SIGINT is making progress. While the overall experience level is low, some success has been achieved in collection. Progress is also being made in analysis and reporting. Limitations include

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a shortage of DGTS personnel, and the need for additional secure communications systems.

10. (S/NFD) NATIONAL POLICE COMMAND (NPC):

DAO liaison with the NPC was established in October on a restricted basis. The Intelligence Directorate, headed by a Major, is organizationally subordinate to the Special Branch of the NPC. It collects raw, unevaluated information concerning national security.

11. (S/NFD) INTELLIGENCE TRAINING:

a. Organization. The Cay Mai School is subordinate to the RVNAF Central Training Command. It has three divisions: Administrative/Support, POLWAR and Training.

b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers :	--	57
NCOs	--	47
EM	--	51
Civilians	--	7
TOTAL	208	162

All instructors must have graduated from the Cay Mai School and received instructor training there. The Commandant and his staff are well-trained and competent.

c. Facilities and Equipment. The equipment at the school is inadequate, outdated, and in poor condition. For example, the only camera is ten years old; the viewgraph is inoperable. Most of the instruction is given from charts since other training aids are almost non-existent.

d. Operational Effectiveness. The well-rounded curricula taught at the school uses US, British, and French intelligence doctrine and includes officer,

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NCO and EM basic and intermediate Intelligence, Security, Collection, Photo Interpreter, and Agent Handler courses. The student enrollment is 353. In spite of serious budgetary problems, the Commandant and his staff have done an outstanding job of operating the school. The average yearly budget is 2,400,000 piasters, which averages out to less than five cents per student per day. This is obviously inadequate. No US funds are contributed for support of the school. The Commandant has stated that there are no funds available to support other training programs. No out-of-country training is currently being conducted. J2/JGS has requested about 150 billets, but the request has bogged down in the Central Training Command. During the reporting period, the Central Training Command approved five billets for intelligence training at Fort Huachuca, beginning July 1974. Besides the training provided at the Cay Mai School, intelligence training (approx 450 hours) is given at the unit level each year.

12. (S/NFD) SUMMARY:

RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. Some of the intelligence activities would have to be drastically reduced or eliminated without US funding assistance. Intelligence training is being conducted on a satisfactory level despite severe budgetary limitations, but degradation can be expected in the long-run unless additional funds are made available. DAO liaison with the RVNAF intelligence services continues to improve, and the input which they provide is generally satisfactory and timely.

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CHAPTER 4

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

(S) COMBINED JGS/DAO FY 75 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW

1. The Combined Joint General Staff/Defense Attache Office (JGS/DAO) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Force Structure Review Committee completed its review of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 RVNAF force structure on 1 December 1973. The committee recommended no change to the RVNAF force structure in FY 75.

	END FY74	FY75 Adjust ments	END FY 75
Army Republic of Vietnam	449,672	-225	449,447
Vietnamese Air Force	64,909	- 4	64,905
Vietnamese Navy	40,181	- 4	40,177
Vietnamese Marine Corps	14,438	+ 53	14,491
Regional Forces	324,799	+180	324,979
Popular Forces	<u>206,001</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>206,001</u>
TOTAL	1,100,000	0	1,100,000

2. Future RVNAF force reductions were not addressed during the FY75 review because JGS will not discuss reduction of the force structure until the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) publishes the Four Year Plan for calendar years (CY) 1974-1977 (MFYP). This plan is expected to be approved in early 1974 and includes phased force reductions of about 100,000 men per year starting in CY 1975 with an end CY 1977 strength of 800,000 men. Planned force reductions include retention of existing divisions at reduced strengths, organization of a ready reserve force and reduction of the Popular Forces (PF) to an end CY 1976 strength of 110,000 men. The MFYP is based on a scenario that depicts a significant reduction in the enemy threat during the plan years. If the enemy threat is not reduced, it is doubtful the plan will be implemented.

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CHAPTER 5

VIETNAMESE ARMY

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH. Depicted authorized and assigned troop strengths include all combat support, and combat service support units assigned to the divisions.

(Figure 5-1)

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS.

a. MR 1 is subdivided into five Areas of Operation (AOs). From north to south, AOs are assigned as follows: VNMC Division, Airborne Division, 1st Division, 3d Division, and 2d Division.

b. MR 2 is subdivided into two division AOs. From north to south, the AOs are assigned to the 22d Division (Kontum-Pleiku) and 23d Division (Quang Duc). Neither of the divisions have subordinate elements in any other MR 2 provinces.

c. MR 3 is subdivided into four AOs and the Capital Special Zone (the area encompassing Saigon). Combat units assigned to AOs are as follows: Ranger Command, 5th Division, 18th Division, and 25th Division.

d. MR 4 is subdivided into three AOs. Combat divisions assigned to AOs are as follows: 7th Division, 9th Division, and 21st Division.

(Figure 5-2)

e. The locations of tactical units at the regional level and above are depicted for each MR.

(Figures 5-3, 5-4

5-5 and 5-6)

3. (C) COMBAT ARMS.

5-1

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AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS

AS OF 30 NOV 73

DIV	AUTH	OFF	NCO	EM	ASSGN	% AUTH
1st	17102	1128	3280	11925	16333	96
2d	14159	940	2552	9012	12504	88
3d	14159	928	2780	8834	12542	89
5th	14159	918	2685	9345	12948	91
7th	14175	886	2531	9689	13106	92
9th	14175	910	2529	9249	12688	90
18th	14159	921	2578	10037	13536	96
21st	14175	906	2674	9343	12923	91
22d	17233	1046	2890	9831	13767	80
23d	14168	900	2395	18111	11406	81
25th	14220	918	2609	12130	15657	110
Abn	13684	953	2690	9963	13606	99
Rgr	34418	2172	5873	24934	32979	96
Mar	14436	988	2250	11598	14836	103
TOTAL	224422	14514	40316	164001	208831	93

Figure 5-1

5-3

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


Figure 5-2

5-5

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ARVN

MR 1




Figure 5-3

5-7
SECRET




Figure 5-4

5-9

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8 200 P.M. U.

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ARVN




Figure 5-5

5-11
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**ARVN
MR 4**




Figure 5-6

5-13

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a. Combat Divisions.

(1) The Vietnamese Marine Corps Division experienced no significant combat activity during the quarter and has been tactically inactive for the past several months. The division is still considered an elite unit although extended lack of combat has contributed to morale and drug use problems. Marine battalions rotate through the Dong Da Training Center at regular intervals and have performed well in training. The division continues to rotate battalions to Saigon for R and R. Severe damage was inflicted upon the division's defensive positions by the heavy rains in October and November. Consequently, considerable effort was dedicated to repair and rebuild of positions. The division continues to conduct a civic action program in selected hamlets throughout the AO. The 15th Ranger Group, with three organic battalions, began to deploy to the Marine AO at the end of the quarter to replace the 51st Infantry Regiment, 1st Division which will return to its parent division after having reinforced the Marine Division the entire quarter. Even though the low level of combat activity has created an environment conducive to disciplinary problems, the division is considered combat effective.

(2) The Airborne Division has experienced only light contact with enemy units during the quarter. Standoff attacks by fire and minor contacts in the Bo River Corridor have characterized the combat activity. In the only sustained combat engaged in by Airborne units, a battalion recaptured an outpost, abandoned due to heavy rains, from an enemy unit which had occupied the position before return of the Airborne unit. Although 18 Airborne soldiers were killed during a week of fighting, the unit's determined efforts held the position. The division has maintained its leave and cyclic training programs and is considered an elite combat effective unit.

(3) The 1st Division continues to operate in a large AO from ten kilometers northwest of Hue to Hai Van Pass with four infantry regiments. The 3d Infantry Regiment has engaged in almost continual combat in the Bo River Corridor and sustained most of the

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182 KIA/MIA and 302 WIA reported by the 1st Division during the quarter. Much of the activity has been harassing attacks by fire against small outposts and minor contacts with small enemy units. The 51st Infantry Regiment, which is in the process of re-deploying to the 1st Division AO, is scheduled to relieve the 3d Regiment in the near future. The 1st and 54th have experienced only light, harassing enemy attacks by fire and infrequent contacts in the lowlands of Thua Thien along QL-1 from Phu Bai to Phu Loc. The new division commander, Colonel Diem, assumed command in early November. His presence and sincere interest in his men's welfare is reportedly beginning to have a positive effect. The division's desertion rotated five battalions through Dong Ba Training Center during the quarter, and is at 93% of authorized strength despite desertions. Although facing many problems, the division is expected to continue to control its AO and improve its performance in combat as Colonel Diem exerts his influence and the well-trained 51st Infantry replaces the long-committed 3d Infantry on the Bo River Corridor outpost line. The division is considered combat effective.

(4) The 3d Division has controlled communist activity in the AO. Operations conducted by the division and regional force units have precluded communist success in obtaining sufficient rice for their units. Combat activity has been limited to small unit contacts, mine incidents and standoff attacks by fire but the division is still untested in sustained combat. Leave and training programs are on schedule. Three battalions rotated through cyclic training at Hoa Cam Training Center during the quarter. Continued light enemy contacts have provided valuable combat experience for all units. The division has maintained its front and made a maximum effort to build up RF forces. The combat effectiveness of this still untested division is considered good. Division units, though untested, considered combat effective. Continued light enemy contacts have provided valuable combat experience for all units.

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(5) The 2d Division has experienced the highest level of combat in MR 1. The division is responsible for southern Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. Divisional units have been deployed throughout the quarter in Quang Ngai while Ranger and territorial forces have operated alone in Quang Tin. Although harassed by attacks by fire, the infantry regiments have experienced only light contacts with the enemy to the west. Elements of the 5th Infantry have been aggressive and effective in contacts with small enemy units in the vicinity of Minh Long. The 4th Infantry has controlled its AO in Duc Pho District effectively. The 6th Regiment has had only light contacts north of Quang Ngai, but has performed well under fire. The division continued to improve its readiness and has gained combat experience in a difficult AO. Leadership capability has improved with combat experience. Battalion unit training was conducted during the quarter and two battalions rotated through the Hoa Cam Training Center. The division is considered a combat effective unit.

(6) The 22d Division was redeployed from Binh Dinh to the Central Highlands in November as the 23d Division deployed from Pleiku-Kontum to Quang Duc. Long tasked with maintaining at least one regiment in Pleiku, the four regiments and all support units are now located in Pleiku and Kontum. After relatively little combat activity in Binh Dinh, the division has been significantly more active in the highlands. The 2/40 Infantry was badly mauled by an enemy tank-infantry force southwest of Pleiku in late October. Elements of the 40th Infantry, now deployed in the vicinity of Kontum, have had several contacts with small enemy units. Although the unit experienced a higher level of attacks by fire in Kontum, the number of incidents decreased significantly in December. The regiment has been conducting security operations and local patrols. The 41st, 42d and 47th Regiments, deployed in defensive positions in Pleiku, have also conducted extensive patrols and security operations. These units have been subjected to attacks by fire and small unit probes, but have performed well in contacts with enemy units. Discipline under fire

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appears to be improved. With the exception of the 40th Infantry, the Division has had light activity overall and has not been heavily committed since the September Toung Nghia-Polei Krung battle. The 22d Division is considered combat effective.

(7) The 23d Division has been heavily committed to combat in Quang Duc since November. The entire division was deployed to Quang Duc by early December and has been committed continuously countering enemy initiatives in Quang Duc. All three infantry regiments, the 44th, 45th and 53d, have had heavy contact with enemy forces; and have experienced sustained combat with only periodic lulls. When the division began the redeployment to Quang Duc, three RF camps had been lost to the enemy. Shortly after arrival of division units in Kien Duc District, the district town was also lost to the enemy. However, 45th Infantry units recaptured the town and have performed effectively in several contacts with the enemy while conducting security operations in the vicinity of Kien Duc. The 53d Infantry inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in frequent minor contacts and some major contacts while sustaining light casualties themselves. The 44th Regiment supported Ranger units as they recaptured the Dak Song outpost. The unit has been involved in frequent contact with enemy units in the Dak Song vicinity with good success. Soldiers of the 45th and 53d Regiments have been credited with destroying or damaging three enemy tanks with anti-tank weapons. The division has been well-supplied during its deployment to Quang Duc; has maintained combat strength at 82%; and is considered a combat effective unit after demonstrating its mobility and readiness for combat.

(8) The 25th Division has experienced sporadic combat activity since the defeat of the 2/49 Infantry in late September and early October in Khiem Hanh District, Tay Ninh. Since that time, the 46th and 49th Regiments have been oriented to defensive positions in Tay Ninh. The new division commander, Colonel Toan, and new regimental commanders of the 46th and 49th Regiments, long considered poor units,

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are beginning to have a positive effect on their units. Four battalions are held in readiness to react to enemy activity while two battalions protect Tay Ninh. Security operations were conducted in Phu Kuong and Khiem Hanh Districts with moderate success. The 50th Regiment, operating in Phu Hoa, Binh Duong and Cu Chi, Hau Nghia has met with success in engagements with enemy units; and sustained only light casualties in attacks by fire. The division has dedicated efforts to upgrading tank defenses in anticipation of an enemy offensive. Three battalions cycled through the Cu Chi Training Center during the quarter. Strength exceeds 100% of that authorized. Since the division has not been heavily committed to combat, the leadership which assumed command during the quarter has not been tested. More training is still needed before the division can be considered more than marginally combat effective.

(9) The 5th Division, long identified as a weak unit, has also had a new commander (Colonel Vy) assigned. Considered ineffective, the division's training has been upgraded, especially in field operations and long range patrolling. In the past, division units have seldom ventured more than a few kilometers from their base camps. Consequently, most combat activity has been attacks by indirect fire. An increase in strength and more intensified training appears to be having a good effect on division units which have not been battle tested for several months. The regiments appear more confident but still require more training. As experience is gained and more aggressive security operations and patrolling are conducted, the combat readiness, now on the upswing, should improve significantly. However, until the unit is combat tested, combat effectiveness must be considered marginal.

(10) The 18th is still considered the best of the MR 3 divisions. The infantry regiments conducted local security operations at the beginning of the quarter and then were committed to multi-unit sweep operations in response to intelligence. The division proved responsive and effective against enemy units in Phu Giao District, Binh Duong; Tan Uyen District

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in northern Bien Hoa; and in Kiem Tan District, Tong Khamli. All three regiments demonstrated their mobility and readiness for combat in several sharp contacts with enemy units. Division morale is high and desertions were the lowest of the MR 3 divisions. When not committed to operations, battalions have been rotated through the Long Hai Training Center. Small unit leadership is effective and command at all levels is effective and competent. Currently, the division is committed to a defensive oriented posture. The division is combat effective and is ready to respond to enemy activity throughout the MR if necessary.

(11) The 7th Division has performed effectively and aggressively. Each of the infantry regiments has demonstrated mobility and responsiveness to enemy threats. Operating primarily in Dinh Tuong, each of the regiments, including the 14th Regiment while under the operational control of the 7th Division, inflicted significant casualties on the enemy. The 3/10th Infantry was defeated badly in Sam Giang District in late October, but by late November had recovered. In a significant contact in response to intelligence information, the battalion intercepted an enemy resupply group, inflicted heavy casualties and captured a large number of weapons in eastern Kien Tuong. The division has rotated battalions through the Dong Tam Training Center and has kept units on the move continuously in Dinh Tuong and Kien Thong. Although performing effectively in the field, problems are still experienced with desertion due to the mobile nature of division operations. The division has maintained the initiative against enemy and is considered combat effective.

(12) The 9th Division shifted its AO from eastern MR 4 in late November and assumed responsibility for the 44th Special Tactical Zone in the western Delta. Initially, the division moved with only one regiment, the 16th, to Chau Doc. The 14th Infantry Regiment rejoined the division in late December and was located initially in eastern Kien Phong. The 15th Regiment, the least effective unit of the division remains under the operational control of the 21st

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Division in Long My District, Chuong Thien. The Division had little enemy contact until the AO change. The 16th Regiment has experienced limited combat activity in Chau Doc, conducting sweep operations and aggressive patrols. The 14th Regiment has experienced more combat activity and has performed effectively in Kien Phong and Dinh Tuong. The division's mobile posture throughout the quarter has affected the desertion rate and has included a rotational training cycle. However, strength has increased to 90% authorized and the units have experienced increased combat operations against the enemy, especially in eastern Kien Phong. The division is considered combat effective though its redeployment to a new AO has resulted in personnel problems.

(13) The 21st Division is still the weakest in MR 4. Operating with four regiments, the division has begun to indicate improvement and increased mobility, heretofore a major deficiency. While the 15th Regiment, 9th Division has operated exclusively in Long My District, Chuong Thien, the three organic regiments, the 31st, 32d and 33d have operated in northwestern and southern Chuong Thien and northern An Xuyen. The 3/31st Infantry sustained heavy losses in V. Thanh District, Chuong Thien in later December, after being hit by heavy attacks by fire and an effective enemy ambush while attempting to relieve a beleaguered RF outpost. The 32d and 33d Regiments have experienced infrequent contact with the enemy except for standoff enemy attacks by fire. The division's strength has increased by almost 1000 troops. Some indications of improvement have begun to be identified but leadership problems at the company/battalion level must be solved and combat experience must be gained before the division can be considered more than marginally combat effective.

(14) As described in Chapter 13, the Ranger Command completed its reorganization in December. Ranger units have been heavily committed to combat activity throughout the quarter. Generally, ranger battalions operating in assigned tactical areas of operation in Quang Nam, Tam Quan District, Binh Dinh; in Pleiku,

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Kontum and Quang Duc in the Central Highlands of MR 2; and in the Seven Mountains area, Chau Doc in MR 4, performed effectively against the enemy. Significant casualties were inflicted on the enemy although the Ranger Battalions in Chau Doc sustained heavy casualties until the Seven Mountains Area was declared secured of organized enemy activity. Ranger battalions occupying camps in MR 2 and MR 3 have been subjected to heavy standoff attacks by fire and sustained only light casualties. The Tonle Cham camp in eastern Tay Ninh continues to require aerial resupply by parachute drop but the battalion continues to defend effectively. The Rangers are a valuable adjunct to MR forces and have demonstrated their combat effectiveness throughout the period.

(15) Roster key RVNAF Commanders:

(a) I Corps, Da Nang, MR 1.

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
LTG	NGO QUANG TRUONG	CDR, I CORPS/MR 1
LTG	LAM QUANG THI	DEPUTY CDR, MR 1
MG	HOANG VAN LAC	DEPUTY CDR, I CORPS
COL	HOANG MANH DANG	C/S, I CORPS
COL	PHAM KIM CHUNG	CO, 1 CORPS ARTY
COL	NGUYEN XUAN HUONG	CO, 1ST ARMOR BRIGADE

1 1st Infantry Division.

COL	NGUYEN VAN DIEM	CDR
COL	TRUONG TAN THUC	DEPUTY CDR
COL	NGUYEN HUAN	C/S
COL	VO TOAN	CO, 1ST INFANTRY REGT
LTC	HOANG MAO	CO, 3D INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN BUI QUANG	CO, 51ST INFANTRY REGT
LTC	NGUYEN THE NHA	CO, 54TH INFANTRY REGT

2 2d Infantry Division.

BG	TRAN VAN NHUT	CDR
COL	HOANG TICH THONG	DEPUTY CDR
COL	NGO VAN LOI	C/S
COL	TRUONG DUNG LIEM	CO, 4th INFANTRY REGT

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<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
LTC	CAM NGOC HUAN	CO, 5TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	NGUYEN THOI LAT	CO, 6TH INFANTRY REGT
<u>3</u> 3d Infantry Division.		
BG	NGUYEN DU HINH	CDR
COL	NGO VAN CHUNG	DEPUTY CDR
COL	NGUYEN KHOA BA	C/S
LTC	VU NGOC HUONG	CO, 2D INFANTRY REGT
LTC	VINH DAC	CO, 56TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	PHAM THE VINH	ACT CO, 57TH INFANTRY REGT

4 Airborne Division.

BG	LE QUANG LUONG	CDR
COL	TRUONG VINH PHUOC	DEPUTY CDR
LTC	PHAM NGOC LAN	C/S
COL	LE VAN NGOC	CO, 1ST ABN BDE
LTC	NGUYEN THU LUONG	CO, 2D ABD BDE
COL	VAN BA NINH	CO, 3D ABN BDE

5 Marine Division (VNMCM).

BG	BUI THE LAN	CMDT VNMCM
COL	NGUYEN THANH TRI	DEPUTY CMDT
COL	LE DINH QUE	C/S
COL	NGUYEN NANG BAO	CO, 147th MARINE BDE
COL	NGO VAN DINH	CO, 258TH MARINE BDE
LTC	NGUYEN THE LUONG	CO, 369TH MARINE BDE

(b) II Corps, Pleiku, MR 2.

MG	NGUYEN VAN TOAN	CDR, II CORPS/MR 2
BG	PHAN DINH NIEM	DEPUTY COMMANDER, II CORPS
BG	TRAN VAN CAM	C/S
COL	PHAM TRONG PHUNG	CO, II CORPS ARTY
COL	NGUYEN DUC DUNG	CO, 2D ARMOR BDE

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1 22d Infantry Division.

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
BG	PHAN DINH NIEM	CDR
COL	LEU THO CUONG	DEPUTY CDR
COL	VU DINH CHUNG	C/S
COL	PHAN DINH HUNG	CO, 40th INFANTRY REGT
LTC	NGUYEN THIEU	CO, 41ST INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN HUU THONG	CO, 42D INFANTRY REGT
LTC	LE CAU	CO, 47th INFANTRY REGT

2 23d Infantry Division.

COL	LE TRUNG TUONG	CDR
COL	TRAN HUU DUNG	DEPUTY CDR
COL	BUI HUU KHIEM	C/S
LTC	NGO VAN XUAN	CO, 44th INFANTRY REGT
COL	PHUNG VAN QUANG	CO, 45TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	TRAN VAN CHA	CO, 53D INFANTRY REGT

(c) III Corps, Bien Hoa, MR 3.

LTG	PHAM QUOC THUAN	CDR, III CORPS/MR 3
BG	DAO DUY AN	DEPUTY CDR, MR 3
COL	VU NGOC TUAN	C/S
COL	LE VAN TRANG	CO, III CORPS ARTY
COL	NGUYEN KIM DINH	CO, 3D ARMOR BDE

1 5th Infantry Division.

COL	LE NGUYEN VY	CDR
COL	NGUYEN BA THIN	DEPUTY CDR
COL	TRINH DINH DANG	C/S
COL	VU DANG CHONG	ACTG CO, 7TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	LUONG VAN BE	CO, 8TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN CHI HIEU	CO, 9TH INFANTRY REGT

2 18th Infantry Division.

BG	LE MINH DAO	CDR
COL	HUYNH THAO LUOC	C/S
LTC	LE XUAN HIEU	CO, 43D INFANTRY REGT
LTC	TRAN BA THANH	CO, 48TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	NGO KY DUNG	CO, 52D INFANTRY REGT

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3 25th Infantry Division.

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
COL	NGUYEN HUU TOAN	CDR
COL	TRAN VINH HUYEN	DEPUTY CDR
COL	TRUONG THANG CH C	C/S
LTC	CAO HUU NHUAN	CO, 46TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN VAN THUA	CO, 49TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	VU LE	CO, 50TH INFANTRY REGT

(d) IV Corps, Can Tho, MR 4.

MG	NGUYEN VINH NGHI	CDR, IV CORPS/MR 4
MG	TRAN BA DI	DEPUTY CDR, MR 4
BG	CHUONG DZENH QUAY	C/S
COL	TRAN VAN HAO	CO, IV CORPS ARTY
COL	NGUYEN VAN CUA	CO, 4TH ARMOR BDE

1 7th Infantry Division.

BG	NGUYEN KHOA NAM	CDR
COL	PHAM DINH CHI	C/S
COL	TRUONG VAN BUOI	ACT CO, 10TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	NHAN NHUT CHUONG	ACT CO, 11TH INFANTRY REGT
LTC	DANG PHUONG THANH	CO, 12TH INFANTRY REGT

2 9th Infantry Division.

BG	HUYNH VAN LAC	CDR
COL	NGUYEN DINH VINH	DEPUTY CDR
LTC	PHAM VAN VEN	C/S
LTC	LE TRUNG THANH	CO, 14TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN VAN LAM	CO, 15TH INFANTRY REGT
COL	NGUYEN VAN HAI	CO, 16TH INFANTRY REGT

3 21st Infantry Division.

BG	LE VAN HUNG	CDR
		DEPUTY CDR
COL	NGUYEN HUU KIEM	C/S
COL	NGUYEN VAN BIET	CO, 31ST INFANTRY REGT

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<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
LTC	NGUYEN VAN TAM	CO, 32D INFANTRY REGT
LTC	LAM CHANH NGON	CO, 33D INFANTRY REGT

(e) Ranger Command.

BG	DO KE GIAL	CDR
COL	NGUYEN QUANG KIET	DEPUTY CDR
COL	NGUYEN KHAC TRUONG	ACTG C/S

(f) Armor Command.

BG	LY TONG BA	CDR
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b. Artillery.

(1) Visits to artillery units revealed many of the past deficiencies noted in last quarter were not corrected and are compounded by additional deficiencies. Some of these are: failure to register weapons after repair or tube changes, failure to die stamp breech with tube change data and annotate gun book, firing graphic tables not updated, daily metro data not available, weapon calibration not performed by visual or radar observation, mil deflection per gun not registered to firing tables. Tube droop data per new tube not available or noted. Repair parts availability is not in line with material readiness. Organizational and support maintenance is inadequate.

(2) Maintenance float for the M-107, 175MM gun, is being used as a point of supply to maintain other items operational.

(3) An indepth study is presently under way to more adequately recognize these shortfalls. A team was fielded to MR 1 and MR 2 providing technical guidance, assisting in training and recommending actions to be taken. Commander CLC has been made aware of these shortfalls most recently noted in MR 2. Communication with ARMCOM is in process to obtain up dated data to firing tables and tube droop.

5-25

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Recommendations made during a recent visit to MR 2 were openly accepted and in many instances, on spot corrective actions were initiated.

(Figures 5-7A and 5-7B)

c. Armor.

(1) Extensive studies during visits to units authorized armored type equipment reveal that past deficiencies noted have not been corrected and are compounded by additional deficiencies. PLL for the support of this equipment is not in line with maintaining combat readiness. High failures of engines are attributed to lack of adequate operator service, organizational maintenance, and failure to change engine oil and filters when due. Training requirements for the M48A3 are in dire need for all personnel including the upgrading of the Ordnance School. Personnel previously trained cannot be identified in the field units.

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U N I T	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
<u>MR 1</u>									
10th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
20th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
30th How 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
44th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
(TF)									
20 Arty Plts How 155mm	40	40							
8 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	10	13							
3 Arty Bns/1st Inf Div	54	54	4						
3 Arty Bns/2d Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/3rd Inf Div	54	54							
101st How 175mm Bn							12	12	
102d How 175mm Bn							12	12	1
105th How 175mm Bn							12	12	
3 Arty Bns/Airborne Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/Marine Div	54	54							
SUB-TOTAL.....	320	323	4	72	72	1	36	36	1
<u>MR 2</u>									
103d How 175mm Bn							12	12	3
37th How 155mm Bn				18	18	2			
220th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
3 Arty Bns/22d Inf Div	54	54							
63d How 105mm Bn	18	18							
69th How 105mm Bn	18	18							
(TF)									
27 Arty Plts How 105mm	54	54							
230th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
Arty School	14	14		6	6		2	2	
National Military Academy	2	2							
3 Arty Bns/23d Inf Div	54	54							
29 Arty Plts How 105mm	58	58							
12 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	18	18							
SUB-TOTAL.....	290	290	0	60	60	2	14	14	3

Figure 5-7A

5-27

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U N I T	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
<u>MR 3</u>									
180th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
50th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
250th How 155mm Bn				18	18	2			
46th How 155mm Bn				18	18	2			
Ordnance School	2	2		1	1			1	
3 Arty Bns/5th Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/18th Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/25th Inf Div	54	54							
61st How 105mm Bn	18	18							
44 Arty Plts 105mm (TF)	88	88							
9 Plts Arty Rgr Grps	14	14							
104th How 175mm Bn							12	12	1
SUB-TOTAL	284	284	14	73	73	4	12	13	1
<u>MR 4</u>									
70th How 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
90th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
210th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
47th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
67th How 105mm Bn	18	18							
68th How 105mm Bn	18	18							
3 Arty Bns/7th Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/9th Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/21st Inf Div	54	54							
64 Arty Bns How 105mm (TF)	128	128							
8 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	8	8							
SUB-TOTAL	334	334	9	72	72	1			
MAINT FLOAT/REPAIR		97			75			18	
GRAND TOTAL	1228	1328	27	277	352	8	62	81	5

Figure 5-7B

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(2) Maintenance floats are not readily available near location and have become a point of cannibalization.

(3) To assist ARVN in correcting the short falls in the M48A3, a message has been sent requesting six (6) qualified technicians be provided from Army Materiel Command (AMC) on a 180 days TDY tour to conduct in-country training to user, support, and the Ordnance School. Included in this training will be shop operations, repair, and logistics support.

(Figure 5-8)

4. (C) TRAINING. Contract DAJB04-74-0018 with the Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated, provided 17 technicians to the 1st AAD in September 1973. Since that time, effective training has been rendered in the operation and maintenance of material handling equipment, with four classes completed encompassing a total of 45 personnel. Additional classes are scheduled for February 1974.

5. (C) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS.

a. Data Processing and Logistics Management: Review of National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) logistic management capabilities reveals a continued reliance on US contracted expertise. Technical assistance to be performed by the contractor consists of these major tasks: Supply Management, Maintenance Management, Financial Management and Logistic Data Processing. Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Services, which must be performed by the contractor to support accomplishment of the technical assistance tasks, are considered an integral aspect of the four major technical assistance tasks indicated above. ADP service required to support accomplishment of these tasks through participation of contractor personnel in hands-on systems analysis, computer programming, and program maintenance will be provided only after approval of the Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) will, in the course of monitoring the provision of technical assistance to NMMA and Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC), determine need and recommend to the requiring activity cases requiring ADP service to preclude deleterious impact on the functional logistic management system. By the end of the third quarter FY74, program maintenance services will be performed by the contractor only

5-30

CONFIDENTIAL

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U N I T (S)	APC M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
I Armor Bde	6	6							
4 Armor Cav.	40	38	2	17	17	2			
7 Armor Cav.	42	42	4	17	17	1			
11 Armor Cav.	42	40	1	17	16	1			
17 Armor Cav.	42	42	2	17	12	1			
18 Armor Cav.	42	42		17	15				
20th Tank Sqd	12	12					56	54	3
(MR-1 Sub-Total	228	222	9	85	77	5	56	54	3
II Armor Bde	6	6							
3 Armor Cav.	42	39	4	17	16	1			
14 Armor Cav.	42	44	15	17	13				
19 Armor Cav.	42	42		17	17				
8 Armor Cav.	42	44		17	17				
21st Tank Sqd	12	12	4				56	52	11
(MR-2) Sub-Total	186	187	23	68	63	1	56	52	11
III Armor Bde	6	7							
1 Armor Cav.	42	41	2	17	17				
5 Armor Cav.	42	39	4	17	17	7			
10 Armor Cav.	58	55	4						
15 Armor Cav.	42	42		17	18				
Armor/Ord School	20	19		10	12				
22nd Tank Sqd	12	12					54	54	2
(MR-3) Sub-Total	222	215	10	61	64	7	54	54	2
IV Armor	6	6							
2 Armor Cav.	58	55	6						
6 Armor Cav.	58	49							
9 Armor Cav.	58	56	13						
12 Armor Cav.	58	58	7						
16 Armor Cav.	58	54	9						
(No Tank Sqd)									
(MR-4) Sub-Total	296	278	35						
MAINT FLOAT/REPAIR					130			97	
TOTAL	932	902	77	214	334	13	166	257	16

5-31

Figure 5-8

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in support of programs of the Inventory Control Subsystem, which will be transferred to ARVN by end fourth quarter FY74, and as specifically requested by the requiring activity and approved by the Contracting Officer to support the efficient interface of LDSC and NEMNA.

b. Depot Operations.

(1) There are currently 339 ARVN personnel on temporary duty (TDY) to the 1st ARVN Associated Depot (1st AAD) Long Binh. They are scheduled to return to their respective units 31 January 1974. These personnel are gainfully employed in all areas of supply supplementing regular assigned personnel.

(a) Contract DAJB04-74-C-0018 with Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated (ECCOI) is providing 17 technicians to 1st AAD. They are furnishing technical assistance, training, and operational support in all areas of supply. Formal training classes have been completed in Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) Operators, Editing and Parts Identification, Care and Preservation (C&P), Quality Assurance (QA), Storage Operation and Document Control. Presently, classes are being conducted in MHE Maintenance and Air Conditioning and Refrigeration. Additional classes are scheduled for all subject areas through completion of contract 28 June 1974.

(b) Thirteen of the fourteen members of the AMC Depot Operations Assistance Team returned to COMUS in mid-December. The majority of the Depot improvements recommended by the team were adopted by the Depots and are in various stages of implementation. The remaining member is a Care and Preservation Specialist and is continuing assistance in this area.

(c) A replacement Depot Operations Technical Assistance Team consisting of ten members is being formed by AMC and is scheduled to arrive in RVN for a 6-month tour in latter January 1974. This team is to continue the assistance program established at the 1st and 2nd ARVN Associated Depots.

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c. Status of Ammo. (October to December 1973)

(1) Available beginning of quarter:

Short Tons: 131,519

Dollars: 267,131,529

(2) Expenditure during quarter:

Short Tons: 55,514

Dollars: 94,170,463

(3) On Hand end of quarter:

Short Tons: 105,034

Dollars: 198,785,824

(4) Requisition:

Short Tons: 27,050

Dollars: 38,686,513

(5) Stockage Levels:

Short Tons: 146,515

Dollars: 241,047,915

d. Shortfall.

(1) Logistics/Management. Middle management in both the Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC) and logistics operation at NMMA remains deficient. Command action is still being recommended for overall upgrading of supply positions in an attempt to acquire numerous supply people who have been trained at US supply activities, as well as the Central Training Institute. In addition, the following management actions are being continuously emphasized:

(a) Continue technical assistance in the area of requirements and distribution, with RVNAF personnel performing all operations, thereby gaining the experience needed to be self-sufficient.

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(b) Training on subject matter that is required for future program needs, i.e., excess, conversion to National Stock Number System, computation of supply control studies, etc.

(c) Continue training on the use of the advance computer systems from the standpoint of programmers and systems analysis.

(2) Depot Operations: The entire operation is still understrength and undertrained. Current operational status follows:

(a) US School Trained Personnel relative to Depot Operation: One Officer, presently assigned as Chief, Issue/Receiving Branch.

(b) Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE): Ninety-six pieces of MHE are operational from a total of 166 assigned to 1st AAD LB. There has been a total of four MHE operator classes and a total of 45 students graduated. This brings available operators to 95. Additional classes are scheduled for February 1974.

(c) Care and Preservation (C&P): One Officer is trained in C&P with 43 assigned personnel. ECCOI technicians have made all equipment that will be used operational. Additional work is being accomplished to install additional conveyors, and various other minor improvements that will simplify work. A proposed date of 28 February 1974 has been established to have this shop completely operational.

(d) Storage Operations: There are approximately 2,350 line items from the 40th Engineer Base Depot (EBD) move that require further processing; of this approximately 600 require further identification. This represents a reduction from the original estimate of 21,534. When location survey is completed, ten additional personnel are to be assigned to this area to eliminate backlog.

(3) Ammunition Deficiencies: (Terms usages: DODAC-Department of Defense Ammunition Code: BOH-Balance on hand).

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(a)	DODAC	A071 Cartridge, 5.56 Millimeter
	BOH	71.6 Million Rounds
	Stockage Level	193.3 Million Rounds
	% Stockage	37
(b)	DODAC	B568 Cartridge, 40 Millimeter M-79
	BOH	2.9 Million Rounds
	Stockage Level	4.1 Million Rounds
	% Stockage	70
(c)	DODAC	B627 Cartridge, 60 Millimeter, Illumin
	BOH	111.6 Thousand Rounds
	Stockage Level	199.4 Thousand Rounds
	% Stockage	55
(d)	DODAC	C256 Cartridge, 81 Millimeter Mortar
	BOH	214.7 Thousand Rounds
	Stockage Level	677.1 Thousand Rounds
	% Stockage	31
(e)	DODAC	G911 Grenade, Hand MK3
	BOH	413.8 Thousand Rounds
	Stockage Level	600.0 Thousand Rounds
	% Stockage	68

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(f) DODAC	M335 Fuze, Point Detonating M557
BOH	1,833.7 Thousand Rounds
Stockage Level	3,461.0 Thousand Rounds
% Stockage	53

The above figures represent the fourth quarter report for the month ending 31 December 1973.

6. (C) MAINTENANCE

a. Field Maintenance

(1) End use surveillance visits performed since April 1973 totaled 214. The number of these visits were reduced during this quarter to allow time for ARVN to react on most significant findings/recommendations resulting from extensive assessment of maintenance performance at selected major units.

(2) Command emphasis continues to improve state of maintenance. Specific actions underway include:

(a) Improve quality of work at organization and support level. Specify repair methods to prescribed standards. Establish a quality assurance program at these levels of maintenance.

(b) Streamline Prescribed Load Lists (PLL's) and reduce stockage list to combat essential and fast moving items.

(c) Eliminate Direct Exchange (DX) items from PLL's.

(d) Revise concept for conducting motor stables. Use training and performance method to cover specific portion of end items each day, with overall coverage in 5 or 6 sessions, i.e., session #1-engine, #2-gear lube & housing, #3-wheels & tires, #4-body bolts & battery, #5-spot paint, #6-BILI items.

(e) Establish a repair or replacement criteria for major items more realistic to requirement of support units, e.g., divisional: (15 days), Corps: (30 days), other: (60 days). Plan to replace all high mileage vehicles in divisional units within 6-12 months.

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(f) Establish a more responsive technical assistance program. Utilize Direct Support (D/S) more effectively in providing assistance in preventive maintenance and diagnostic methods. Consider establishment of Vietnamese civilian team for this purpose. Obtain skilled retirees as the nucleus for this team.

(g) Improve ir' asive management of those items causing most deadline.

(h) Establishment of a directorate for maintenance with full responsibility and authority over maintenance matters.

(3) The Operational Readiness (OR) rate for items in use is steadily improving. Although there are still difficulties in considering equipment deadline at organizational maintenance in computing the OR, the following shows a favorable trend in this direction:

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>
Materiel Handling Equipment	55%	65%
Track Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)	65%	74%
Combat Vehicles	80%	80%
Artillery	95%	97%
Communications and Electronics (C-E)	94%	96%

b. Depot Maintenance.

(1) Engineer Equipment. Progress continues to be made toward the attainment of self-sufficiency in the areas of rebuild and technical supply, although the following problems persist, which require technical assistance:

(a) Limited number of personnel capable of fully understanding US Technical Manuals.

(b) Inability to establish comprehensive training programs.

(c) Lack of proficiency at the middle management level.

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(2) Maintenance Facilities. Conversion to production line methods is now underway in many areas, while the remainder of operations continue to be accomplished in bays. Plans are also being developed for the accommodation of new items to the Depot Rebuild Program, as well as to provide for related test equipment.

(3) Technical Supply.

(a) Intensive efforts in identifying, location and inventorying technical supply stock, coupled with a detailed and comprehensive review of Bill of Materiel (BOM) requirements for the 3rd and 4th Quarters FY74 program, has allowed reduction in requirements of more than \$550,000.00. Requisitions were adjusted accordingly.

(b) 6,100 lines of repair parts have been declared as excess and reported to the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for disposition instructions.

(c) Shortages of warehouse storage space is hindering the warehousing of repair parts and is causing a backlog. It is anticipated that adequate warehouse space will be available during the early part of April 1974. All of the technical supply stock will be rewarehoused when the additional space is made available.

(d) A wall to wall inventory of technical supply stock was completed on 7 January 1974. The Locator Inventory Count has been provided the National Materiel Management Agency to be incorporated into the Republic of Vietnam Automated Materiel Management System.

(4) Vietnam Army Arsenal (VAA).

(a) Self-Sufficiency: Current assessment of self-sufficiency, in terms of skills, has been improving to an extent justifying reduction of 10 U.S. civilian personnel by 1 February 1974. Total self-sufficiency has been achieved in the areas of commodities, batteries and small arms. However, there is a slippage, in terms of equipment required to perform depot rebuild of ordnance major items, in the Power Train, Tire, and Materiel Handling Equipment Shops. Each of these areas is discussed separately under sub-paragraph (c), Maintenance Facilities, below.

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(b) Shop Supply. An inventory, including shop supply stocks, has been completed and recorded on the VAA asset balance file. During the third quarter FY74 a final review of stocks on hand and due in, versus program requirements for the next 12 months, will be made.

(c) Maintenance Facilities.

(1) Power Train Shop. Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1973 to 31 December 1973. Finalized shop layout is not expected until 1 May 1974 with a complete change over to the new layout by 1 June 1974. New test equipment is being constructed for CD-500 cross drive transmission with training required on new test procedures, etc.

(2) Tire Shop. Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1973 to 31 December 1973. To increase production capability by 25%, the present shop must be upgraded by the addition of new equipment. A request for this equipment has been submitted for funding (\$126,000). Upon receipt of this equipment, additional training will be required.

(3) Materiel Handling Equipment Shop (MHE). Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1973 to 31 December 1973. Because of untimely receipt of repairable assets at the rebuild facility, requisitions for necessary repair parts were late in being submitted. Accordingly, receipt of repair parts will be delayed.

(d) Phase II Upgrade and Foundry Installations.

(1) The objective of this upgrade is to provide the RVNAF with the capability to rebuild and test in-country combat vehicles (including battle damaged) and track shoes.

(2) The foundry installation is to provide self-sufficient in-country industrial manufacturing capability for production of source supply items, non-supply items, and repair parts line stoppers for Ordnance and MHE.

SECRET

(3) Status of new combat vehicle, artillery and track shoe shops.

Study period & Advertise From 1/73-12/73
Contract

Construction & Installation From 2/74-2/75

Training Period From 2/75-4/75

Begin Production From 5/75

(4) The foundry installation design was completed and contract advertised in October 1973. Due to lack of response, the contract was amended and readvertised with award of contract expected early in January 1974.

(5) Drawings have been completed for the design of a 3KM test track. No dates have been established for start of construction.

7. (S) PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL).

a. Restrictions imposed on oil suppliers by the Arabian and Singapore Governments against selling POL to the United States prohibits US involvement in petroleum contracts for RVNAF.

b. Acting under guidance from the US Departments of State and Defense, the RVNAF sought and secured petroleum supply contracts for CY74. One of four proposed contracts has been consummated and supplies are arriving in RVN against this contract. This contract will supply 82 percent of RVNAF requirements, providing crude availability to the contractor is not reduced from the Persian Gulf.

c. When the three additional contracts are consummated RVNAF will receive 100 percent of their petroleum fuels and lubricants from their own negotiated contracts. Financial assistance in the POL program will continue from the United States.

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d. In July 1973, it was determined that certain quantities of petroleum fuels would be required to support 70% of RVNAF operational ground equipment and programmed flying hours. Consumption of petroleum fuels per day was approved as shown below to meet this requirement. October 1973 saw the initial reductions in crude oil supply from the Arabia Gulf. To stay within the quantities of fuel available, fuel consumption was further reduced beginning 1 October 1973. Arabian embargoes against sale of petroleum products to U.S. were imposed in November 1973. During Oct - Dec 73, fuel consumption was reduced to stay within fuel availability. The quantities shown below for 1 Jan 74 are the lowest point that had to be imposed. With RVNAF contracts currently on-going, this quantity will not have to be reduced. With prospective contracts RVNAF may be able to increase their authorized consumption; however, it will not reach the July 1973 figure during CY 74 unless hostilities increase.

AUTHORIZED RVNAF DAILY FUEL CONSUMPTION (BARRELS)

	MOGAS	DIESEL	JP4	AV	TOTAL
1 Jul 74	3,233	10,266	6,666	1,800	21,965
1 Oct 73	3,100	9,766	4,800	1,636	19,302
1 Jan 74	2,926	8,703	4,880	1,499	18,008

e. Shown below are the percentages of reduction during Oct - Dec 73 when compared to 1 July 73 authorized consumption.

CONSUMPTION REDUCTIONS IN PERCENTAGES COMPARED TO

1 JULY 73 AUTHORIZATIONS

	MOGAS	DIESEL	JP4	AV	TOTAL
1 Oct 73	5%	5%	28%	10%	13%
1 Jan 74	10%	16%	27%	17%	19%

CONFIDENTIAL

8. (C) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations, less Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions. These are being accomplished by US contractor (Alaska Barge and Transport Company). Stevedore services are provided by ARVN military personnel and Vietnamese under contract with ARVN. Total tonnage handled through ARVN operated ports during period 1 April 1973 through 30 December 1973 amounted to 325,453 measurement tons (M/T) inbound and 9,813 M/T outbound for RVNAF; 42,232 M/T inbound, and 55,725 M/T outbound of US interest cargo.

b. Shortfall.

(1) During the 2nd quarter FY74 the RVNAF intra-coastal cargo movement capability became saturated to the point whereby a reported 30,000 M/T backlog developed. This backlog, involving all ports, was composed of normal resupply items and return of unservicable vehicles and components to repair facilities near Saigon. To assist in reducing this backlog, more than 7,000 M/T of cargo was moved from Newport to Da Nang aboard the Military Sealift Command (MSC) time chartered SS Seatrain Florida. No change in vessel itinerary was necessary as Da Nang was the next scheduled port of call. The feasibility of using this type of assist to further reduce the current backlog is being explored. To preclude recurrence of this situation the Combined Logistics maintain visibility of cargo offerings and movements to detect buildups at an early stage.

(2) Cargo handling operations aboard vessels is improving but remains substandard when measured against the Military Sealift Command standard of 1500 M/T per day. The average daily cargo handling rate of 959 M/T for the 2nd quarter FY74 shows continued improvement over the 773 M/T rate attained during the 1st quarter FY74. Efficiency in cargo operations will be stressed at every opportunity to the Commander, Central Logistics Command and terminal supervisory personnel.

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(3) Unsatisfactory conditions still existing remain relatively unchanged during this reporting period. The inefficient joint use of military and commercial stevedores to perform specific tasks involved in cargo operations has been discontinued. Commercial stevedores now perform all tasks to include vessel cleaning and cargo shoring.

(4) Port operations throughout the country must continue to be a subject of prime concern for the appropriate CLC Staff elements.

9. (C) FACILITIES ENGINEERING SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM.

a. Since March 1973, the facilities engineering contractor has been conducting an ARVN self-sufficiency program in facilities engineering operations. This program involves providing technical assistance to ARVN organizations in all facets of facilities engineering management and operations; conducting formal and on the job training in selected skills; and providing a limited amount of assistance to ARVN in the operation and maintenance of complex utility systems.

b. Technical and operational assistance programs are conducted by teams of contractor personnel located at the Office of the ARVN Chief of Engineers (OCE); the 13 Military Property and Construction Offices (MPCO's); the Medium Maintenance Centers (MMC's); and the 40th Engineer Base Depot. These teams assist ARVN in developing realistic Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE's) and Tables of Authorization (TA's); preparing and implementing uniform procedures for managing facilities engineering services; organizing and conducting on the job training programs; managing the Dependent Shelter Program (DSP) and Bulk Construction Materials (BCM) programs; calibrating equipment and operation and maintenance of SIMS sites and utility systems, conducting equipment overhaul/rebuild programs, etc.

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c. Formal training under the ARVN facilities engineering self-sufficiency program is being conducted in essential facilities engineering skills at training centers located in Da Nang and Long Binh. As of 31 December 1973, a total of 19 different courses had been conducted for 790 students. An additional 608 students are scheduled to undergo training prior to the end of the fiscal year. Upon graduation from the training centers, students are returned to their original unit for continuation of on the job (OJT) training or assigned to critical areas as needed.

d. The self-sufficiency program has progressed reasonably well to date. The current assessment of ARVN capability is:

(1) Manpower. ARVN is still lacking in sufficient numbers of trained personnel, especially in the skill areas associated with operation and maintenance of utility systems.

(2) Utilities Systems Maintenance. Lack of personnel and spare parts are the main problem areas. Assigned personnel are capable of performing most maintenance functions. However, they do not have the ability to diagnose major engine problems, and they are not yet capable of resolving major electrical and control circuit problems.

(3) Utilities Operations. ARVN has made good progress in this area, having assumed full responsibility for operation of all but two of the power plants transferred by the US. However, more trained personnel are required. Limited technical assistance will continue to be required for the foreseeable future, especially at the large power plants.

(4) Tools, Equipment and Supply Support. This is a definite problem area. Requirements are known and have been placed on requisition. However, the ARVN supply system has not yet reached a high level of responsiveness and as a result, the backlog of essential maintenance and repair has continued to grow and training programs have suffered.

(5) Publications. Missing publications have been identified and placed on order. ARVN can satisfactorily perform maintenance on those items for which technical manuals and/or commercial manuals are available.

CONFIDENTIAL

(6) Work Management. ARVN has demonstrated that they are capable of planning and completing work assignments satisfactorily.

(7) Formal Training. The entire program has progressed satisfactorily.

10. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM.

a. Since 1961, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has engaged in an effort to provide dependent housing for families of RVNAF personnel. Originally, the program was wholly sponsored by the GVN but as its extensive nature became more apparent, the United States began to assist with aid in the form of construction materials. By 1969, about 85,000 housing units had been completed but many had been destroyed by enemy action during TET Offensive and by weather. At the beginning of 1970, only 49,000 usable shelters remained. DAO is currently committed morally through Presidential promise to aid the GVN financially in the construction of 100,000 Dependent Shelter Units during the period CY 1971 through 1975. Funding for this program is:

(1) \$4.8 million OMA which is and can only be used for purchase of materials.

(2) \$600 thousand MCAF and \$600 thousand MCN that may be used either for labor or material, but is currently being used for material.

b. Additionally, the GVN Defense Budget has allocated an average of \$3,972,670 per year during CY71, 72, 73, and 74. Fifty percent of this amount (\$1,986,335) was funded by the US Government from Joint Support Funds. These funds are used for the contractor portion of the program for which all materials are supplied by US Government funds cited above.

c. The Navy and Air Force sponsored independent programs prior to the 1970 Presidential commitment that is additive to the 20,000 units per year in the Program; the Navy will build 5,184 units, the Air Force 400 units. These do not form a part of the basic program and will retain present sponsorship through completion.

CONFIDENTIAL

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d. The total program is now 34% complete. This program was initially constructed by military engineers and occupant self-help. Little contractor effort was used. Local contractor participation and local material purchases have increased each year to the point that in the CY73 program, 62% of the total effort was by local VN contractors and 48% of the materiel was locally purchased, thus enhancing both the construction and materiel industries. Although this program is currently intended for use by military dependents, it should be considered as a potential source of housing for Rural Development Cadres and for refugees.

e. During this quarter a country-wide survey of the constructed units and concurrent review of program management was conducted. Results in both areas revealed serious deficiencies. The construction program is approximately 27 months behind schedule, evidences a 26% vacancy rate (representing \$4.9 million) and is experiencing a 7% theft loss of materials. With the introduction of NSDM 210 and the construction facts noted above, it became apparent that the remaining shelters in the program should of necessity be constructed 100% by local contractors using local materials, and the basic unit required upgrading.

f. Legal prohibitions on the use of OMA funds preclude use for contractors, and outmoded fiscal limitations set in 1970 are preventing the necessary upgrade. Believing the original considerations and timetable for the program to be still valid and recognizing the economic importance of adherence to NSDM 210, the following plan of action has been derived:

(1) A design has been established which will enable increased local procurement and enhance habitability. Cost of materials will approximate \$550 each (versus current \$300 MACV limitation). Approval for this increase has been received from DOD.

(2) Separate the program into 2 phases (Phase I being the final 10,000 units of the first half of the program, and Phase II consisting of the final 50,000 units). Phase I units will be modified to include some improvements and Phase II will incorporate the new design and be under the sponsorship of USAID. This approach will cost an additional \$17.4 million.

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g. Increase the contractor participation immediately through use of the withheld \$1.2 million MILCON funds. DOD has been requested to consider early release of these funds.

h. Transfer the final 50% of the program to the sponsorship of USAID, thereby allowing 100% contractor participation and local purchase through an inspection and reimbursement upon completion of program. This approach will eliminate the shortcomings noted in the legal prohibition of the use of OMA funds.

i. Reductions in the RVNAF budget for the Dependent Shelter Program have caused a problem in that they do not have sufficient funds to pre-finance construction in Phase II of the program. Without this, there will be no means of recouping monies expended for materials. If additional funds cannot be obtained through in-country reprogramming of MASF funds or receiving supplementary funds from DOD, and GVN has no means to secure the pre-financing, the only alternatives left will be to go back to the original concept of building a nonhabitable facility or reducing the number of units in the program. Neither of the above alternatives is acceptable to RVNAF GVN, and therefore, we are currently at an impasse.

(Figure 5-9)

11. (U) ARVN-LOC PROGRAM.

a. During the past three months, delays have been experienced in construction projects under the ARVN-LOC Program. Only 30 kilometers of roads and 145 meters of bridges were completed during this period. The problems encountered were logistical in nature. The prime constraints were lack of POL, quarry expendables and transportation.

b. There are presently 8 active projects within the ARVN-LOC Program. These projects and their current status are outlined below:

(1) Ong Bo Bridge. This is the only ARVN-LOC project assigned in MR I. The Ong Bo Bridge on QL-1, a 113 meter structure is now in the redesign stage by the OCE Bridge Design Team. Construction is scheduled to begin prior to the end of 1974.

5-47

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM STARTS AND COMPLETIONS FOR ALL AGENCIES




Figure 5-9

5-49

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(2) LTL-07. Junction QL-14 to Cheo Reo, 48 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 202nd Engineer Combat Battalion is responsible for the highway construction, and the 215th Light Equipment Company is responsible for production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Phu Cuong Industrial Work Site. Construction completion is estimated at 43 percent.

(3) QL-14. Junction Route 431 to Dao Thong, 104 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway in two sections. The 65th Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction, and the 605th Heavy Equipment Company is responsible for production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Ban Me Thuot Industrial Work Site near Bridge 6. Construction completion of the first 44 kilometer section is estimated at 95 percent, and work on the second section has begun.

(4) QL-20. Dalat to the MR II/MR III Border, 157 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring 113 kilometers of highway in two sections. The 61st Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction and production of crushed rock and asphalt. The first 53 kilometer section is approximately 98% completed. The second section is currently approximately 20% complete.

(5) LTL-2. Junction QL-1 to 36 kilometers southerly of Junction QL-1. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 51st Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Nui Le Industrial Work Site on QL-1. Construction completion is estimated at 44 percent. Security constitutes a problem on this project.

(6) QL-4. Soc Trang to Ca Mau, 116 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway in two sections.

c. Management of the ARVN-LOC Program is scheduled to transfer from DAO to USAID by NLT 1 May 74. The program is being transferred primarily because it is of a nation building character and also because it will centralize management of the entire LOC Program.

(FIGURES 5-10, 5-11 and 5-12)

5-50

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ARVN-LOC


AS OF 1 JAN 74

ROADS :

SCHEDULED 659KM
COMPLETED 392KM
REMAINING 267KM

BRIDGES :

SCHEDULES 5,298 METERS *
COMPLETED 1,853 METERS
REMAINING 3,445 METERS



* DOES NOT INCLUDE REDECKING
OR REPAIR OF 6,178 METERS.

Figure 5-10

5-51

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ARVIN - LOC ROADS (KILOMETERS)




Figure 5-11

5-53

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


Figure 5-12

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12. (U) MASF/MILCON,

a. Projects Under Construction:

	<u>NO.</u>	<u>CWE \$ VALUE (000)</u>
Hospital	1	2,387
Ammo Depots	1	30
Const Bn Facility	1	163
Logistics Depots	2	539
Const Br	<u>2</u>	<u>3,703</u>
Total	7	6,822

b. Projects Under Design:

Logistics Depots	2	1,215
------------------	---	-------

c. Projects Funded, on Sponsor/SECDEF "Hold":

Ammo Depots	5	4,401
-------------	---	-------

13. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS

Overall progress toward ARVN self-sufficiency during the quarter has been noted in some of the vital logistical areas, and the short falls recorded throughout the chapter have been brought to the attention of the commanders concerned. In the majority of instances ARVN personnel have favorably reacted within the constraints of their available resources whenever a short fall has been brought to their attention. Heavy ARVN command emphasis is being continuously placed on maintenance at all echelons since it has become common knowledge throughout the ARVN that the level of US support must eventually be reduced in accordance with funding limitations as dictated by US Congressional interests. ARVN is now convinced that they must identify and dispose of their excesses, and it is anticipated that the momentum gained in the last quarter will be continued. Effective 31 Jan 74, the DAO Army Division authorized strength for US DOD employees will be reduced from 285 to 191 and internal capabilities

5-56

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will decline accordingly. Through a series of pre-planned internal organizational realignments and redistribution of individual work loads, all mission essential functions will continue to be conducted at a reduced level of performance. It has been noted that the frequency of technical assistance visits to units can be correlated to the readiness and maintenance posture, and therefore a concerted effort will be made to conduct the maximum number of visits to ARVN organizations within the residual capabilities of the DAO Army Division.

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CHAPTER 6

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: The VNAF strengths, weaknesses, logistics, equipment status, OR rates and the DAO assessment are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. Current overall VNAF manning is 96 percent, officer manning is 79 percent, enlisted manning is 99 percent, and civilian manning is 76 percent of the authorized level.

(Figure 6-1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 2,503 squadron pilots represent 65 percent of the authorized manning. Figure 2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to Figure 2 column labeled assigned OR/TNG. This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuation/upgrade training. The majority of them are capable of performing basic combat missions.

(Figure 6-2)

3. (S) AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The authorized Air Order of Battle (AOB) is shown by military region. The AOBs closely represent the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 and 6-6)

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VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/BASE	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		TOT MIL.		CIVILIANS	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
HQ VNAF	894	510	2036	1794	2930	2304	99	35
ACA	19	14	66	47	85	61	0	0
AC&W	136	123	815	751	951	874	1	1
ATLC	391	235	5858	5012	6249	5247	98	345
AMC	51	32	112	97	163	129	9	4
AOC	342	262	667	670	1009	932	0	0
ATC	390	260	921	978	1311	1238	23	7
Air Admin Unit		14		112		126		5
Bien Hoa - 3d AD	1298	839	7539	5435	8837	6274	137	63
Binh Thuy - 4th AD	853	407	4758	3857	5611	4264	74	19
Da Nang - 1st AD	1133	733	6403	5172	7536	5905	150	97
Nha Trang - 2d AD	803	438	3977	3432	4780	3870	70	21
Phan Rang	329	201	2481	2215	2810	2416	0	0
Phu Cat	524	253	3248	2331	3772	2584	0	0
Pleiku - 6th AD	632	371	3346	2718	3978	3089	47	8
Can Tho	492	400	2833	1658	3325	2058	46	0
Tan Son Nhut - 5th AD	1234	971	6274	5185	7508	6156	163	92
Sub-Total	9521	6063	51334	41464	60855	47527	917	697
Pipeline		1411	3469	12797	3469	14208		
Total	9521	7474	54803	54261	64324	61735	917	697

Figure 6-1

6-3

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CONFIDENTIALVNAF PILOT/COPILOT MANNING

TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED OR/TNG	TOTAL ASSIGNED	%
A-37	350	189/3	232	66
A-1	123	85/0	85	69
F-5	197	92/24	116	58
Total Ftr/Attack	670	366/27	433	62
C-7	135	101/52	101	74
C-130	118	99/34	99	83
Total Cargo	253	200/86	200	77
UH-1	1983	909/186	1095	55
CH-47	180	93/61	154	57
Total Helo	2163	1002/247	1249	57
Liaison (U-17, O-1, O-2)	324	249/0	249	76
AC-119K	59	29/27	56	94
AC-119G	59	31/32	63	106
AC-47	53	28/29	57	107
Total Gunship	171	88/88	176	102
RC-119 L	43	9/4	9	20
EC-47	95	80/35	80	84
RC-47	44	33/22	33	75
U-6	10	10/0	10	100
Total Recce	192	132/61	132	68
T-37	31	21/0	21	67
T-41/01	27	37/0	37	137
UH-1	16	8/0	8	50
Total Training	74	64/0	64	86

Figure 6-2

6-5

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
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Figure 6-3

6-7
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
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Figure 6-4

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
SECRET**MR 3**

Figure 6-5

6-11

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SECRET**VNAF****MR 4****BINH THUY / CAN THO
4th AIR DIV****84 WING**

211 38 UH-1
 225 38 UH-1
 227 38 UH-1
 259J 12 UH-1

74 WING

116 25 O-1
 7 U-17
 122 25 O-1
 7 U-17
 520 24 A-37
 526 24 A-37
 546 24 A-37

64 WING

217 38 UH-1
 249 16 CH-47
 255 38 UH-1
 259H 12 UH-1




Figure 6-6

6-13

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4. (C) VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY:

A firm base line has been established for the VNAF aircraft inventory by type, location and tail number. The following schedule shows aircraft status as of 31 December 1973:

<u>ACFT TYPE</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>RECD 1-28-73</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>ATTRITED (1)</u>	<u>OTHER LOSSES</u>
A-1	72	79	72	7	3 (2)
A-37	240	248	237	11	9 (2)
AC-119G	18	23	23		
C-119G		21	13		8 (3)
AC-119K	18	22	20	2	
C-130	32	32	32		
O-1	165	239	192	12	46 (4)
O-2	35	35	33	2	
T-37	21	24	24		
U-6	8	10	10		1 (2)
U-17	58	85	85		1 (2)
C-123		19			19 (5)
C-7	48	56	54	2	1 (2)
T-41	18	24	24		
CH-47	64	70	69	1	3 (2)
UH-1	842	861	814	47	36 (2)
F5A/B/RF	152	151	145	6	8 (2)
C-47 ALL	66	76	69	3	6 (6)

Legend:

- (1) Losses which have been verified by JGS.
- (2) Damaged or lost aircraft have not been verified by JGS as of 31 Dec 1973. Totals included in possessed column.
- (3) Eight aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.
- (4) Thirty-five aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. Eleven aircraft damaged or lost which have not been verified by JGS as of 31 Dec 1973.
- (5) Nineteen aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.
- (6) Four aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. Two aircraft damaged or lost which have not been verified by JGS as of 31 Dec 1973.

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5. (C) MAJOR EQUIPMENT STATUS:

Current aircraft status rates are depicted in Figures 6-7 through 6-23. In the following paragraphs items causing Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) conditions, in excess of the VNAF standard rate of five percent, are addressed by type of aircraft.

a. O-2A Aircraft: Main contributing factors are the long lead times involved for obtaining spares replacements. ATLC repair capability is impaired due to lack of major item component parts and their resupply lead time. The recently established critical item review board will insure adjustment of demand levels and timely requisitioning.

b. U-17 Aircraft: Problems are lack of ATLC repair capability and most components are requisitioned by part number as the U-17 aircraft is commercially supported. All items causing NORS conditions are reviewed by inventory managers to adjust levels and follow-up on all due-ins. Action has been initiated to obtain commercial overhaul manuals from Cessna to increase ATLC repair capability.

c. T-41 Aircraft: Problems were experienced with long repair cycle item (Propeller) and no governor repair capability. Intensive management has been applied to NRTS reparable, adjustment of stock levels and to improve and expedite repair. Action has been initiated to obtain commercial overhaul manuals from Cessna to increase ATLC repair capability.

d. C-47 Aircraft: Reasons for high NORS are the lack of component repair capability at ATLC and long lead time on stock replenishment from CONUS. Follow-ups are made on all outstanding requisitions and levels are being adjusted as required.

e. C-130 A Aircraft: A very limited repair capability exists at ATLC for C-130 aircraft items. A full range listing of components was received from WRAMA 23 December 1973 and is now being reviewed by ATLC/AE to improve the ATLC repair capability. This action should reduce the NORS rate on the C-130 aircraft. Intensive management has been initiated with constant review and adjustment of levels as required. Fuel leaks have plagued this weapon system during this last quarter.

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



Figure 6-7

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ASSIGNED: 54
POSSESSED: 43

TRANSPORTS C-7



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Figure 6-8

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


Figure 6-9

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



Figure 6-10

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GUNSHIP AC-119K


ASSIGNED: 20
POSSESSED: 18



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Figure 6-11


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Figure 6-12


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Figure 6-13

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


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Figure 6-14

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
FIGHTERS A-37




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Figure 6-15

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Figure 6-17

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



Figure 6-18

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
Figure 6-19

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UTILITY O-1

ASSIGNED: 182

POSSESSED: 161



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Figure 6-20

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



Figure 6-21


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Figure 6-22

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Figure 6-23

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f. AC-119 Aircraft: ATLC has no capability to repair pumps and compensators. Inventory Managers are expediting NRTS action, adjusting levels and following up on all due-ins.

g. UH-1H Aircraft: Army Intensified Managed Items (AIMI) are the primary reasons for the high NORS rate on the UH-1H aircraft during the current quarter. Twenty-three AIMI items were GNORS support only. During the quarterly AIMI conference (Dec 73), the GNORS support items were reduced from 23 to three which should reduce the NORS rate.

h. C-7 Aircraft: Main contributing factor is the long lead times involved for obtaining replacement engines. An adequate supply of battery cells have been received. Outstanding repair parts for actuators and inverters hampering ATLC repair capabilities; however, follow-ups are being made to expedite delivery. A critical NORS item review board is established to insure adequate levels are reflected and requisitioned.

i. F-5 Aircraft: Main contributing factors were long lead times involved in obtaining serviceable replacements, repair support components and lack of ATLC depot level repair capability. Inventory Managers are continually expediting DIFM assets for repair, reviewing levels and following-up on all NORS and stock replenishment requisitions. The J85-13 engine has been a big pacing item which is now beginning to look much better.

j. A-37 Aircraft: Main contributing factors were long lead times involved in obtaining serviceable end item replacements and/or repair support component parts and lack of ATLC depot level repair capability. Inventory Managers are following up on GNORS and stock replenishment requisitions and reviewing levels to insure logistic support.

6. (C) AIR TECHNICAL LOGISTICS COMMAND:

a. Supply and Transportation Center.

(1) Considerable improvement has been made to VNAF asset visibility through a location validation and wall-to-wall inventory of ATLC assets. The location validation of depot assets has been completed with the exception of some items undergoing rewarehousing actions and

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items requiring inspection for correct identity, condition and status.

(2) The complete wall-to-wall inventory originally scheduled to begin on 1 August 1973 was delayed until 12 September 1973. This slippage was due to inadequate VNAF manning, concentrated efforts to eliminate backlogs and involvement in the inventory location validation and rewarehousing project. As of 20 December 1973, 62,000 or 38% of the projected 160,000 locations have been physically counted. Although intensified action is continuing, some slippage of the 28 February 1974 scheduled completion date is anticipated.

(3) Statistical sampling quality programs utilizing MIL STD-105 have been implemented for two major processes. The first process is a continuous sampling of all warehouses to determine location accuracy. This project commenced in November and involves the taking of samples before and after the wall-to-wall inventory to determine the degree of accuracy. Warehouses not meeting an acceptable accuracy level are scheduled for a 100% validation. The second process involves the conducting of quality checks which are made during the wall-to-wall inventory physical count. Lots and areas not measuring up to a minimum established standard are rejected and recounts are performed. There is a very critical need to extend quality control sampling techniques through all major processes in the Supply and Transportation Center; however, due to the shortage of both quality and quantity of assigned VNAF personnel, this program cannot be expanded at this time.

(4) Inspection Support: A shortage of qualified VNAF personnel in the material and equipment inspection area is hindering progress. Currently, there are only two qualified supply inspectors assigned and none in training. In an effort to alleviate this condition, an amendment to PA&E Contract F62272-73-C-0042 has been proposed that would permit the hiring of 15 US (Contract) supply inspectors. If approved, these inspectors would be utilized to perform supply inspection functions and also provide on-the-job training for VNAF personnel.

(5) Receiving.

(a) The receiving facility is functioning very efficiently with an average of 1,000 receipts being processed daily. This function is totally VNAF with the exception of one DAO technical assistant to the

6-51

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1 Chief of Receiving.

(b) A continuous overflow condition exists in the receiving area. To eliminate this problem, an 8,000 square foot shed is under construction with completion scheduled for 1 February 1974.

(6) Storage Facilities: The movement of five warehouses from Cam Ranh to Bien Hoa AB has been completed and these facilities are being utilized. There is still a need for additional warehouse space which is evidenced by the fact that nine storage facilities at Tan Son Nhut are being used to store ATLC assets.

(7) Controls: A central receipt and issue control section has been established within the Material Facilities Division to plan, schedule and control all issues and receipt documents. The section is VNAF operated and is functioning very effectively.

(8) Satellite Repair Teams:

(a) All ten Satellite Repair Teams are fully interfaced in every functional area with VNAF. In addition, a crash fire and rescue specialist is provided to each team.

(b) The VNAF is providing as many trainees as their manning structure will allow. Three bases, Binh Thuy, Phan Rang and Phu Cat are nearing self-sufficiency. The major obstacle to complete self-sufficiency is the lack of understanding of supply requisitioning procedures.

(c) Greater emphasis will be placed on OJT and reports during the second half of FY 74. This will provide the VNAF with a clearer picture of the capability of their personnel and point out future training requirements.

(9) Packaging and Crating:

(a) VNAF personnel have been given extensive training in the operation and maintenance of the Instapak Foam-in-Place packaging machine. Follow-up inspections indicate that VNAF personnel are operating these machines effectively and efficiently.

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(b) Overall VNAF approach to self-sufficiency is nearing a realization. However, a shortage of supplies exist at some bases due to the lack of VNAF understanding of supply requisitioning procedures.

(10) Manning: The VNAF manning within the Supply and Transportation Center is currently 66 percent. There are 859 authorized spaces with 564 personnel assigned.

(11) Vinnell Corporation Contract (F-62272-74-C-0005):

(a) The month of December 1973 was devoted to termination of contractor operations. All complete work, in-process items, accompanying supplies, demand supported stockage, and related shop stocks were disposed of by 21 December 1973. Government furnished property was 40 percent redistributed by the same date to consignees specified by the property administrator.

(b) The loss of this facility to support VNAF will have an impact on the Special Purpose Equipment Fleet, which has about a six months backlog of rebuild work for both Vinnell Corporation and Commando Wheels. VNAF will now cover this area.

(c) The Vinnell Corporation capacity and facilities exceeded those of Commando Wheels (Lear Siegler Inc.) having full operational responsibility and access to the US Government and CONUS supply channels through the use of an "EY" supply account system. In an effort to promote greater VNAF self-sufficiency, the Commando Wheels revised mode of operations, effective 1 January 1974, will place this operation under VNAF control and leaves a minor American influence in management assistance status, plus a LN workforce augmentation. Change from the "EY" supply account and local purchase channels places the operation dependent upon the VNAF supply system for obtaining necessary parts and supplies. This is a major departure from dependence upon US operated and managed facilities. Vietnamization is truly being put into effect here.

b. Base Support Group (General Activity):

During this reporting period the major effort of the Base Support Group has been placed upon completing action items outlined in the V-Log report. The most pressing being construction projects in the Civil

6-53

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Engineering area. In addition, an all-out effort was instituted for the design and construction of a computer facility to supplement the present building. In the other sections, the major effort has been on reviewing management procedures for the purpose of identifying problem areas and instituting corrective measures. In general, accomplishments have been achieved, but not to the extent or degree desired. Additional effort will be placed in resolving these problems during the forthcoming months.

(1) Civil Engineering Support: Since the last report all warehouses being constructed under project BNH 33-3V have been completed and are now in beneficial use. Paving of the area around the warehouses remains to be completed. Fourteen other construction projects are presently underway at Bien Hoa in support of the ATLC mission. The majority of the projects are for the construction of buildings which will house various repair shops. Included in this category are the following:

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>USE</u>	<u>CONTRACT SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE</u>
BNH-8-3V	Vehicle Repair Shop	30 Dec 73
BNH-10-3V	Jet Engine Repair	30 Dec 73
BNH-11-3V	Engine Test Cells	15 Jan 74
BNH-12-3V	Aircraft Maintenance	15 Jan 74
BNH-13-3V	Packing & Crating Bldg	30 Dec 73
BNH-14-3V	Receiving Building	30 Dec 73
BNH-16-3V	Accessories Repair Shop	30 Dec 73
BNH-17-3V	Avionics Repair Shop	15 JAN 74
BNH-18-3V	C-130 Nose Docks	15 Jan 74
BNH-19-3V	Fuel System Repair Shop	30 Nov 73
BNH-32-3V	Ground Communication Equipment Repair Shop	30 Dec 73

(2) The completion of these projects is of utmost importance to the total ATLC mission as they will be utilized in the various training programs. Delays in their construction will have an adverse impact on the total program. The delay will cause slippage in the installation of equipment and in turn prevent productive utilization of the shops. Presently it appears that these delays will be from 30 to 90 days. Construction of the computer building is progressing rapidly and a completion date of 1 February 1974 is scheduled.

(3) The Base Maintenance contract was extended to

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30 June 1974. This contract provides training of Civil Engineering personnel. In so far as the availability of contractor personnel permits, augmentation of the Base Civil Engineering force is also provided. Additional training and augmentation of the VNAF Base Engineer Forces is considered prime importance because of the assignment of low skill level recruits. Personnel assigned to Civil Engineering Squadron is as follows:

	<u>SKILL</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
1.	Officers	4	7	57%
2.	9 Level	0	7	0%
3.	7 Level	8	31	26%
4.	5 Level	58	124	47%
5.	3/1 Level	149	133	112%

(4) Pacific Architects and Engineers has established an On-Job-Training (OJT) course in carpentry, painting, plumbing/boiler maintenance, sheet metal/welder, refrigeration/air conditioning, electrical, water/sanitation, entomology, masonry, production control, POL and roads/grounds. A total of 24 ATLC personnel have completed OJT. One of the 24 personnel completed the 7-level, five the 5-level, and 18 the 3-level training. A special graduation exercise was held for the first group of students to complete the OJT program. Twenty-two additional VNAF personnel have been added to the class rolls. Instructor outlines, study guides, and training aids are being developed for formal classroom instruction. In addition, USAF Specialist Training Standards are being rewritten for the use of VNAF.

(5) Training in engineering, drafting, surveying, supply, material control, estimating, clerical and administrative type fields is considered weak; however, much improvement has been noted in the work control center. There is strong evidence of VNAF capability in accepting responsibility and self-organization. The squadron commander has been conducting weekly meetings in which work requests are reviewed for priority of accomplishment and the status of each project is determined. In addition the Commander has briefed the various VNAF staff agencies at Bien Hoa Air Base on the functions and organization of the Base Civil Engineers.

6-55

CONFIDENTIAL

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An energy conservation program has been initiated and emergency night and holiday crews established. A problem for the day crew is the lack of transportation to and from job sites. A request to increase the vehicle authorization list has been sent to higher VNAF headquarters.

(6) Base Support Supply Squadron:

(a) Considerable progress has been made in this section to improve the operation during this reporting period. Reworking of materials and review of paper work procedures was accomplished. Previously the lack of adequate facilities made it impossible to properly warehouse stock. All automotive parts were stored in one small warehouse with no bin locations. As a result of a concerted effort by the DAO and the VNAF, a new building was obtained, bins constructed, and all material rewarehoused. The material was inventoried and all data documented. Through this effort, it is anticipated that the vehicle deadlined for parts rate will be significantly decreased.

(b) The next rewarehousing effort will be directed toward Base Civil Engineering materials; however, this effort is delayed for lack of an adequate warehouse. A survey of the documentation flow was conducted and the "bottleneck" areas pinpointed. Management attention has been focused on these areas to alleviate these stumbling blocks which should greatly enhance the smoothness of the supply operation.

(7) Other Supply Squadron Problems:

(a) Manning: Multiple problems continue to exist due to inadequate manning and insufficiently trained personnel. The low skill level of personnel, only a shade above the raw recruit level, results in minimal support in some areas. This problem will be eradicated if the proposed contractor augmentation for this area is approved.

(b) Transportation: Prior to this past quarter, available vehicles were in very limited supply. During the past quarter, Base Support workload showed a vast increase, thus rendering vehicle availability within the critical area. Additional vehicles have been requested, so far, without positive results.

(8) Vehicle Squadron Support: The VDP rate, which

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is the primary factor used to portray our mission readiness, has continued to remain at an extremely high level staying close to 25 percent. A closely coordinated effort between the Vehicle Squadron and Base Supply is underway in an attempt to lower this rate to an acceptable level. Shortage of both diesel and gasoline fuel has presented some problems. Imposition of 40 percent cutback of fuel provided the impetus for institution of emergency procedures in the form of gas rationing and other stern controls. Even with these measures, operations would have been seriously curtailed; however, fuel availability enabled the full operation to continue, but controls are still tightly maintained as supply is not sufficient to operate freely.

c. Materiel Management Center (MMC):

(1) The Materiel Management Center is currently 82 percent manned which represents an increase of 8 percent this quarter. As rapidly as basic training is completed additional VNAF personnel will be assigned. Plans are currently being formulated by VNAF training personnel to concentrate on increasing the quality of assigning trained VNAF personnel rather than striving for a totally manned organizational structure.

(a) PA&E contractor supply management training is continuing on schedule with completion scheduled on or before 30 June 1974.

(b) The assignment of competent top-level middle management personnel is continuing to present problems; however, this condition is being alleviated to a degree through the assignment and OJT of junior grade officers and warrant officers. More officers and NCO's are still required to provide VNAF with the necessary middle management personnel level for proper operations.

(c) Overall manning for ATLC remains at approximately 95 percent; however, this figure includes those VNAF who have not completed their basic training and received their organizational assignments. The assignment of these personnel has slipped from November 1973 and is currently planned for January 1974.

(2) Facilities: Construction of the new VNAF/ATLC "C" configuration U 1050-II computer system facility began on 15 November 1973. Completion date for the facility construction is 1 February 1974. The two "C" configuration U 1050-II computer systems are now scheduled for shipment to VNAF/ATLC during February 1974

6-57

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(system #I) and May 1974 (system #II). Estimated computer installation and check out time is 30 days after receipt of equipment. The additional capability provided by these systems will enable the VNAF to computerize management of Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) assets at the Air Divisions and free the present "B" system for production of other important management products.

(3) Equipment Management:

(a) Both Officers and NCO's have a good understanding of correct management procedures and all assigned personnel are trained to a near self-sufficient level. Currently PA&E contractor LN personnel are still assigned as augmentees. Plans are for these personnel to be scheduled for either phase out or retention as Vietnamese Civil Servants. The PA&E personnel are currently training newly assigned VNAF personnel who have completed formal classroom instructions.

(b) Three areas still require additional training attention; however, VNAF personnel could manage the operation with only limited DAO guidance. These areas are as follows:

1 Document Control: Redistribution of excess equipment located during VNAF inventory.

2 Authorization and Allowance: Conducting surveys of authorization and utilization of equipment at all VNAF bases. (As bases are surveyed a close review will be made as to correct table of allowance application and retain minimum quantities).

3 Registered Equipment: Reviewing VNAF registered vehicle authorization listing in a joint DAO/VNAF effort (an extremely urgent requirement).

(4) VNAF Requisitioning: Procedures were developed to automatically release requisitions under \$500 within country program limitations. Items requisitions over \$200 require increased review at higher management levels based on dollar expenditure. ALC commenced computer releveling and requisitioning of EOQ and repair cycle replenishment stock 30 September 1973; this action is continuing. Selective requisitioning is being made for AIMI and NORS items.

CONFIDENTIAL

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(5) **Reparable Processing:** Actions are underway to condense existing VNAF procedure governing DIFM processing at base level. DAO/ALC recommended that the complete flow be charted and distributed to all bases. Full time monitors have been appointed at each base. Actions are taken to establish the ALC Reparable Processing Center as a reparable warehouse. A recommendation that serviceable assets from shops be routed to central receiving in lieu of the Reparable Processing Center (RPC) will be included in the VNAF/ALC procedure. Inventory of assets in the RPC and adjustment of computer records was completed 30 November 1973. Inventory accuracy was 76 percent with the net result being a gain of approximately 400 units valued at 256 thousand dollars.

(6) **Common Service Item Support:** ALC submitted a total of 2124 separate requisitions for common service items to the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) during this quarter. Nine hundred twenty-one of these requisitions were initiated 19 December and, as of 21 December no status had been received. Of the 1203 requisitions submitted earlier in the quarter, 233 requirements have been received (19 percent), 522 have been backordered (43 percent), 52 have BA status (4 percent), 17 other status (2 percent) and 97 have been cancelled (8 percent). No status has been received on 379 (24 percent). Overall quarterly demand satisfaction on NMMA support was 68 percent which reflects an increase of approximately 60 percent since the last quarter.

(7) **Funds Management:** The VNAF are now proficient in processing requirements and analysis of the H051 system R-18 report. This was accomplished by revising the recently developed funds control procedures to clarify manual processes and the display of flow process charts in the work area. Training in preparation of budget inputs and use of MAP/MASF reference documents is being initiated. In addition, implementation of PACAF developed V-55 computer program is being planned. This program, designed to provide asset consumption history, will be used to develop more realistic budget estimates.

(8) **AIMI:**

(a) DAO/VNAF/ALC is currently developing a procedure to increase intensive management of AIMI (Items).

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The procedure will include daily item manager review of D06 transaction registers to record each separate AIMI receipt in order to develop comprehensive analysis of Army supply support.

(b) Problems in requisition flow between ALC, AFLC HO-51 system, WRAMA and Army have continued. Updated procedural guidance is expected from AFLC during January 1974 which should alleviate much of the difficulty.

(c) Administrative coordination between RVNAF and DAO, coupled with funding problems, has prevented VNAF representation at quarterly AIMI conferences held at USAAVSCOM in St. Louis. Efforts are underway to insure VNAF officer participation at the 4th Quarter FY 74 conference which is tentatively scheduled for March 1974.

(9) Seek Point:

(a) It has become necessary to place the Seek Point program under intensified management with a weekly conference being held at ALC. Attendees include VNAF/Sierra Research/DAO representatives. Progress has been made toward efforts to provide required support.

(b) VNAF/ALC have taken an active part in the materiel management of Seek Point and should become proficient in the near future; however, additional training will be required before complete self-sufficiency is attained.

(10) NORS Reconciliations: VNAF/ALC began monthly reconciliations of outstanding NORS requisitions in October 1973, by message to CONUS supply sources, on C-7, CH-47, UH-1H and O2-A aircraft. During December, reconciliation was expanded to include U-17 aircraft and all "E" (Engine) NORS condition requirements. Monthly reconciliations will continue until support is satisfactory.

(11) Computer Downtime:

(a) With the exception of 62 hours downtime on the "E" Primary System during the periods 29 - 30 November 1973 and 1 - 5 December 1973, due to Immediate Access Storage Fastrand (IAS DRUM) problems, remedial downtime and Input Backlog on all systems continues to show

6-60

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

improvement. Input backlog on the "E" primary system as of 0800, 26 December 1973, is zero. Reports continue to be processed on a timely basis and Air Divisions continue to receive better in-line support.

(b) Actions are currently being taken to improve VNAF computer support capability and further reduce computer remedial downtime. Two additional "C" configuration U1050-II computer systems are scheduled for installation in the Spring of 1974. It is anticipated that Satellite EOQ and DIFM items will be converted to this system. To further reduce remedial downtime, action is being taken to repair all VNAF backup ADP equipment (file loader, printer, card punch, remotes and switching devices). On 4 December 1973, an essential parts list for repair of these components was forwarded to WRAMA/MMU and Bunker Ramo World Services Corporation to expedite requisitioning action. One Remote Switching Device has been installed and is operationally ready at the VNAF 5th Air Division, Tan Son Nhut AB. Remote Switching Devices at the other Air Divisions will be installed as parts are received and Bunker Ramo Engineers are available for the necessary TDY.

(c) The DCT 2000 transceiver at Bien Hoa has been inoperative since 29 November 1973, due to cable problems between Bien Hoa and Clark AB. Estimated repair is dependent on receipt of grappling gear ordered from CONUS and weather conditions in the area. Card data will be flown to and from Clark AB daily until cable repairs are completed.

d. Maintenance Engineering Wing (MEW):

(1) Industrial Engineering Division: VNAF Industrial Engineering consists of three branches: Service Engineering, Work Measurement and Plant Services.

(a) Service Engineering Branch: The branch is presently manned by two Engineering Officers and three draftsmen. The authorized strength would require five additional trained Industrial Technicians or Engineers. This branch has the equipment, technical data, directives and procedures necessary to support MEW. At present, there are eight contractor engineers augmenting this branch.

(b) Work Measurement Branch: The branch is staffed with one Engineering Officer and ten trainees. Students

CONFIDENTIAL

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of this branch completed formal training 1 October 1973 and are now engaged in assigned tasks while receiving OJT from two contractor engineers. This branch has directives and procedures to support the MEW, but additional personnel and training will be necessary to become fully operational.

(c) Plant Services Branch: The branch has facilities, equipment, tools, technical data to support the MEW. This branch is a production shop with work being accomplished by contractor personnel who are, in conjunction with their production program, rendering VNAF personnel OJT training, in skills necessary for Plant Services operation. Authorized personnel for this branch is ninety-five but only 78 are assigned. In order to support the mission of the MEW it is necessary that VNAF manning be brought to the authorized strength and the additional personnel be fully trained in specific skills. The contractor effort augmenting this branch was scheduled for phase out 1 December 1973; however, a new phase out date of 1 July 1974 has been requested due to slippage of construction programs.

(2) Aircraft Repair Group:

(a) Training: The A-37 and F-5 ACI, Crash/Battle Damage and Corrosion Control Teams have arrived in-country. Both teams have prepared training materials but are awaiting an interpreter to proceed with the training program. A total of 19 students have been graduated from the first to the second phase of the LSI production training program.

(b) Facilities: The three cargo aircraft nose docks are under construction and should be completed by 30 January 1974. The nose docks will help eliminate the crowded conditions in the other aircraft working areas. Expansion of the wash rack facility has been approved but not funded.

(c) Manning: Aircraft Repair VNAF personnel assigned strength is now approximately 69 percent of the authorized level. This represents a two percent increase over the past quarter.

(d) Equipment: A lack of tools continues to be a problem for the VNAF. The tools have been on order for several months but not received. Work orders have been initiated for local manufacture of special tools.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Propulsion Group:

(a) Of the 493 authorized VNAF personnel for Jet Engine Overhaul Facility, 441 are presently assigned. A total of 150 have completed training in their assigned skill categories with 104 students now in training in the Engine Shop.

(b) The VNAF continues to progress in the self-sufficiency with students graduating in Engine Mechanics, Cleaning, Inspection, Machining, Welding, Balancing and Testing programs. The high speed air motors have been received and put to good use in a concentrated training/production program in the parts rework area. This effort has helped relieve reworked components shortages which were hampering training in many other areas of the Engine Shop. Training quality has improved in direct proportion to the productive flow of the Engine Shop. November was the most productive month.

(c) The fuel component test area is not yet completed. Most of the problems are of a minor nature, i.e., missing fittings, calibration of flow meters, broken or damaged components of test stands and unknown or unanticipated malfunctions. Each of these problems contributes excessively to the overall slippage due to time required for logistic support. New target date for completion of this area is 1 February 1974.

(d) Rotor Blade Shop has accomplished certification of the facility by producing 63 serviceable blades in the period from 13 November to 12 December 1973. The locally developed training plan was submitted and training can now be emphasized instead of facility certification. There are only two other such facilities in the world and they are both located in CONUS. Thus a "bench mark" has been established for VNAF self-sufficiency.

(4) Armament and Electronics Group:

(a) Manning: Strength (67 percent) has not improved during the past three months. The present authorized personnel quantity is 502 versus 337 VNAF personnel assigned.

(b) Equipment: Equipment received is 84 percent complete for all Armament and Electronics Group Shops

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excluding the Electronics Warfare Shop which is still in the development stages. Of a total of 2,786 items required, 2,363 have been received. The Electronics Warfare Shop is in receipt of only 21 AGE items of a total of 620 required. The CA/CRL was just recently approved for this shop. VNAF has concurred in having the Electronics Warfare Shop perform intermediate level maintenance in support of F-5E systems; such as the Fire Control Radar-AN/APQ153, Lead Computer Optical Gunsight-AN/ASG29, IFF/SIF-AN/APX72 and other items. The Instrument Shop has virtually reached 100 percent capability and lacks only a minimum of AGE items and some technical orders.

(5) Manufacturing and Repair:

(a) Manning: The authorized strength is 798 military and 65 LN civilians. Assigned strength is 624 military and 120 LN civilians. Contractor (LSI) is authorized 82 personnel and has 82 assigned. Total VNAF personnel strength has increased to 86 percent, an increase of 13 percent since last reported. Contractor personnel strength has increased to authorized strength, enabling the group to maintain its production capability and increase the number of students in training.

(b) Training: Formal training and over-the-shoulder training is being conducted by contract. There are presently 146 trainees in Airframe Repair, Plastic/Fiberglass, Welding/Heat Treat, AGE, Plating and Machine Shop Training Programs. A training package has been approved for diesel generator repair and is presently being translated into Vietnamese. Training is being accomplished in the Plastics/Fiberglass career field. During the period of this report seven Sheet Metal, three Heat Treat and three Plastic/Fiberglass trainees have graduated. Construction slippage of project BNH-12-3V to 30 January 1974 restricted training in Heat Treat and Plastic/Fiberglass.

(c) Equipment: The group presently has 78 percent of authorized equipment on-hand. An inventory has been completed and follow-up action initiated to obtain shortage. This item remains a special interest item until completed.

(d) Technical Data: The group presently has 83 percent of required technical data on-hand. All data

CONFIDENTIAL

presently required has been placed on order. This item remains a special interest item until completed.

(e) Facility: Completion date of construction of Bldg 2275E, 9800 square feet expansion of Hangar A, has been slipped to 30 January 1974 with an additional forty-five days estimated for installation of equipment.

(f) Production: Production capability has been maintained in the Sheet Metal Shop during this period. Additional capability is being developed in other group shops.

(6) Commando Wheels:

(a) The approved VNAF strength for this facility is seven officers, 238 airmen and 60 civilians. Assigned as of 30 December 1973, are 2 officers, 2 Warrant Officers, 154 airmen and 22 civilians. This equates to approximately 58 percent of the authorized strength. The contractor has 240 LNs employed. These personnel are integrated into all phases of the vehicle overhaul facility and are receiving OJT and assistance from 32 US contractor personnel. This facility overhauled 128 vehicles and 810 components, such as engines, transmissions, starters and alternators.

(b) Commando Wheels graduated 125 students from formal training. These students will be returned to their respective air divisions.

(c) The Commando Wheels contract also provides ten satellite repair teams to furnish technical assistance and OJT for base level vehicle repairman. These teams will provide repair assistance and OJT for 565 VNAF personnel.

(7) Accessories Repair Group:

(a) Facilities: Contracts for projects 16-3V and 19-3V, scheduled for completion 15 September 1973 are now scheduled for completion 1 February 1974. This slippage compounds not only the VNAF training programs and production output, but extends a similar period to the modification project of Bldg 2700 (expansion of the Electrical Shop) due to the moving of shops temporarily located therein into the new Bldg. (Project 16-3V). The Environmental Shop Bldg 1785 is presently being modified by Plant Services with expected completion 15 February 1974.

6-65

CONFIDENTIAL

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(b) Equipment: Studies to determine the total equipment requirements are presently being purified through the computer products before placing the balance on order. A problem still remains in determining the receipt and location of equipment previously shipped.

(c) Manning: Manning is now 94 percent complete with the remaining 6 percent expected by 1 February 1974.

(d) Training: The training program in the Electrical Shop provides 48 students with training in various areas. Lesson material is being prepared (written, translated and typed) for each end item and in each shop. Presentation of lesson material will be given as facilities, TO's, tooling, equipment, translators, and instructors are available.

(e) Technical Data: All technical data is either on hand or on order.

(8) Production Control: Production Control Division current authorized strength is 222 personnel with 144 assigned. Formalized production control training, including OJT, has been conducted by the LSI instructors for 101 VNAF personnel. In addition to the training program, this division has guidance from an ALCM 65-1. This manual is a two-part directive which describes procedures the VNAF are currently using and provides recommendations to satisfy procedural deficiencies. Communication operations through the A-1 push button telephone key system has been inadequate in the Production Control Division. To improve the communication operations a wireless radio intercomm system has been approved and authorized by DAO for procurement.

7. (C) VNAF BASES:

a. Communication-Electronics.

(1) Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) and Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Facilities: Project Commando Gopher (Project Code Designator 480) has been established to resolve the immediate and near term requirements of VNAF to restore equipment and facilities to technical order specifications within three (3) phases:

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Phase 1. Determination of Requirement: This phase is partially completed inasmuch as the pre-IRAN equipment surveys, reports, and recommended Depot Level Maintenance (DLM)/Service Repair Activity (SRA) schedules have been accomplished by PACAF/DCM Teams and DAO/AF Division. Based upon the surveys, Bill of Materiel (BOM) are requisitioned by VNAF Air Technical Logistics Command (ATLC) and monitored by the DAO/AF Division. These materiels consist of replacement parts, bits and pieces, swap out of components and basic equipment. This phase was tentatively scheduled for completion during November; however, due to the late receipt of BOM's from the survey teams by the ATLC, requisitions started to be processed in mid-December, which caused slippage in the overall project milestone schedules. The estimated receipt date of BOM's is unknown at this time.

(b) Phase 2. Quickfix: This phase will consist of a quick-fix effort by having the BOM materiels installed and checked out by VNAF/Contractor on-site technicians. This action should upgrade the facilities to minimum acceptable (or higher if possible) technical order specifications, with some assistance from ATLC personnel. Minimal out-of-country DLM assistance will be required in the AC&W area. During this phase, a quantity of AN/TRN-6 TACAN single-channel units will be swapped out to bring up, in the case of a two-unit system, one unit to technical order specifications. In the areas where only one-unit AN/TRN-6 is installed, the required units will be swapped out. The Phase 2 target date of completion was 1 January 1974; however, due to the slippage, the new estimated completion date is 1 February 1974, which is dependent upon timely receipt of the BOM's.

(c) Phase 3. Long Range Restoration: This phase consisted of long range restoral efforts. Accomplishments are predicated upon meeting the CONUS SRA schedules proposed in Phase 1. This also includes the modifications of TACAN's to AN/URN-3 configurations at the SRA's prior to return to RVN. The "get well" date was initially established as 30 June 1974. However, the target date is dependent upon swap out assets availability within in USAF and the rate of rotation of VNAF assets through the SRA, the long term SRA schedules may run into FY 76.

(2) The Page Communication Engineers, Inc. AC&W NAVAIDS Contract was extended from 30 September 1973,

CONFIDENTIAL

to 1 April 1974, for on-site technical personnel and the ATLC portion was extended until 1 July 1974. The contractor requirements will be reviewed during February and May 1974, respectively, against existing requirements and recommendations made for any necessary actions. A revised contractor Statement Of Work (SOW) was accomplished and became effective 1 October 1973. The revised SOW defines Contractor Personnel Qualifications and allows for the On-Site Contractor Technicians to perform production as well as OJT. Contractor On-Site technician will perform maintenance services with VNAF Technicians to provide OJT to the maximum extent possible.

(3) Precision Approach Radar, PAR-2: Building construction at Tan Son Nhut AB was completed in December 1973. The first PAR-2 shipped into country was located and inventoried by a PCA EI team. The intercom set, indicator junction box and installation hardware were missing. A waveguide section was found damaged requiring repair or replacement, and the intersite cabling was missing. The PCA team reordered the installation hardware which has been shipped to Bien Hoa ATLC.

(a) DAO Operations and Plans has recommended to VNAF that the PAR-2 project be cancelled because of the possible difficulties in providing logistic support. It is not a military system, consequently USAF cannot provide direct support. VNAF is willing to cancel provided an AN/MPN-13 is received in lieu of the PAR-2. The problem was referred to Director of Material Management at SMAMA and to AFCS, Richards Gebaur AFB, MO for action.

(b) The intersite cabling (except ground cable), depot and site spares and the first shipment of installation hardware have been located. Still missing are the intercom set, junction box, a good waveguide section, ground cable, the spare set, and the second shipment of installation hardware. Upon receipt of the first four missing items, installation can be completed.

(4) Weather Recorder Facsimile Equipment.

(a) The VNAF has approved change out of the four Weatherfax RJ-4 Facsimile leased units (Recorders, Facsimile, AN/UXH-2) which are in the Federal Stock List Catalog. AFCS Headquarters, PACCOMMAREA, and CINCPACAF have approved the conversion, and return of the RJ-4 units to the contractor. This conversion will enhance VNAF supply system support and improve the

CONFIDENTIAL

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reliability of their Weather Data system.

(b) Action to obtain the AN/UXH-2 units has been initiated. As they are received and placed in operation, the RJ-4 units will be returned to the contractor.

(5) T2/T4 Radar Simulators (Systems Development Corporation): The ACO at DCASR Los Angeles has delegated contract monitoring authority to DAO, AF Division Contracts Management Office. Contractor personnel continue to make field trips and conduct frequent training exercises. The AC&W Group personnel are satisfied with the received services and have expressed a desire for the training consultant service to be continued through 30 June 1974. The VNAF request for extended service was addressed at a negotiating conference in December, and the consultants will be retained through 30 June 1974. Logistic support is still a significant problem. By juggling major components, personnel have managed to make the equipment operational (limited in some cases) at all sites.

b. VNAF Base Civil Engineering (BCE) Training:

(1) Further training of VNAF personnel in Base Civil Engineering skills is a continuing requirement. The need for this training effort has been recognized and both contractors (PA&E and Kentron) have had their respective contracts extended through 30 June 1974 to provide the VNAF with additional training in essential Civil Engineering skills and disciplines. These are airfield related skills such as interior and exterior electricians, power production, refrigeration/air conditioning, water/sewage, entomology and pavements.

(2) Power Production: A modification has been negotiated with Kentron Hawaii, Ltd., to extend the power production contract F62111-71-C-0056 from 1 January 1974 to 30 June 1974. The contract was further modified to provide only OJT and technical assistance for all VNAF Base power plants. The training, is for Nordberg generators and provides for 24-hour technical assistance.

(3) Facilities Maintenance: PA&E O&M contract F62272-73-C-0072 and Kentron Hawaii, Ltd., contract F62272-73-C-0056 have been extended, by modification, to include the third quarter of FY 74. Major changes to these contracts include the deletion of operations

CONFIDENTIAL

and maintenance by the contractors. Contracts now provide for only training and augmentation of the BCE work force and LN employees. This training and augmentation is confined to mission essential areas.

(4) Fire and Rescue Program.

(a) With the exception of Binh Thuy and Can Tho Air Bases the fire prevention program has improved; however, deficiencies still exist. Some of the prevalent problems are:

- Inexperienced driver/operators
- Inadequate preventive maintenance
- Noncompliance with standards and procedures
- Inability to maintain an adequate bench stock

(b) Regular meetings of VNAF fire chiefs are held at VNAF HQ to discuss current problems. An attempt to improve morale has been initiated by organizing inter-base evaluation contests.

(c) Intensive training programs in crash rescue, fire protection and equipment operation will be set up at each base beginning 2 January 1974.

(5) Preventive Maintenance: BCE contractors and VNAF BCE have established preventive maintenance programs at each base. Provisions for this program have been incorporated in contract modifications to cover scheduled periodic building, facility repair, scheduled periodic equipment maintenance and overhaul.

(6) Housekeeping: All housekeeping activities have been assumed by VNAF Civil Engineering. The Civil Aviation Director will assume this responsibility, at Tan Son Nhut only, for those areas of common usage, i.e., taxiways, runways, etc., as of 1 January 1974.

(7) Translation of AFM 85-1: The policy procedural guidance manual has been submitted to VNAF-DE and final action is pending. This manual is a simplified version of AFM 85-1 translated into Vietnamese. Revision is now underway to provide material control instruction and policy.

(8) Local National Personnel: A requirement for 25 LN engineers and administrative support personnel was projected for Civil Engineering Air Force Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

Of these, 21 have been selected, processed, and are presently receiving OJT from their U.S. counterparts; one individual is being processed and the remaining three positions are under recruitment. LN engineers are assigned with their US counterparts to each VNAF air base as the Civil Engineering base manager.

(9) Facility Utilization Survey:

(a) A joint VNAF/USAF Civil Engineering Facility Evaluation of VNAF Bases, for the period of 4 October to 1 December 1973, has been completed. The DATT was briefed on an analysis of this survey early in December. A similar briefing to PACAF HQ was subsequently made by the PACAF team leader.

(b) At Da Nang AB, a program to consolidate six power plants into three power plants is underway. The base is implementing a program to demolish 282 wooden buildings and 44 metal buildings. In addition, large areas of unused apron are to be sterilized.

(c) The Phan Rang AB south asphalt runway and concrete taxiway to the south are excess and will be sterilized. Fifteen pre-engineered metal buildings are excess and have been identified for relocation to other projects.

(d) The Tan Son Nhut AB demolition program includes 500 wooden and 43 metal buildings. This plan to demolish dilapidated and excess structures will greatly reduce the maintenance workload on VNAF Air Bases.

(10) Manning of VNAF Civil Engineering: The number of assigned personnel is still short of the authorized strength. Unfortunately, many of these shortages are for skills needed for specialized fields which VNAF is unable to supply. Primary critical skills are interior/exterior electricians, refrigeration/air conditioning mechanics, water/sewage technicians, entomologists, air-field pavement crafts and power production technicians. Contract augmentation has assisted by supplying approximately 460 LN's.

(11) Certification of VNAF OJT Trainees: Contractor reports indicate that, as of 31 December 1973, 62 power plant operators, 24 power plant mechanics, and 6 power plant electricians have been certified as qualified technicians through OJT.

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(11) Certification of VNAF OJT Trainees: Contractor reports indicate that, as of 31 December 1973, 62 power plant operators, 24 power plant mechanics, and 6 power plant electricians have been certified as qualified technicians through OJT.

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(b) A total of \$2,160,000 has been approved for dependent shelters (MCP), or \$1,560,000 in CY 71 funds and \$600,000 in CY 72 funds.

(c) The CY 71 program calls for 2,400 units with construction started on 2,160 units of which 1,490 units have been completed and 1,370 units are occupied. The CY 72 program calls for 2,000 units with construction started on 1,990 units of which 1,700 units are completed and 1,014 units are occupied.

(d) Numerous construction slippages are still being experienced. Primary causation is the inability of Vietnamese contractors to meet U.S. work standards and scheduled completion dates.

(e) Skilled personnel and material shortages are also a contributing factor. For example, the Bien Hoa contract 73-C-0277 for 10 depot MCP projects to relocate or replace repair and maintenance shops was targeted to be completed 9 November 1973. As of 31 December 1973 approximately 50 percent of construction has been completed. The primary cause of delay was the contractors refusal to purchase cement due to high prices and devaluation of the VN piaster. A cure notice has been issued by DIRCON and if conditions are not met, the contract will have to be cancelled and awarded to another contractor that can meet the revised schedules.

c. Air Transportation:

(1) VNAF has performed the Military Air Transportation Terminal (MATT) operations in a professional manner with the assistance of a DAO contractor augmentation force. DAO/VNAF coordination has been excellent under the counterpart concept and has continued to result in steady progress. Several programs are being planned and will be implemented to include the establishment of a flight line function, which will absorb the contracted technical assistance role, upon completion of the contractor augmentation, when the VNAF becomes totally independent.

(2) The PA&E contract F62272-73-C0045 provided continued guidance and technical assistance in the operation of the MATT at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. VNAF provided operation/management in all areas of the port to include mobility teams, pallet build-up, and all other areas of

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Bien Hoa AB

<u>DATE</u>	<u>VNAF INPUT</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR PHASEOUT</u>
1 Jan 74	10	
15 Jan 74		10
1 Mar 74 *	6	6

* Scheduled complete contractor phaseout.

(6) The VNAF transport fleet moves cargo and passengers between twenty-two MATTs and several areas which require air support due to enemy activity. Daily air support requirements, as a result of hostile action which cuts off surface resupply, are passed to the CLC operations where they are validated, consolidated and fragged on the available aircraft scheduled to operate the following day. These missions take priority over all other requests. Routine requirements are also submitted to CLC via the Area Logistics Command and are fragged according to the demand, which is dictated by the hostile activity in the respective military regions.

(7) Log air requirements are passed on a daily basis from the MATTs in the field to VNAF headquarters, Chief of Transportation, where they are evaluated and fragged accordingly. Three aircraft are dedicated to the logair system (1 C-130A and 2 C-7A Aircraft). The following schedule represents VNAF cargo and passengers moved in-country during a nine month period:

	<u>C-7 AIRCRAFT</u>		<u>C-130 AIRCRAFT</u>	
<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PASSENGER</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGER</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
March	7.088	235.920	12.590	559.600
April	9.059	253.630	21.525	958.500
May	12.232	212.400	29.623	1.047.050
June	13.119	140.520	26.786	727.900
July	10.885	177.350	28.091	558.700
August	9.698	186.850	32.691	532.200

6-75

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	<u>C-7 AIRCRAFT</u>		<u>C-130 AIRCRAFT</u>	
<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PASSENGER</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGER</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
September	7.384	148.700	31.060	1,298.000
October	5.527	134.000	24.030	866.250
November	5.530	145.300	27.760	2,136.450
MONTHLY AVERAGE:	8.946	181,630	26.017	902.905

d. Intermediate Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) Aircraft spares and Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) were based on the low projected flying hours and are not tailored for an accelerated expansion of the flying hour program. Additional AGE and spare support levels were established and necessary actions taken to make the equipment and material available. Supply discipline is poor, DIFM items are not being returned to depot for repair and supply follow-up is not responsive. The contractor (LSI) management team is evaluating the ineffectiveness of the shop repair capability, which is inadequate due to the low skill levels and lack of established bench stocks.

(2) AGE notification by CINCPACAF (Msg 200300Z of December 1973) provided guidance for the immediate input of 3 (MD-3) generators and 3 (MJ-1) bomb lifts to the China Air Force (CAF) for repair and/or overhaul on contract F4606-74-C-0519. Action has been initiated through VNAF to expedite the shipment of the six items to the CAF facility.

(3) Two contractor (LSI) teams are scheduled to work on AGE repair at VNAF bases. VNAF personnel are being provided OJT by the Contractor team in conjunction with O&I maintenance of AGE items. Problems are being encountered by the teams, i.e., items previously identified as operational are now in need of repair due to cannibalization of parts. Another problem area is the delayed receipt of requisitioned parts required for repair of AGE equipment. The production status is as follows:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>IN WORK</u>
Tan Son Nhut	168	0
Bien Hoa	74	16
Da Nang	25	3
	<hr/> 267	<hr/> 19

(5) The non-availability of R2000-7M2 engines directly affects the VNAF ability to return weather/damaged C-7 aircraft to operational status. The R2000 engine status is as follows:

- . Eighteen are required
- . Ten engines are enroute from CONUS (which completes scheduled returns for November and December 1973)
- . Seventeen engines are scheduled for return during the month of January 1974.
- . Nine reparable engines are enroute to the overhaul facility
- . Six reparable engines are awaiting containers for shipment.

Man-hours utilized to support the weather damaged aircraft repair has strained the available resources but has improved status of aircraft. One aircraft has been repaired and five are in work at Da Nang; an additional two aircraft have been repaired and one is in work at Phu Cat.

(6) UH-1H Aircraft 2200 Hr P.E.: During the period of 26 October to 10 November 1973, a team of technical personnel from Warner Robins Air Materiel Area, Aircraft Division, conducted an on-scene evaluation of the UH-1H 2200 HR P.E. Recommendations were to drop the 2200 Hr P.E., accomplish a 100 Hr P.E. on UH-1H aircraft past due on 2200 Hr P.E. and adopt the aircraft condition inspection system (as per Army Pamphlet 750-12 (1)) as follows:

(a) Modify the aircraft condition profile from a computer analysis to a manual determination. Augment the Air Divisions as necessary to catch up on accumulated and inadequate maintenance work specifications requirements (based on actual helicopter condition). The team's

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recommendations to drop 2200 Hr. P.E. were approved.

(b) A limited number of Aircraft Condition Profile reports that have been customized to VNAF operations have been received. A workable plan to officially integrate usage of forms by VNAF has been distributed. The rework of 31 CBD UH-1H has been approved by AUSCOM.

(c) Air Vietnam has completed five 2200 Hr. P.E. inspections with twelve 2200 Hr P.E. inspections remaining in work. ATLC has completed three 2200 Hr P.E. inspections. Final input was 22 aircraft with 19 currently being in work.

(7) A position has been established in DAO for a corrosion control specialist to monitor the Corrosion Control Program. The monitor is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam 7 January 1974 to establish a comprehensive VNAF Corrosion Control Training Program.

(8) EC-47 Aircraft: A program to combat in-flight crew fatigue has been initiated. In flight rations, are being made available and hot cups for each aircraft are being procured.

(a) The basic VNAF problem of writing technique and clarity, when recording and reporting electronics discrepancies, is improving. Formal classroom training for VNAF electronics personnel is in preliminary stages. Bravo classroom instructions are scheduled to commence in February 1974. Doppler classroom instructions are in progress and OJT training will be concurrent with classroom instruction.

(b) Equipment to calibrate the C-12 compass is on-hand and technical orders for calibration are being processed at Tinker AFB. Technical orders will be forwarded to VNAF by 1 February 1974.

(9) Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM): Survey of jet engines by location and condition was completed and aircraft engine data prepared for computer application. The initial order of spare parts, designated Project Code N72 material, requisitioned during September 1973 are currently being received at ATLC/Bien-Hoa. Local procedures were prepared, coordinated with all concerned (VNAF/ALC) and disseminated to all JEIM base supply activities during December 1973. This material

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is being handled on a select basis to insure proper distribution is made based on the type of engine being in work at each JEIM location and on monthly workload projection. Initial distribution was started 4 December 1973. The J69 engine items ordered have been received and ALC/Bien Hoa is in the process of shipping the total quantities to the Phan Rang JEIM site.

(a) The Initial Spares Support List (ISSL) received for the J85-13, 17, 17A engines from SAAMA, Kelly AFB, were considered less than adequate to support the VNAF program under the current hostile environment. Manual build-up of ISSL's is currently underway and follow-on requisitions will be submitted to appropriate AMA's upon completion. Estimated completion date is 15 January 1974. The ISSL for the T56 engine was received from Kelly AFB during December 1973. Spare parts and tools will be placed on order upon completion of the asset survey. Estimated completion date is 28 February 74.

(b) Headquarters VNAF has prepared the necessary work request for country requirements for the six JEIM activities, approved the recommended JEIM and list of special tools required for the T53 and T55 engines. Activities will be advised accordingly and special tools will be placed on order. Estimated completion date is 25 January 1974.

(c) Of prime concern is the need for required Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) equipment. Regardless of the level of JEIM a minimum of five equipment type items are required. (Magnaflux Unit, Zyglo System, Eddy Current Tester, X-Ray Machine, and Ultrasonic Test Unit). An NDI team has been dispatched to visit all activities. The team will determine whether activities have submitted justifications for authorization of equipment and submitted requisitions accordingly; and whether the NDI facilities are adequate. The itinerary and a written report is currently being prepared.

(d) The JEIM project office is consolidating all actions taken to date in regard to spare parts, special tools, equipment, and technical data. When consolidated listings are available and matched against available assets, and on-order quantities, facts will be compiled accordingly. JEIM activities will be notified to send selective representatives to ALC-Bien Hoa for information on what must be accomplished by each activity to support JEIM.

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(e) Continual monitorship, visitations, and constant communication will be maintained by the Centralized JEIM Control Point in order to keep all JEIM activities apprized of ATLC progress. Assistance will be provided to solve local activity problems if any are being encountered, and to allow for a more homogeneous working relationship between depot and base.

(10) Maintenance Achievements/Deficiencies:

(a) A-1 Aircraft: Two aircraft were processed through IRAN, and two crash battle damaged aircraft repaired. Fuel cell modification (2135 TO-1A-1-532) is being accomplished at ATLC, with the remainder to be completed by July 1974. ALE-20 Flare Mod 2775 TO-1A-1-574 is being performed by Lear Siegler, Inc., Contract Field Team. As of 31 December 1973, 30 modifications have been completed with the remainder to be accomplished upon availability of missing kit parts. Modification 2723, modernization of communication, Trial Kit Installation was accomplished by Lear Siegler, Inc., in November and December on one A-1H and one A-1G aircraft supported by Electronic Engineer from SMAMA. Follow-up modification will be accomplished by Lear Siegler, Inc., upon receipt of kits with technical data changes and drawings.

(b) C/AC/EC/RC/VC-47 Aircraft: Two aircraft have undergone Analytical Condition Inspection with three remaining to be accomplished during FY 74. The work is being performed by Chinese Air Force in Taiwan.

(c) C/AC-119 Aircraft: Five aircraft are programmed for Analytical Condition Inspection at the Air Vietnam Contract Facility. Two are presently in work. ALE-20 Flare Modification accomplished by LSI Field Team on all but seven AC-119 Aircraft undergoing repair at Air Vietnam. Two C-119 aircraft modified, 11 held in abeyance per WRAMA instructions. The propeller modification (1C-119-688) kits received were incomplete. LSI team is conducting inventory of received kits to determine parts shortage. One AC-119 crash repair aircraft at Tan Son Nhut AB is programmed for repair at Air Vietnam. One AC-119 aircraft crash battle damaged at Da Nang AB will be repaired by VNAF.

(d) UH-1 Aircraft: Of the 39 aircraft programmed for 2200 hr Periodic Inspection to be accomplished at

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Air Vietnam, 17 have been input to the contractors facility. Four have been completed and the remaining 22 aircraft will be terminated from the contract. The base level inspections are considered adequate to maintain operational aircraft with a minimum of downtime. ATLC also is accomplishing 22 2200 hr Inspections; four ACI's; one hundred forty fuel modification (35) completed; 80 gunship modifications (39) completed; 13 Combat Battle Damaged Aircraft repaired which is all in-house work. The IRS Paint is contemplated to be contracted to Air Vietnam for accomplishment on the entire UH-1 fleet. In view of the criticality of the rotor blades, Parsons will accomplish the rotor blades at ATLC. Contractual coverage expected to be obtained by 1 March 1974.

(e) CH-47 Aircraft: Of the 18 aircraft programmed for 18 PE Life Extension Inspection at Air Vietnam, two are in work and it is anticipated that a total of eight aircraft will generate for the remainder of FY 74. Termination action requested for ten aircraft. Two ACI's programmed, one in work. Two Combat Battle Damage (CBD) Aircraft programmed for repair at Air Vietnam; one is in work. Action presently being taken to contract the tunnel cover modification on four aircraft to Air Vietnam. Contract coverage anticipated by 1 March 1974. ALE-20 Flare Modification accomplished on 20 aircraft. Heat shields being manufactured at ATLC maintenance shops to correct deficiencies resulting from exhaust heat on the electrical conduit. Anticipate completion by May 1974.

(f) C-130 Aircraft: Four aircraft are presently undergoing Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and Wing Modification at LASS Singapore. The program for FY 74 is 12 aircraft. The Wing Modification consists of "beef-up" in accordance with TO 1C-130-872. The ALE-20 Flare Modification is being accomplished by Lear Siegler, Inc., Field Teams. As of 31 December 1973, twenty-five (25) have been completed and the remaining seven aircraft will be accomplished upon completion of PDM. Presently fuel tank leakage problems are being encountered. A US Air Force crew from the Prime ANA is in-country to assist in repairing fuel tank leaks of the C-130 fleet.

(g) F-5A/B Aircraft: Thirty-four aircraft are programmed for corrosion control. Work being accomplished at ATLC in house with twelve aircraft completed and four Combat Battle Damaged Aircraft repaired. AIM-9E capability modification TCTO 1F-5-712 C/W on 27 aircraft completed

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and six aircraft remain to be accomplished, upon completion of repairs.

(h) A-37B Aircraft: Seventy-four aircraft programmed for Wing Modification at Air Vietnam. Fourteen are in work and four Analytical Condition Inspections (ACI's) being accomplished. Ten aircraft processed through corrosion control in house at ATLC. ALE-20 Flare Modifications accomplished on 164 aircraft by LSI. The remainder to be completed upon receipt of sufficient parts. There are 23 kits with shortage of case, switches, and isolators. Estimated completion date July 1974. AN/ARC-51/ARC-109 Swap Out Modification in process to be accomplished by LSI field team upon receipt of sufficient quantities of requisitioned equipment. ECP 177 Carry Thru Spar Replacement being finalized and kits manufactured. Estimate availability by second quarter FY 75.

(i) C-7 Aircraft: Eighteen aircraft are programmed for corrosion control and six for ACI. Four corrosion controls have been completed, two ACI's and two corrosion controls are in work. Program being accomplished by Thai-Am. Five weather damaged aircraft repaired in house at Phu Cat AB. Six aircraft undergoing repair at Da Nang AB. ALE-20 Flare Modification TCTO 1C-7A-615, 26 aircraft have been completed. The remainder will be completed upon receipt of kit shortages.

(j) T-37 Aircraft: All 24 aircraft have been removed from storage and are being used for pilot training at Phan Rang AB.

e. Contract Management:

(1) Contract Administration Services are provided for about 51 contracts (28 firms) with an estimated value of 43 million. The major effort under the contracts is directed toward training. The objective of these various training programs is to assist VNAF in becoming proficient in the various skills required to obtain self-sufficiency.

(2) Contract Management Branch personnel are continuing in their efforts to upgrade the qualifications of their employees as well as those of other interested DAO organizational elements through conduct of weekly training seminars in contract administration. These seminars are attended by VNAF as well as DAO employees.

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SECRET

authorized forty-eight E missiles twenty-four have been called forward to equip twelve aircraft for self defense.

g. (S) Aerial Resupply:

(1) There are 25 isolated RVNAF outposts and bases totally dependent on aerial resupply for continued operation and effectiveness. The approximate locations of the aerial resupply sites in MR 1 (13), MR 2 (5), and MR 3 (7) are shown.

(Figure 6-24)

(2) Enemy forces seized DAK Song on 6 November 1973 and cut QL 14 and LTL 8B. As a result of the enemy action Quang Duc Province and the GVN forces conducting operations in the central part of the province were isolated. These forces numbered about 5000 ARVN and territorial forces. CLC estimated that 9 C-130 and 15 C-7 sorties per day would be required to support these forces. During the period 4-6 December 1973 an additional requirement (2500) troops was airlifted into the area.

(3) Actual support for Quang Duc Province averaged 5 C-130 and 1 C-7 sorties per day. The tonnage of supplies lifted provided 27 lbs. per man per day, which appears to be an adequate level of resupply.

(4) VNAF capability to provide adequate airlift of supplies to more than one "hot spot" is marginal. Presently, a study of VNAF airlift capability is being conducted.

8. (S) CONCLUSION:

a. The previous VNAF assessment remains substantially unchanged. Although progress has been made in some of the various programs, as reflected throughout this report, many significant actions are still required to assist VNAF in attaining the desired degree of logistic and operational self-sufficiency. The highest priority is being given to:

- . Contractor training in all logistic areas.
- . F-5A Operational Ready Rate and withdrawal from storage.

6-84

SECRET

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


Figure 6-24

6-85

CONFIDENTIAL

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- . C-7/CH-47/UH-1/C-130 Aircraft Support.
- . Establish Queen Bee concept for VNAF engine support.
- . UH-1 Power Train Overhaul.
- . Verify type, quantity and location of all engines.
- . Joint Venture Contracts.
- . UH-1, CONUS repair of 31 hulks.
- . Aircraft inventory reporting system.
- . Computer Effectiveness.

b. Progress has been noteworthy in the accomplishment of the USAF Vietnamization Logistics Plan dated September 1973. Specifically, inventories have been completed, asset visibility has improved, shops are producing serviceable items as result of training and improved manning. Equipment utilization is being examined, with excesses returned for redistribution, and overall production at the Air Technical Logistics Command is in an upward trend.

c. Progress has been made in the training of VNAF middle management level personnel, on the job training of maintenance technicians and logisticians to attain satisfactory level of combat/operational capability. However, problems will be resolved gradually as experience is gained by the VNAF. Continuing efforts and support of AOSAF remains essential to assist VNAF in becoming self-sufficient. Contractor formal classroom and OJT training is being further intensified to properly train VNAF personnel.

d. During December 1973, AOSAF expanded with the introduction of an Operations Branch. This branch was established to ensure inclusion of operational considerations when rendering logistical decisions to US-RVN policy makers and to monitor operational usage of US provided materials.

6-86

SECRET

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CHAPTER 7

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The 31 December 1973 VNN manpower authorization remained at 40,181, with 5,714 officers, 13,643 Petty Officers and 20,824 enlisted personnel.

b. Strength. The actual strength as of 31 December 1973 was 40,150, composed of 5,428 officers, 13,122 Petty Officers and 21,600 other personnel, including midshipmen, recruits and pipeline personnel.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. The best overall measure of personnel readiness available is response to actual combat situations and emergencies, as well as the number of personnel normally in training. During the last quarter of CY 73 the VNN reported a total of 1,295 personnel entering and 1,159 completing in-country training courses, including basic training, with an average 1,968 in training throughout the quarter. Participation in off-shore training courses included one officer and 14 enlisted beginning and nine officers and five enlisted completing training.

b. Several examples of VNN response to emergency situations were noted during the reporting period and are detailed below:

(1) In December 1973 the merchant ship Island Pearl grounded on a sandbar while transiting the Mekong River enroute from Phnom Penh to Vung Tau. After lifting off the sandbar the ship began taking water and radioed for assistance. Within 25 minutes VNN HQ-14 (PCE) and HQ-3827 (PCF) were on the scene and HQ-14 took the Island Pearl, which had lost power, in tow toward Vung Tau. Eight miles southwest of Vung Tau the Island Pearl sank. HQ-14 immediately rescued all on board, including 29 crew members, a river pilot and a customs official.

(2) During October three typhoons brushed by RVN and caused extensive flooding in the northern part of the country. The VNN, in rescue operations, evacuated

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some 1,200 civilian refugees and ten RF and PF platoons. Again in November a typhoon caused major flooding and necessitated evacuation of more than 1,000 people by VNN units.

(3) VNN units were involved in 85 fire fights, 14 mining incidents and 16 attacks by fire during the reporting period. As far as is known, all units involved performed well, sustaining a total of 135 casualties, including 25 KIA.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT:

a. The authorized number of ships and craft remains at 1,547 as of 31 December 1973.

b. Actual strength, as noted in the previous report, varies from month to month due to combat losses, salvage of previously reported losses and faulty reporting from the field. The N4 project to purify the records and reconcile the actual number on hand with inventory records by HQ number has not been completed and VNN has not provided an expected completion date. Combat losses from date of ceasefire to 31 December 1973 amounted to some 40 miscellaneous craft. These have not been validated as combat losses for replacement purposes, however, since many of them have either been salvaged or are awaiting salvage and will eventually be returned to service.

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. General. Implementation of the joint DAO/VNN Logistics Development Plan for resolution of logistics programs representing weaknesses in attainment of VNN self-sufficiency, promulgated on 30 June 1973, is continuing. Status of the 72 programs as of 31 December 1973 was as follows:

Programs Completed	None (1)
Programs Cancelled	2
Programs on Schedule	29 (2)
No Progress Report	3
Programs with insufficient data to determine status	36 (3)
Programs Established	2
	<u>72</u>

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Notes:

(1) Program previously completed was reestablished upon reevaluation of requirement.

(2) One of the three previously cancelled by VNN was reestablished at DAO request.

(3) These are the two programs addressed in Notes (1) and (2) above.

Future assessments will continue to track progress in resolution of these issues.

b. LSB/ISB/ASB Technical Management.

(1) The Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP) is resulting in gradual phased upgrading of the effectiveness of the Coastal Radar System. Some significant results of the program to date were:

(a) Planning and design of a complete overhaul facility in-country for the AN/TPS-62 radar has been 75% completed. All preliminary plans and procedures for operation of this facility are scheduled for completion early in 1974.

(b) Excess repair parts for the AN/UPS-1 radar, which can also be used in the AN/TPS-62, have been located in the US and are available at no cost other than PCH&T. Shipment of these parts to RVN has been requested.

(c) Pending completion of the overhaul facility, a Radar Pedestal Overhaul facility has been established at LSB Nha Be. This facility, although initially hampered by lack of parts and technical documentation, has now become operational and repaired, in December, the first two of six defective radar pedestals turned in for repair.

(2) The Central Logistics Command (CLC) of RVNAF JGS has directed that ARVN will retain responsibility for 3d and 4th echelon maintenance of approximately 456 ARVN watercraft instead of transferring this responsibility to VNN as had been programmed for 31 December 1973. The VNN will, however, provide supply support, training and technical assistance, as well as 5th echelon (depot overhaul) maintenance, for these craft. The ARVN 306th Floating Craft Maintenance Group will

CONFIDENTIAL

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remain in operation for this purpose. The JGS has also directed that VNN turn over ISB Cat Lai to ARVN for the same purpose but VNN, with DAO Navy Division support, has requested reconsideration of this decision due to the importance of ISB Cat Lai to the VNN maintenance program, especially for ammi pontoons. The matter has not yet been resolved.

(3) A total of 16 ARVN LCM-8 overhauls have been completed. The remaining 16 in the CY 73 program are scheduled for completion by 15 March 1974.

(4) The situation as regards attainment of self-sufficiency in the area of shipboard Planned Maintenance Systems (PMS) is not encouraging, although some progress was noted in December. The more significant deficiencies noted by PMS Field Teams in visits to 14 separate activities during the quarter were:

(a) Insufficient PMS training at local levels.

(b) Inconsistent performance by PMS officers and maintenance supervisors of responsibilities assigned them by VNN PMS directives and manuals.

(c) Lack of local command attention and interest, resulting in insufficient implementation of PMS and inadequate maintenance of equipment.

(d) A VNN Commander or Lieutenant Commander capable of serving full-time in the billet still has not been assigned as Head, PMS Support Office, as previously recommended.

(e) No effective action has yet been taken to prevent transfer of PMS-trained VNN personnel to unrelated assignments.

(5) All of the above discrepancies relative to the PMS program have been reported to and discussed with cognizant VNN PMS officers and local base commanders, and recommendations for correction were offered to the cognizant officials.

(6) Installation of 20 and 40mm gun mounts has been completed on seven of the nine ships scheduled to receive this equipment, including seven WHEC's (High Endurance Cutter) and two DER (Destroyer Escort Radar Picket). Two WHEC's remain to be completed, which will

7-4
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be done during their regular overhaul (ROH) cycle.

(7) The third class trained in the Diesel Engine Overhaul Training School graduated on 19 October 1973 and the fourth class on 3 December 1973. The fifth class with 12 students in attendance is scheduled for completion in early January 1974. The VNN instructors continue to perform well, with US instructors in a monitoring role only. Preliminary planning has been completed to add maintenance training in hydraulic reduction gears to the course. Inclusion of transmission overhaul in the course curriculum remains under study.

(8) Development of a base inspection and surveillance procedure to monitor end-use of US-provided material equipment and funds is well underway. An objective check list has been developed with assistance of DAO and a joint End Item Use Inspection (EIUI) team visited LSB Ben Luc, LSB Cat Lo and ISB Rach Soi during the quarter to get the surveillance program underway and field-test the check list. It is planned that the EIUI teams will inventory all Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE) in conjunction with their visits to bases, which will eventually result in a complete and accurate inventory of IPE at all VNN bases.

(9) A joint VNN/DAO team has performed a site survey at the Cam Ranh Bay VNN Communications Station, site of the antenna field deterioration mentioned in the 3d Quarter report. This survey revealed that soil erosion is seriously affecting structural support of 13 monocone antennas; ten of the 16 air conditioners require repair; three of five generators were inoperative and require major repairs, and one teleprinter converter was inoperative and awaiting repair parts. All significant problems have now been identified, VNN personnel responsible for their correction designated, and corrective action is underway. The antenna removal/repair recommendations made by DAO technical assistance personnel are now under study by the VNN. Recommendations for removal and repair of nine radio transmitters has met with some opposition from VNN and they are now developing an alternate plan which they intend to present to DAO by mid-January 1974.

(10) The support base craft overhaul comparison for 1972 and 1973 showed a higher percentage of scheduled overhauls completed in 1973, although a smaller number

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of overhauls were scheduled, as follows:

<u>Completion</u>	<u>1 JAN - 9 DEC 72</u>	<u>1 JAN - 8 DEC 73</u>
Scheduled	840	724
Actual	685	662
Percentage	81.5%	91.4%

(11) The VNN Salvage Report indicates that 160 craft have been sunk since 30 March 1972, of which 126 or 78.7% have been salvaged and an additional 26 or 16% are awaiting salvage. This continues the outstanding VNN salvage rate, which is an overall 94.7%. Only eight of the craft sunk since 30 March 1972 have been determined unsalvageable. After salvage a high percentage of these craft are repaired and returned to service. The remainder, which are damaged beyond repair, are stripped of all usable items and prepared for turn-in to Property Disposal.

c. Vietnamese Navy Shipyard (VNNSY).

(1) Certain capital improvements are planned and under construction. Those under construction include seawall repair, and additional sanitary facilities. The latter is a self-help project. Still in the planning stage is a pier extension to allow work to be conducted on additional ships. Plans and specifications have been prepared and the project is in the final design stage. It is not yet known when it will be ready for contracting.

(2) The limited training course on maintenance and repair of navigation equipment commenced in September was completed in November with six technicians graduating. Additional training is dependent upon availability of a qualified US instructor.

(3) Progress has been made in the area of solving material problems and expediting delivery of critical items which have a significant bearing on overhaul progress. An updated material status list is being published and distributed weekly to the Planning and Production departments for appropriate action. These lists highlight problem areas and provide a means for communicating problems to cognizant officials and expediting specific items. In addition, ship superintendents report weekly on material problems which might adversely affect completion dates of the ships for

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which they are responsible.

d. Construction and Base Maintenance.

(1) Total number of U.S. Navy sponsored dependent shelter units completed is 5,036 of the 5,184 total programmed. Land is available for construction of 300 additional units under the RVNAF-sponsored program, but funding has been deferred. A new standard design, less austere than the existing design in the hope of increasing occupancy rates, has been prepared and will soon be presented for service coordination and final approval. Currently, 23 self-help units at Hon Tre and 25 at Ha Tien are awaiting arrival of materials stored at LSB An Thoi. Materials for another 40 self-help units at Ninh Chu have been lost, stolen or diverted and are currently the subject of an investigation by VNN military security.

(2) A schedule for upgrading power supply at all 15 Coastal Radar Stations was developed and is now being implemented, with about 40%, or six stations, completed. Generator operator training is now underway at the Central Generator Pool, Cuu Long, in an effort to insure that the new power supply will be maintained at peak efficiency. The stations at Poulo Obi and De Gi still have critical power problems. Poulo Obi is awaiting delivery of a 30KW generator now at An Thoi and De Gi requires new submarine cable where the power supply must cross a stream between the power station and the radar site.

(3) Contract Field Teams are now being dispatched to bases where problems are known to exist in the base maintenance area so that technical guidance and assistance can be offered in such matters as site-plan development, dredging investigation, and construction and repair projects. An improvement in self-sufficiency has been noted at a number of bases, and is likely to continue if the personnel now assigned to Public Works Departments are allowed to remain in their positions.

(4) Projects underway or completed by the VNN Public Works Department in Saigon during the reporting period include:

Installation of new wiring at VNN Security Office (100% complete)

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Construction of entrance gate at WAVE quarters
(50% complete)

Installation of water system at VNN Logistics
building (20% complete)

Repair and maintenance of offices at VNN
Logistic Support Command (55% complete)

5. (C) SUPPLY:

a. Scheduled starting date for the first classes at the VNN Supply Officers' School has slipped several times and is now 4 February 1974. VNN officials have asserted there will be no more delay. The school facilities are designed to accommodate 25 students and 24 have been selected to attend the first class. Each class will run nine weeks and a minimum of four classes are scheduled for CY 74.

b. The VNN CNO has agreed to the establishment of a Supply Command within VNN as recommended by DAO, and has directed his staff to prepare a proposal outlining mission, functions, organizational placement within the VNN, and definition of responsibilities and authority when crossing organizational lines. The proposal will recommend the Supply Command absorb the VNN Supply Center and the Data Processing Center, and report directly to VNN Headquarters rather than to the Logistic Support Command. This recommendation is expected to be the most controversial aspect of the proposal, and has not yet been approved by the CNO. Responsibilities to be centralized under the Supply Command would include operation of the VNNSC; development of Navy-wide uniform supply procedures; monitoring operation of the VNN supply system; inspecting and providing technical supply assistance and on-site training to supply departments afloat and ashore; and developing the supply and data processing specialties in the VNN, including determining number of personnel required, their training needs, and duty station assignments. The proposal is expected to be delivered to the VNN Headquarters staff for detailed review in January 1974.

c. Joint VNN/DAO Field Assistance Support Teams (FAST) visited and inspected 23 activities during the quarter with only two "unsatisfactory" ratings. All discrepancies uncovered were discussed with the

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Commander of the activity concerned, and reported to the VNN Logistic Support Command for corrective action.

d. Average supply effectiveness for the quarter was as follows, slightly improved over the previous quarter:

<u>DEMANDS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>NIS</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS</u>		
				<u>NET</u>	<u>GROSS</u>	<u>AR*</u>
34,268	23,463	6,137	5,029	79%	67%	85%

*Accommodation rate = percent of requisitions received for stocked items

e. The quarterly excessing program identified 2,207 line items with a value of \$1,175,572 as excess. This material is being pulled from stock and retrograded to Naval Supply Center, Oakland.

6. (S) OPERATIONS:

a. Coastal Surveillance System.

(1) VNN reported boarding 144,925 craft during the quarter, resulting in 437 craft and 1,433 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the Coastal Radar Stations averaged 72% for the quarter, which is a slight decline from the third quarter. An average of 3.8 of the 16 stations were down per day. The Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP) developed by a joint NAVSEEAPAC/NAVSEEACTIONPHIL team is now being implemented and gradual improvement is forecast during the next two quarters. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 5,248, of which 3,739 were tracked and 1,910 identified. Of 53 Filter King exercises conducted to test the system, 50 were considered satisfactory for a detection rate of 94%.

(3) Visual Air Reconnaissance (VARs) flights were requested on 567 occasions, but only 231 were actually flown. In addition, 21 air support missions were requested and 18 provided.

b. Material Readiness. The term "operational readiness" will no longer be used to describe readiness posture of VNN. Instead, the term "material readiness,"

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which more accurately describes the situation being reported upon, will be used. Average material readiness rates of VNN ships and craft were 70.5% for the Blue Water Fleet and 80% for the Brown Water craft. Both of these rates include ships and craft in restricted availability (RAV) and regular overhaul (ROH).

c. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS). VNN units provided NGFS for tactical operations on 38 occasions. A total of 21 ships were involved in these missions, expending 355 rounds of 5", 182 rounds of 3", 492 rounds of 81mm, 3,440 rounds of 40mm, 2,100 rounds of 20mm, and 15,750 rounds of assorted smaller caliber ammunition.

d. Combat Operations. During the quarter the VNN was involved in 85 fire fights, nine mining incidents and 16 attacks by fire, and suffered 25 personnel killed and 110 wounded, with 67 craft sunk or damaged. Following the usual pattern, these incidents were initiated by both sides and included unprovoked attacks by enemy forces as well as enemy reaction to joint RVNAF security operations in which VNN units participated.

e. Mekong Convoys. Nine regular and six special convoys were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory. There has been no enemy action against the convoys since April. A recap of Mekong convoy activity since 1 January 1973 follows for information (this data was obtained from DIA reports):

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>	<u>NO. OF SHIPS AND TUGS</u>
JAN	4	46
FEB	6	67
MAR	3	38
APR	7	41
MAY	6	56
JUN	6	64
JUL	12	68
AUG	15	107
SEP	6	40
OCT	11	47
NOV	9	78
DEC	8	72

SECRET

NOTE: The DIA report included convoys going to Phnom Penh as well as those returning and covered the period January through November 1973. The actual number of ships involved is half that shown since each ship was counted twice. December data was obtained from local records and computed in the same manner.

7. (S) SHORTFALLS:

a. Threats from KOMAR gunboats and MIG aircraft of the DRV continue to be a shortfall as no effective measures have yet been developed to counter them. No joint VNN/VNAF exercises have been practiced or scheduled, and no substantive reaction has been obtained to DAO efforts to encourage such exercises.

b. Amphibious Warfare Capability. The VNN has no amphibious warfare capability at present and no action is being taken to develop such capability. The Commandant of the VNMC has repeatedly endeavored to obtain approval of joint VNN/VNMC amphibious exercises but has so far not been successful due to shortage of LST's in VNN. This problem has been addressed in the following paragraph.

c. Shortage of Water Transportation Assets. The VNN, with only six LST's, have been unable to satisfy both RVNAF intra-RVN cargo lift requirements and VNN operational requirements, much less make LST assets available for amphibious maneuvers. Action was undertaken in November and December to obtain transfer of six demilitarized LST's from the U.S. Military Sealift Command Ready Reserve Fleet to VNN. This would satisfy all cargo and refugee lift requirements and allow VNN to plan and conduct extensive joint amphibious and other training exercises. Final approval of SECDEF and JCS for transfer of these assets is being awaited.

8. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The VNN is still in a satisfactory position with regard to combat capability, although maintenance techniques and procedures leave much to be desired. Morale and esprit de corps are high and the desire to progress is evident. Improvements are slowly being made, but there is much to be done before the VNN can be expected to stand alone and remain an effective fighting force.

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b. As the US level of effort to assist VNN is gradually lessened, responsible officials are beginning at last to become aware of the necessity to plan for the day, not too far distant, when the only US assistance available will be monetary, and the technical expertise necessary to manage an effective, efficient modern navy must come from within the VNN ranks. To this end, major effort must be expended by the US on assisting them to develop strong middle management and on in-house engineering and design capability, as well as significantly improved maintenance procedures. This is and must continue to be the major thrust of DAO activity as the VNN progresses down the road of self-sufficiency.

7-12

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CHAPTER 8

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The total VNMC personnel authorization as of 31 December 1973 was unchanged at 14,438, with 964 officers, 2,490 NCO's and 10,984 other enlisted.

b. Strength. The personnel strength as of 31 December 1973 was 14,329. This figure includes 966 officers, 2,220 NCO's and 11,143 other enlisted, of which 941 are recruits in training. Deducting the recruits the on-hand strength of the VNMC as of 31 December 1973 was 13,388. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC by grade is shown below:

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u> (31 DEC 73)	<u>CURRENT STRENGTH</u> (31 DEC 73)
B. General	2	1
Colonel	9	4
LtCol	32	17
Major	75	33
Captain	264	102
1st Lt	582	275
2nd Lt		169
WO		365
Master Sgt	49	51
Gunnery Sgt	325	191
Staff Sgt	788	815
Sergeant	1328	1163
Corporal	2211	1091
Lance Corporal	1757	1965
Private 1st Class	2898	4043
Private 2nd Class	4118	4044
	<u>14438</u>	<u>14329</u>

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. The VNMC training programs have received new emphasis; both internal and external training have increased significantly during the quarter due to the comparative lull in the operational tempo throughout the AO. Although the Division remains highly alert

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and effective, ready to assert its considerable authority in the event the enemy makes any hostile move, full advantage is being taken of the current opportunity to increase skill levels and effectiveness of individuals through increased training.

b. No progress has been made toward arranging for joint amphibious training with the VNN, but negotiations with VNN are continuing and this training remains a major concern of the VNMC Commandant.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS:

a. Replacement of the LVT-5 amphibian tractors with the LVT-7 series has been approved and the tractors are being added to the FY 74 MASF program. Delivery lead time is not yet known.

b. A comprehensive report of combat losses, evacuation of equipment to higher maintenance echelons, and equipment deadlined awaiting spare parts was provided to the Central Logistics Command, requesting issue of items critically needed as a result. There has been no significant response to date, and the RVNAF system of filling spare parts requisitions and of replacing evacuated items of equipment from maintenance float stocks is not sufficiently responsive. As a result the VNMC maintenance readiness posture continues to suffer. To counter this unfortunate situation, an excellent internal program of maintenance-consciousness has been undertaken within the Corps, and the necessity for developing self-help solutions to maintenance problems is being emphasized at every echelon of command.

c. There are currently 54 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 38 trucks, 1/4 ton and miscellaneous other vehicles which have been evacuated for repair and which have not yet been returned.

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. The only item remaining to be accomplished in the VNMC Records Reconciliation Program is correction of the Equipment Status Summary (ESS) and the Equipment Status Report (ESR) in accordance with purified Unit Equipment List (UEL). This program will be completed by mid-January 1974.

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b. All VNMC TO&E's have been reviewed and updated, with the final eight documents completed in November, and placed in the data base.

c. A field inventory of all VNMC equipment was completed in December 1973 and will be computerized. This information will constitute the first actual on-hand equipment report of any RVNAF service. It is anticipated that the computer printout will be available for use by mid-January 1974.

d. It has been determined that the 55 buildings previously identified as available for relocation and use in the rehabilitation and construction project at the Di An - Song Than Training Center and Base Camp Complex have already been committed for other use. This essential troop housing project is therefore being held in abeyance pending review of other possible sources of material to allow completion.

e. The contract for construction of a combat training tank at Song Than Base Camp was finally awarded in December 1973 after being "in the mill" for 1 1/2 years. Construction costs are now estimated at \$322,000.

f. A program to obtain photographic documentation of all VNMC facilities has been underway for several months and is now about 95% complete. This program will provide a pictorial display of existing facilities and show a sequence of construction accomplishments over the years.

5. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. There was no significant change in the operational posture of the VNMC Division during the quarter. The Division continues to occupy the assigned broad-front defensive position in northern MR I with its nine organic infantry battalions reinforced by two battalions of the ARVN 51st Infantry Regiment and five understrength/undertrained RF battalions. The AO encompasses over 1600 square miles of extremely diverse terrain, and the Division faces two NVA divisions to its front and one to its left flank and rear. Enemy activity, however, continues to be concentrated to the south of the VNMC AO with only very light, minor contacts within the AO. VNMC casualties during the quarter were nine KIA and five WIA, mostly from

8-3

CONFIDENTIAL

140

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enemy mines, and eight non-combat casualties.

b. During November the JGS ordered the movement of operational LVT-5 series amphibian tractors from Saigon to MR I to replace ARVN tanks which had been relocated to MR III. Although the LVT-5 tractors are not effective fighting machines and are not maintenance-supportable within VNMC, the theory was that the mere presence of this equipment, whose potential was presumably unknown to the enemy, would have a psychological deterrent effect on enemy forces in the absence of tanks. The VNMC Commandant argued against the movement of this equipment for the above reasons, coupled with their inordinately high fuel consumption and the rather obvious fact that the enemy either knew or would quickly learn their lack of capability. As a result only six of the tractors were moved to Da Nang, where they still await movement to the VNMC Division AO.

c. The 12 civic action platoons continue to operate in their assigned villages and hamlets, living with the civilian populace. Current emphasis is being placed on organization and equipage of PF platoons within those villages and hamlets to eventually take over the VNMC platoon responsibilities. As mentioned in the previous report, an excellent rapport has been established with the populace, providing a prolific source of intelligence both on day to day activities and on any plan for projected increased enemy activity.

6. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Amphibious assault training continues to be a shortfall area for the same reasons noted in the previous report. It is possible, however, that action currently underway to augment VNN sealift assets will allow limited amphibious training exercises to be commenced within the next three to six months. Full-scale exercises will have to await arrival of the LVT-7 series amphibious tractors which have already been programmed as replacements for the LVT-5 series.

b. Maintenance and spare parts support provided by ARVN continues to be unsatisfactory. The Commandant has repeatedly brought this problem to the attention of CLC without success. It is now planned that the Defense Attache will arrange to present the problem directly to the Commander, CLC.

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7. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The VNMC Division remains one of the most effective and combat-ready fighting units in RVNAF despite the shortfalls and difficulties being encountered. Morale is high and the personnel display a certain pride in being Marines. It can be confidently predicted that any enemy offensive, whether small or large, will have little success in the VNMC AO unless the Division is overcome by sheer weight of numbers.

b. Concrete and effective action must be taken by CLC in providing spare parts and maintenance support to preclude further degradation of the equipment position.

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CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF):

a. This chapter presents an updated view of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces (TF), and significant changes and/or modification in their organization, mission and employment that reflects progress or regress since the previous assessment. This assessment is based upon a completion of staff and field activity reports from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), the Defense Attache Office (DAO), and a reduced US Embassy field operations staff, to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the ceasefire situation, militarily, politically, and psychologically. Cognizance is taken of the increased enemy initiated ceasefire violations that have occurred during this quarter.

b. General Background (RF/PF). The RF/PF continue to constitute more than half of the manpower in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Under the territorial security system the Regional Force is province/district (sector/subsector) oriented while the Popular Force is village/hamlet oriented. The following states the primary mission of the Territorial Forces: The principal objective of RF/PF is to provide adequate security to the rural populace while the Government of Vietnam (GVN) carries out its national goals in support of rural reconstruction and rehabilitation, return-to-village (RTV), land reform, and village self-sufficiency and village self-government; the essential elements and ingredients of "nation building." Protective security of the rural populace provided by RF/PF frees the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) regular forces to conduct operations against communist main force units, particularly in those areas of South Vietnam where progress in implementing national programs has been severely hampered or limited as a result of continuing enemy initiated ceasefire violations.

2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES (RF):

a. Under Presidential Decree reorganizing RVNAF in 1970, the RF was transferred from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to the Joint General Staff (JGS), where it became an integral part of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Branch.

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(Figure 9-1)

b. Present RF strength is over 307,000 men; a decrease of 5,000 over that reported in the previous assessment. Military Region (MR) field reports reflect increased combat casualties among the RF resulting from increased enemy attacks and assaults-by-fire (ABFs) against RF outposts, lines of communications (LOCs), subsector headquarters, and populated areas. Additional casualties are being inflicted upon RF as MR Commanders continue to redeploy and attach RF units to reinforce ARVN in the field.

(Figure 9-2)

c. The most significant event that reflected a change in operational policy of the RF was the dissolution of the RF/PF Central Improvement Committee in December 1973. Subsequent to the transfer of RF/PF to JGS command and control, this committee was created by the Chief/JGS to guide, direct, monitor and manage program activities of the TF. The major function of the committee (similar committees were organized down to subsector and special zones) was to upgrade and improve overall operational, administrative and logistical capabilities at all levels.

d. The dissolution of these committees was brought about largely because:

- (1) Accomplishment of original program,
- (2) Objective manpower streamlining,
- (3) The need for tighter control, improved efficiency, and consolidation of management assets at all levels, and
- (4) An enforced austerity program as a result of significant reduction in US military assistance budgetary allocations.

The organization charts of these committees are included for information, to illustrate that in the past command emphasis was provided from top to bottom. These charts will not be published in subsequent quarterly assessments.

(Figures 9-3 & 9-4)


e. Organization. No significant change from

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MOND and RVNAF Reorganized by Presidential
Decree No. 0614-a/TT/SL, 1 July 1970

SCALED DOWN VERSION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
OF REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF)



Command and Control

--- Coordination, Writes Plans and Directives, TO&E, and Program
Objectives for MR/Sector Implementation.

NOTE:

(a) Chief, JGS, is additionally Commander of all ARVN Forces.

(b) Infantry Branch includes Regional Force/Popular Force.

(c) RF/PF are OPCON to Sector Commanders. RF Asgd Primarily to Sector/Sub-Sector Operations, PF Asgd to Village/Hamlets and are OPCON to Village Chiefs.

Figure 9-1

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REGIONAL FORCES ASSIGNED STRENGTHS





Figure 9-2

9-5
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ORGANIZATION SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT COMMITTEE/REGIONAL FORCES & POPULATION FORCES



9-7

Figure 9-3

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ORGANIZATION CHART OF RF & PF CENTRAL IMPROVEMENT COMMITTEE




Figure 9-4

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previous assessments.

f. Mission. (Restated from previous assessment). "The RF support the GVN national goals and nation building programs at the rural level by providing and maintaining adequate territorial security, and conducting mobile offensive, reconnaissance and intelligence operations against enemy main force and Viet Cong (VC) local force units. JGS has directed MR Commanders to continue to place command emphasis on intelligence collecting, effective and improved reconnaissance and analysis of enemy movements, to be used as a basis for attacking the enemy when he is moving into GVN controlled areas, or to organize nighttime patrols and ambushes."

g. Ceasefire Situation. Enemy forces continued to violate the ceasefire agreement and have intensified their efforts at applying moderate to heavy pressure against Territorial Force units, outposts, LOC's, static defense lines, and subsector headquarters, as reflected in MR field reports. Infiltrations of and harassing attacks against rural populated areas resulted in increased civilian casualties, as the enemy continued to increase his efforts to subvert GVN control at the village/hamlet level. The Chief, JGS, continues to direct Corps/MR Commanders and Sector Commanders to place increased emphasis on maintaining a strong defensive posture in all areas under GVN control and on borders of contested areas where it is either known or suspected that the enemy is infiltrating, conducting logistics operations, or conducting agent-intelligence operations. Continuing enemy initiated ceasefire violations, coupled with increasing enemy offensive operations against ARVN regular forces have forced MR Commanders to redeploy significant numbers of Regional Forces outside their previously assigned sectors to reinforce ARVN forces, to interdict enemy LOC's, to conduct blocking and security operations, and to blunt the enemy's infiltration of ARVN's areas of operations.

(1) ARVN tactical commanders continue to request MR Commanders to reinforce their combat units with Regional Forces. During the 4th quarter 1973, 40 RF Battalions and several smaller-sized units were redeployed outside their home sectors to reinforce ARVN combat forces. Of this total, 27 occurred in MR 4 (7 in Dinh Tuong, and 11 in Chuong Thien). This practice continues to cause moderate to heavy casualties within the RF, losses which are becoming increasingly

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difficult to replace. This widespread practice, if left unchecked by MR Commanders, will continue to adversely effect overall operational capabilities of the RF, and will undoubtedly continue to have a degrading effect on territorial security of the rural countryside, essentially leaving the rural populace open to increased VC terrorism.

(2) During the 4th quarter 1973, the enemy initiated a total of 4,724 various incidents against the Territorial Forces, inflicting a total of 5,730 casualties. Of this total, 3,250 and 3,504 respectively, occurred in MR 4. These figures reflect a significant increase over the previous quarter, particularly in MR 4 during the month of December where farmers were preparing for the rice harvest and enemy was attempting to replenish his short food supplies.

h. Concept of Employment. No significant change from previous assessment.

(1) The customary role of the RF is to man and maintain an integrated series of outposts, interdict enemy lines of communication, prevent VC infiltration of enemy forces into rural populated areas, and to assist the people in improving their state of existence. Their overall performance in meeting these objectives continues to range from poor to good with a few spottings of excellent and higher, as reflected in JGS, MR and Sector Inspector General (IG) inspections. The latter rating normally occurs when MR Commanders allow the RF to operate within the parameters of their established missions, rather than attaching them to ARVN for unspecified periods of time. Overall performance would improve, it is believed, with more frequent stand-downs from operations for rest and recuperation, a more rigid policy for rotation of units deployed outside their home sectors, and more frequent visits of appropriate JGS and MR staff officers to insure that TF policies are being implemented.

(2) J3/JGS states that the Chief/JGS has recently directed MR Commanders to report all redeployments of RF units outside their home sector, provinces to which deployed, and periods of deployment. This source also stated that the Chief/JGS will permit MR Commanders to redeploy RF units outside their home sector for periods ranging from two weeks to a maximum of ten weeks. MR Commanders will require permission from the Chief/JGS for any redeployments that will exceed the maximum period. This is a major shift in operational

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policy and is a modification from the previous assessment.

(3) RF field operations employ 45 Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCPs), 360 battalions which include 1,440 RF rifle companies, and 372 separate companies, throughout the 44 provinces of the four Military Regions. Additionally, RF are manning and maintaining a total of 1,327 various size outposts (down slightly from September), ranging in size from major operating bases of battalion size down to squad size. Command and control of such a large dispersed force is understandably complex and with problems.

(4) Continuous redeployment outside their home sectors and continuous reinforcement of ARVN combat units for prolonged and unspecified periods of time continues to be a significant problem, and there is little reason for optimism that this trend will be reversed, until correction is initiated from the Central Government down to the tactical command level. It is still too early to tell whether or not the recent JGS policy in (2) above has been implemented by MR Commanders. This item of interest will be followed in the next quarterly assessment.

(5) There have been numerous examples in the use of RF to reinforce ARVN during this quarter. The most significant example was in Quang Duc Province (MR 2) during heavy attacks on 4 November and again on 4 December 1973, when several ARVN outposts were overrun by superior enemy forces. Several RF battalions were redeployed to Quang Duc and were placed at various locations from Duc Lap in the North to Kien Duc in the South to reinforce heavily committed ARVN forces. In MR 4, in anticipation of increased enemy attacks during the rice harvest season, 7 RF battalions were redeployed outside their home sectors to Dinh Tuong Province, and 11 RF battalions to Chuong Thien Province. These units, supporting staffs and mobile command posts, representing approximately 10,000 men, are still in operation outside their home sectors. The MR 4 Commander continues to shift RF to reinforce ARVN, particularly in provinces bordering Cambodia, in an effort to block infiltration of enemy forces into the rice belt area.

(6) Sufficient directives have been published by JGS to assist MR Commanders and Sector Commanders in improving and upgrading RF performance and capabilities. However, actual application and implementation remains

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slow.

3. (C) POPULAR FORCE (PF).

a. The PF like the RF, had their management shifted from the Ministry of Interior to JGS in 1970, where it became an integral part of the ARVN Infantry Branch. Current strength is reported at a little over 198,000; a decrease of 2,000 from that reported in September 1973. Since 30 June 1973, the PF assigned strength has been reduced by 14,000 men. Authorized strength remains at 206,000 (down from 223,000 in early 1973) consisting of 6,699 29-man platoons. Actual number of platoons was reported at 6,368 (reduced by 240 from previous assessment). Increased casualties and a reduced replacement rate has forced MR Commanders and Sector Commanders to consolidate and reinforce understrength PF platoons in security areas of high priority.

(Figure 9-5)

b. Similar to the RF, more than one-third PF assigned strength is employed to man, maintain and defend a total of 4,328 various size outposts throughout the country (down slightly from previous assessment). The reduction in outposts was probably caused because some isolated outposts were consolidated or abandoned due to enemy pressure, and ARVN commanders shifted and realigned areas of operations to counter increased enemy activity. As a result, PF mission to defend the village/hamlet periphery, to prevent internal VC infiltrations, to protect resources, lines of communications and installations is slightly weakened. Static defense of outposts, as opposed to the more proper role of mobile defense by patrol and ambush, continues to invite increased enemy subversion and infiltration in the rural areas. This is borne out by the fact the enemy is increasing efforts to infiltrate into GVN controlled areas for the purpose of proselyting and land grabbing, resulting in numerous civilian casualties in recent months.

c. Overall PF performance generally remains poor to good with only isolated cases of excellent performance against the enemy, as enemy attacks against PF positions continued to increase during 4th quarter 1973. Although overall performance remains basically unchanged from the previous assessment, PF battlefield performance (if MR reports are accurate) shows

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POPULAR FORCES ASSIGNED STRENGTHS




Figure 9-5

9-15
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that PF have inflicted nearly twice the number of casualties against enemy forces during this quarter than in the previous quarter. The JGS is continuing to place command emphasis on MR Commanders and Sector Commanders to accelerate programs to upgrade and improve PF performance. As a result, the JGS/IG is now making PF performance and operational and logistical support a matter of priority concern during their field inspections. MR and Sector inspector staffs have also been directed to conduct more frequent inspections of PF units, particularly those units that have failed to reach an acceptable state of operational readiness. JGS/J3 continues to monitor the PF program for the Chief/JGS, and periodically conducts field visits to insure compliance with JGS directives. Recommendations are submitted to the Chief/JGS, as required. J3 field visits are normally predicated upon the results of JGS/IG field inspection reports.

4. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS AND MAINTENANCE:

This paragraph remains basically unchanged from from the previous assessment, with the exception of a recent revision to reporting requirements. With the recent dissolution of the RF/PF Central Improvement Committee (which had CLC representation), previous monthly reports from the five Area Logistics Commands (ALC) have now been reduced to quarterly reports. Discussions with the RF/PF logistics team of CLC reflects no significant changes to this paragraph from the previous assessment. CLC and ALC logistics overviews, as well as results of JGS/IG inspections, will be included in the next quarterly assessment.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

No significant change since the previous assessment. CLC stated that appropriate information concerning this subject would be reported in the 1st quarter 1974 CLC/ALC quarterly update. This information will be included in the next quarterly assessment.

6. (U) TRAINING:

Status of RF/PF training is covered in Chapter 11.

7. (C) DESERTIONS:

- a. Desertions and absenteeism among the

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Territorial Forces continues to be a major problem. On the bright side, however, there has been a significant reduction in the PF desertion rate. In the 3d quarter CY 73 the RF had an average strength of 310,287 and an average desertion rate of 1.48; in the 4th quarter the average strength decreased to 306,995, but the average desertion rate rose slightly to 1.49. During the same period the PF had an average strength of 201,209 and 198,752, with desertion rates of 0.86 and 0.57 respectively.

b. Most of the major causes of desertions as stated in previous assessments, still exist, and there is little evidence at this time that they will be quickly diminished.

c. JGS and the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) are emphasizing improvement programs designed to upgrade RF/PF, as directed by the Chief/JGS at all levels. Hopefully, the gap that has long separated the regular forces from the Territorial Forces will begin to narrow, resulting in eventual reduction in desertion rates.

8. (U) RF/PF RECRUITMENT.

There have been no significant changes from those enumerated in previous quarterly assessments. It is reported that there has been no major problems in recruiting to replace RF/PF losses.

9. (U) MORALE.

This subject is covered in Chapter 12.

10. (C) SHORTFALLS.

a. There has been no significant change in previous reported shortfalls during this quarter. The following capsulizes some of the more prevalent shortfalls previously reported:

(1) Inadequate and inequitable logistical support of RF/PF continues to be a pressing problem, but JGS/CLC sources state that deficiencies and inadequacies in logistical support are slowly but consistently improving as evidenced in CLC field reports. The most significant problem in this area continues to be the logistical support of RF/PF units that man and maintain

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almost 6,000 interlocking outposts, many of which are extended outside their normal sector Area of Operations (AOs). Sector Commanders are still experiencing difficulties in obtaining extremely limited surface transportation and dedicated air assets, to furnish essential and adequate tactical logistical support. This problem is compounded by the fact that a significant number of these outposts are situated in areas that can only be supported by helicopters.

(2) The RF/PF continue to be plagued by many of the same problems previously reported: an unacceptable rate of desertions and absenteeism, poor morale, inadequate subsistence allowance (when compared to a spiraling cost of living index), a lack of adequate leadership, inadequate refresher training, and often inconsistent equipment and maintenance support. In varying degrees, these problems have all contributed to mediocre RF/PF performance and a low state of combat readiness. In view of this, the Chief/JGS is continuing to place command emphasis on MR Commanders and Sector Commanders on upgrading and improving the TF program.

(3) Inconsistent and ineffective command and control of the RF/PF at all levels still remains a problem, as MR Commanders, in increasing frequency, redeploy RF units outside their home sectors for unspecified periods of time. JGS sources state, however, that this situation is being corrected by a recent Chief/JGS directive that prescribes time limitations that RF units may be redeployed outside their home sectors. Periods that exceed ten weeks must be approved by the JGS on an individual basis.

11. (C) SUMMARY:

a. The substantive inputs to previous assessment of Territorial Forces remain unchanged. There continues to be slow but noticeable progress in logistical and maintenance support of the RF/PF. Admittedly, progress has been slow, but nevertheless the problems are addressed as JGS continues to prod MR Commanders to improve and upgrade RF/PF performance and support.

b. RF/PF continue to be a significant fighting force for South Vietnam when employed and supported properly. Their principal and legitimate role of defending the rural populace against enemy encroachment is essential to ensuring that the GVN can successfully carry out national policies of rehabilitation and

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reconstruction, and village self-development, self-defense and self-government. Long term redeployments of RF/PF outside their assigned base areas for the purpose of defending ARVN perimeters, LOC's, installations, outposts, etc., continues to cause extensive deterioration in RF/PF mission objectives. With the potential of an enemy general offensive in the making MR Commanders are currently reorganizing and redeploying their military assets where they are most needed. When this causes the absence of adequate Territorial Forces in contested as well as high impact, vital rural areas, the credibility and eventually the political and military existence of the national government among the rural populace is threatened.

c. The Chief/JGS, is continuing to direct increased command emphasis on upgrading and improving the Territorial Forces. Progress to date has been slow, but the problem seems to have been recognized, and MR Commanders are being directed to correct and resolve problems that have long plagued RF/PF operational performance.

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CHAPTER 10

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS CAPABILITY

1. (C) SINGLE INTEGRATED MILITARY (TELECOMMUNICATIONS) SYSTEM (SIMS): The RVNAF are now totally responsible for the management, operation and maintenance of the SIMS. However, as the system is extremely diversified and complex, they have still not achieved total self-sufficiency in some areas.

a. SIMS Integrated Communications System (ICS) Reliability.

(1) Figure 10-1 portrays the monthly reliability of the ICS traversing South Vietnam. For this 2nd Qtr FY-74 reporting period the reliabilities attained were as follows:

OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
99.70%	99.90%	99.97%

(2) The low reliability for October was caused mainly by high idle channel noise (ICN) on group 770Z05. This 12-channel group was out from 5 - 7 October because of noise between Pleiku and Phu Lam. It was logged out again on 9 October because of noise at Pleiku and Pr'-line and was still out at the end of the month. The reliability improved to 99.90% in November, a vast improvement over October's 99.70% and September's 99.48% (the year's lowest reliability figure). The high ICN on group 770Z05 continued to log out this group through 5 November. Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) teams visiting Tan Son Nhut, Phu Lam and Pr'-line restored the group on an impaired service condition to support circuit reroutes necessitated by the 439L Link "G" failure between Vung Tau and Vayama. The teams further OJT'd site personnel who cleared the impairments on this group to acceptable levels. For nine consecutive months the reliability remained below the 99.98% threshold (March through November). December's reliability improved to the 99.97% level. An overall view, however, indicates that problems continue to plague the ICS which are not being reported by RVNAF operation and maintenance (O&M) agencies.

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INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY 1973




Figure 10-1

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(3) Five breaks have occurred in the undersea cable system during the reporting period. These breaks are tabulated below:

<u>DATES</u>	<u>LINK</u>	<u>BREAK LOCATION</u>
8-20 October	439L "C" Link Qui Nhon - Da Nang	On beach at Da Nang
5-14 November	439L "G" Link Vung Tau - Vayama	Between Repeaters 35 and 36
16-23 November	484N Wetwash Alpha	On beach at Nha Trang
23-30 November	439L "G" Link Vung Tau - Vayama	Between Repeaters 17 and 18
30 November to present (30 December)	484N Wetwash Alpha	Suspected to be near Repeater 36, 80 NM from San Miguel, PI

(4) Difficulties were experienced in obtaining GVN clearance for the entry of the cable repair ship CS Neptun into Vietnam.

(5) Action is being taken by DAO and the Political Section of the American Embassy to expedite GVN clearance procedures for the cable ship.

b. Cable Maintenance Capability.

(1) There are outside cable plants associated with each of the 27 RVNAF operated SIMS dial telephone exchanges (DTEs). Many of these plants have deteriorated to such an extent that telephone and other circuits using these cables have been adversely affected. Service interruptions become frequent during the rainy season due to moisture entering cables through improperly closed splices and damaged cable sheaths.

(2) Many cable plants now experiencing trouble were turned over to the RVNAF by US Forces in substandard condition. The RVNAF have inherited many of the present problems.

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(3) To correct this situation, both the ARVN and the VNAF are undertaking inspect, repair as necessary (IRAN) projects. A schedule of the currently programmed IRANs can be found at Figure 10-2. A pre-IRAN survey is performed prior to the IRAN to determine scope of work required and to develop a list of materials needed to accomplish the repair.

(4) RVNAF cable maintenance capabilities are hampered by the following:

(a) The RVNAF (especially the VNAF) lack sufficient quantities of tools and test equipment to do an adequate job. This problem can be traced to the US drawdown when many pieces of equipment were "lost." Replacement efforts using RVNAF supply channels have not yielded satisfactory results. The situation is compounded by the lack of care displayed toward the tools and equipment by the RVNAF. Further, defective equipment are often left on the shelf with no attempt made to repair them. When repair attempts are made, efforts are often thwarted by lack of repair parts. A common RVNAF solution is to order a complete new unit. DAO is taking action to expedite the acquisition/repair of the required tools and test equipment.

(b) Materials required for daily maintenance are not readily available or obtainable. Long supply lead time has caused units to run out of material required for repair of cable plants and associated equipment. When materials do arrive, they are frequently in damaged condition due to inept or careless in-country material handling. DAO logisticians are providing technical assistance to RVNAF supply personnel to rectify the supply situation.

(5) DAO is working closely with the RVNAF to identify and upgrade all substandard RVNAF outside plants and to obtain necessary materials and equipment.

2. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. AMSF-V.

(1) The monthly receipts of unserviceable components from units for repair by the maintenance shop at AMSF-V and the monthly accomplishments of repaired components is depicted on Figure 10-3. The first month's production of this quarter dropped to a low of 321 items compared to the monthly average of 507 items

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


Figure 10-2

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


Figure 10-3

10-9

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mainly due to lack of repair parts. Receipts of un-serviceable items increased from a yearly low of 321 items the first month of this quarter of 661 items by the end of this quarter. The monthly average receipts for the past 12 months is 530 items. The monthly average completions for the past 12 months is 507 items.

(2) The monthly maintenance shop backlog at the AMSF is depicted on Figure 10-4, and includes those items deadlined for parts. Many of the parts ordered for deadline components are NSN items which are not stocked in the US Army inventory and are procured from manufacturers as required. Production performance increased this quarter. The backlog was reduced from the yearly high of 925 items at the end of last quarter down to 700 items end of 4th quarter calendar year 1973. The deadline items were reduced from a yearly high of 527 items the first month of this quarter to a low of 332 items end of 4th quarter calendar year 1973. C-E Division is continually monitoring the supply activity to reduce the number of items deadlined awaiting parts. The current backlog of 700 items represents 6 weeks workload based on the monthly completion average of 507 items for the past 12 months.

(3) The 60th Signal Base Depot (SBD), located near Saigon, is the only ARVN repair facility tasked to perform rebuild of signal equipment.

(a) The technicians have not reached the level of competence for 5th echelon rebuild of some equipments. Contractor technicians are providing formal and on the job training designed to raise the technical competence to the 5th echelon level. Supply personnel are being trained in Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS) procedures, editing and supply procedures and stock control procedures. In November, 35 students completed training courses in rebuild of signal equipment; 107 students are currently attending courses in subjects as mentioned above.

(b) Depot Expansion and Improvement:

1 The Storage Division of 60th SBD has moved its receiving section to 1st Army Associated Depot (AAD), Long Binh. A location survey and inventory will be conducted at 60th SBD prior to moving stocks to the AAD. The move is expected to begin 1 March and be completed in 60-90 days. An adjustment of NMMA records with inventory counts will be made at completion of the move.

10-10

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AMSF MAINTENANCE DEADLINED, BACKLOG




Figure 10-4

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2 Currently, a review is being made of the depot expansion plan and it is expected to be completed by 31 January 1974. Changes are being made in location of shop areas. A list of equipment required to complete the expansion is being prepared.

(c) The depot has not achieved self-sufficiency because technical and middle management abilities have not sufficiently developed. Contractor assistance is engaged in a program to develop technical abilities. Depot officers with assistance from NMMA are conducting programs aimed at developing depot management skills.

(d) The current Bill of Materials (BOM) system for depot maintenance has proven much too complicated. Requisition rejections and failure to monitor the accepted requisitions has resulted in continual shortages of operational supplies. NMMA has developed a less complicated BOM system which will be implemented.

(e) Figure 10-5 depicts the Maintenance Rebuild Program. The ARVN FY 1974 rebuild program is currently 17% behind programmed schedule. During December 1973, the rebuild program was revised by NMMA. This revision reduced the program for the remainder of FY 1974. The revised program is based on rebuild assets on hand at the 60th SBD. Unserviceable items are being retained in field units that should be turned in for rebuild. The revised rebuild program is unsatisfactory. The program reflects assets on hand rather than the requirement.

(f) Personnel at 60th SBD are currently making an effort to identify all excess and obsolete equipment. Figure 10-6 lists equipment to be eliminated from ARVN accountability through property disposal action. The 60th SBD will implement disposition instructions on these items in the near future.

(5) The plan to consolidate the Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) maintenance and calibration is making acceptable progress. A single TMDE repair and calibration facility will be developed for each Military Region (MR) and will:

(a) Provide economical and effective service for all customers of Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

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60th SIGNAL BASE DEPOT REBUILD PROGRAM

TYPE EQUIPMENT	COMP FY 73	ORIG FY 74 SCHED	REVISED FY 74 SCHED	QTY COMP	PERCENT COMPLETE										
					10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	
RADIO	3768	4615	3245	1780	-----	-----	-----	-----	38.6	-----	-----	-----	-----	54.9	
VHF-CARRIER	944	1257	1086	456	-----	-----	-----	-----	36.3	-----	-----	-----	-----	42.0	
WIRE	468	1025	237	118	-----	-----	-----	-----	11.5	-----	-----	-----	-----	49.8	
AUDIO-VIS	103	130	81	24	-----	-----	-----	-----	18.5	-----	-----	-----	-----	29.6	
PHOTO	10	40	17	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	2.5	-----	-----	-----	-----	5.9	
TMDE	396	483	397	169	-----	-----	-----	-----	35.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	42.6	
TELETYPE	153	210	169	56	-----	-----	-----	-----	26.7	-----	-----	-----	-----	33.1	
RADAR			37	0	-----	-----	-----	-----	0	-----	-----	-----	-----	0	
MODULES	9395	22355	21655	6196	-----	-----	-----	-----	27.7	-----	-----	-----	-----	28.6	
PROGRAM TOTAL	15237	30115	26924	8800	-----	-----	-----	-----	29.2	-----	-----	-----	-----	32.7	

----- ORIGINAL SCHEDULE

----- REVISED SCHEDULE

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OBSOLETE AND EXCESS EQUIPMENT
AT 60TH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT

LINE	TYPE	QTY	UNIT COST	TOTAL COST
1	AN/GRC-4	35	1,454	50,890
2	AN/GRC-5	247	1,744	430,768
3	AN/GRC-26	21	15,600	327,600
4	AN/PRC-6	1057	190	199,960
5	AN/PRC-9	52	284	17,608
6	AN/URC-4	30	157	4,710
7	AN/VRC-6	9	1,738	15,642
8	AN/VRC-9	45	811	36,495
9	AN/VRC-10	169	856	144,664
10	AN/VRC-14	3	1,026	3,078
11	AN/VRC-15	133	1,071	142,443
12	AN/VRC-17	5	1,112	5,560
13	AN/VRC-18	53	1,155	61,215
14	AN/VRC-24	37	2,960	109,520
15	AN/VRQ-2	48	1,842	14,736
16	AN/VRQ-3	10	1,853	18,530
17	R-109	70	298	20,860
18	R-110	5	252	1,260
19	RT-67	93	651	60,543
20	RT-68	122	586	71,492
21	RT-70	103	323	33,269
22	RT-175/PRC-9	45	284	12,780
TOTAL		2360		1,783,353
SCR-188		24 (to be salvaged)		
SCR-193		68 (to be salvaged)		

NOTE: Unit Cost based on data in SB-700-20

Disposition instructions have been received for all equipment on this list; 37 AN/VRC-24's will be sent to CONUS. Balance of equipment will go to PDO in Vietnam.

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(b) Simplify and reduce the duplication of facilities by use of a one-stop service point in each MR.

(c) Create a pool of highly skilled repairmen and calibrators to assure all peculiar and common TMDE is repaired and calibrated.

(d) Assure that a more responsive system is available in each MR.

The ARVN staff is capable of handling all facets of this mission. Technical personnel are available and need minimum assistance. The end result will be an overall savings of skills, facilities, and transportation costs. This system will allow a total command and staff overview of the TMDE and material readiness of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

b. Supply.

(1) Supply support for tactical communication equipment is controlled by the NMMA. All requisitions are funneled into NMMA where the Materiel Release Order (MRO) is accomplished and forwarded to a supply depot for shipment to direct support unit (DSU). The NMMA system is still experiencing difficulties and is not responsive for the following reasons:

(a) The time required to process a MRO to a supply depot is excessive.

(b) Update of depot inventories of equipment and spare parts have not been established for C-E items. The program is delayed due to ARVN desire to inventory concurrently with the move of C-E depot stock from 60th SBD to ARVN AAD, Long Binh. The DAO position is that the 60th SBD stocks should be drawn down as much as feasible prior to the move of the depot.

(c) Meaningful, on-hand, due-in and due-out records are difficult to develop. In December 1973, NMMA completed a reconciliation of due-ins for major items with USA International Logistic Center (ILC) and corrected the machine stock records for the first time since 1 January 1973.

(d) Excessive requisition rejections are still being experienced.

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(e) Computer problems are still affecting requisition processing cycles. Meetings have been held with IBM World Trade Corporation management to develop a solution to the problems with the IBM 360/50 equipment.

(2) The DSUs maintain a manual card record system and, generally, these records are excellent. The problem areas are:

(a) Obtaining accurate due-in date.

(b) No editing capability. Action has been taken to develop this capability but is progressing very slowly.

(3) The AMSF supports the SIMS and the Army Calibration Center (ACC). AMSF supply effectiveness is depicted on Figure 10-7; the demand satisfaction objective is 85% fill for authorized stockage list (ASL) items stocked by AMSF. The drop to a low of 17% in October 1973 resulted from the discontinuance of Direct Supply Support System (Airlift) and use of only surface shipments. As a result, order ship time increased. There was a delay in adjusting the Requirement Objective (R/O). Zero balance ASL items increased to a yearly high of 1234 items in October 1973 and dropped to 937 items end of December 1973. Expediting action is continuing with CONUS supply sources. Summary of SIMS supply status for in-country support is indicated below.

(a) Monthly requisitions averaged 2588 per month for the past 12 months.

(b) The ASL items averaged approximately 3300 per month for the past 12 months.


(c) Due-out lines increased to a high of 7817 in October 1973 and decreased to 4864 at the end of December 1973. Receipts from expediting action initiated in September 1973 accounted for this reduction.

(4) In-country procurement of C-E selected items have a potential value of \$23 million. As of 31 December 1973, only \$3 million were realized (see Figure 10-8). Efforts are being made to increase procurement; however, progress is slow for the following reasons:

10-17

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10-19

Figure 10-7

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C-E IN COUNTRY PROCUREMENT FY-74




Figure 10-8

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- (a) Limited in-country manufacturing capabilities.
- (b) Worldwide shortages of raw materials.
- (c) Reluctance of private capital, domestic and foreign, to invest in an unstable economy and political environment.
- (d) Local manufacturers looking for windfall profits and ironbound contracts.
- (e) Selected items must be carefully scrutinized to insure that capabilities to produce do exist. Also, that items selected for initial production can stand slippage in delivery dates without having an adverse affect on operational readiness. USAID is lending its help in assisting interested companies with such problems as financing, raw materials, equipment, and technical assistance.

3. (C) END ITEM SURVEILLANCE:

a. Tactical Units.

(1) Radar Sites - DAO C-E surveillance visits to various radar sites in MR III and to the 43rd Medium Maintenance Company (MMC) showed that 17 of 45 Ground Surveillance Radars were deadlined. A high percentage of nonfunctional radars has been observed in other MRs. A DAO C-E review of outstanding requisitions for the 43rd MMC showed that requisition priority 12 was being used instead of 02-999 for deadline equipment repair parts. The 43rd MMC was not turning in high value items for rebuild. This information was provided to the ARVN Signal Department. A command emphasis visit made by ARVN Signal Department personnel on 24 December 1973 resulted in the reduction of deadline MR III radars from 17 to 10 as of 26 December 1973. Increased ARVN efforts in maintenance and supply, country-wide, is required to reduce the deadline rate and thereby increase operational capability of current assets. DAO C-E personnel are assisting ARVN with their radar programs. The following are typical problems encountered in the field:

- (a) Failure of lower echelon repair facilities to evacuate equipment to higher echelon repair facilities when repair exceeds the unit's technical capability or for lack of spare parts. When direct support (DS) or

10-22

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general support (GS) facilities cannot repair equipment, the shops will hold them for long periods of time. It has been found that some equipment had been in a shop for longer than a year.

(b) The lack of school trained operators limits the operational efficiency of the radars. Frequently the operators are unaware that the radar set is inoperable. Daily operator checks could eliminate this problem; however, operators must be trained to perform these periodic checks. Presently, insufficient operator's training is conducted at unit level.

(c) Transportation presents a problem. Deadline radars are evacuated to the nearest support facility. In some cases, these may be as far as 180 miles away.

(d) Reporting of deadline radars lacks coordination; sets are deadlined and the command is frequently unaware of the fact.

(e) Supply continues to be a problem. Once a replacement for a defective part is ordered, there is little follow-up action. Requisitions have been found to be older than 1 year and equipment remains deadlined (awaiting parts).

(f) There is a continuing need to train radar repair technicians, both formally, and OJT. Surveillance visits have noted that graduate radar repair technicians (Vung Tau Signal School) have been assigned to units where no radar exists.

(g) The practice of using automotive batteries in place of the specified batteries for the AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 Radar sets should be stopped. While the batteries are sufficient to operate the units, they limit the transportability of the sets. The AN/PPS-4 and -5 essentially become fixed units due to the weight of the batteries. NMMA has requisitioned the proper batteries from CONUS.

(h) RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS), Central Logistics Command (CLC) is aware of the situation and has:

1 Directed the 1st and 3rd Area Logistics Commands (ALCS) to pay more attention to radar repair.

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2 Recommended that the ALCs send radar repairmen to the RVNAF Artillery School to learn radar operation in conjunction with artillery fire missions.

3 Directed 312 Signal Support Group to improve maintenance, management, training and general support of MPQ-4A Radars.

(2) Night Vision Devices - The ARVN and VNAF are authorized 2799 PVS-2 Starlight Scopes. The Equipment Status Report and VNAF records indicate 3406 scopes are on hand, valued at \$6,406,086. The PVS-2 is powered by a BA-1100 battery. If the on-hand quantity were fully utilized for combat operations during the past 11 months, consumption would have been 149,864 batteries. From 30 January 1973 to 30 December 1973 (11 months) records show that only 1641 batteries were issued. This consumption rate indicates approximately 1% utilization of Starlight Scopes. Similar battery consumption data was obtained from DSUs and 60th SBD for the period December 1971 through July 1972. Possible reasons for low utilization are:

(a) Individual fear of liability for loss.

(b) Too much added weight to the rifle.

(c) Fear of radiation hazard to eyes. The ARVN Signal Department reports that 84% of the PVS-2's have been modified to prevent possible eye damage. Presently, action is being taken by JGS/J6 and Signal Department to modify the remaining scopes. During November and December, 277 were modified. Adequate number of modification kits are available.

(3) Sensors - During this reporting period, priority was placed on strengthening and adding sensor coverage to vital installations. Emphasis is being placed on perimeter defenses for fuel depots, ammo depots, airfields and ICS stations. There is a total of 95 vital installations that are being considered for sensor coverage. A survey team consisting of representatives from Special Operations Center J3/JGS, local Electronic Combat Detachment commanders in areas visited, and DAO C-E Division, are programmed to visit all sites to determine sensor requirements. During this period, five fuel depots, four ammo depots and two airfields in MR IV were surveyed. Recommendations were submitted to JGS and were approved. J3/JGS has directed responsible Electronic Combat Detachment commanders to expedite the recommended sensor deployment.

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(4) Radio Equipment.

(a) A search for AN/PRC-25 radio assets, that have not been issued but received under Projects Enhance and Enhance Plus, is being conducted by C-E Division. A complete inventory will be made. AN/PRC-25 assets will be used to replace the AN/PRC-10. This will remove an obsolete, costly, battery-consuming piece of equipment from the inventory. The saving in batteries alone will be approximately \$700,000 per year.

(b) A visit made on 7 December 1973 to the Consolidated Base Depot, Long Binh, to investigate a complaint about defective locally manufactured BA-31 and BA-200 dry batteries purchased with MASF funds. An inspection of the cold storage facilities showed the temperature in the cold chambers was only 52 degrees F instead of the required 30 to 35 degrees F. This was due to lack of properly operating air conditioning units. All of the units were damaged when the Long Binh Ammunition Dump exploded in early 1973. While two of these units were repaired the third was never fixed. One of the previously repaired units failed in October 1973 and remains inoperable. The one functional unit does not have the capability to cool the storage facility to the required temperature. Failure of this remaining unit will result in a complete breakdown of the cooling facility. Further, the battery storage facility is not being utilized properly. Photo supplies and tire recap rubber is also being stored there. This is at the expense of \$314,460 worth of dry batteries being stockpiled in nonrefrigerated areas. The problem has been brought to the attention of the Chief, ARVN Signal Department for corrective action.

b. SIMS. Observation during surveillance visits to SIMS sites revealed the following problems:

(1) Preventive maintenance is inadequate.

(2) Conditions were found where equipment redundancy was lost without a hazardous condition (HAZCON) report being submitted.

(3) Defective components are removed from the equipment but not sent to the AMSF-V for repair.

(4) Sites maintain an inadequate supply of spare parts and are lax in having TMDE calibrated when due.

10-25

CONFIDENTIAL

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c. The following recommendations were made to the RVNAF J6/JGS for consideration in determining corrective courses of action:

(1) That top priority be given to clearing deficiencies noted in quality assurance (QA) visits to prevent further deterioration of SIMS.

(2) That JGS command emphasis be placed on selecting the best qualified QA personnel to give additional on-site training to assigned personnel in diagnosing, isolating and repairing of equipment.

(3) Establish procedures to insure that local commanders and site supervisory personnel are continually aware of the operating condition of their sites.

d. Surveillance visits to SIMS sites to evaluate the status of air conditioning and power generating equipment revealed the following:

(1) Many site OICs and NCOICs are not placing adequate emphasis on supervising the preventive maintenance program.

(2) Generally, 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance is not being performed.

(3) Insufficient emphasis has been placed on daily routine preventive maintenance.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The primary objectives of the C-E Division are to increase the ARVN's capability to attain and maintain:

(1) SIMS reliability at 99.98%.

(2) Effective tactical C-E systems.

(3) Supply effectiveness at 85% or higher.

(4) Effective and efficient maintenance capability.

b. Analysis of surveillance and operation evaluation reports indicate that the following major problems are associated with attaining these goals:

(1) SIMS sites' OICs and NCOICs are not placing adequate emphasis on supervising preventive maintenance

CONFIDENTIAL

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programs. Generally, 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance capabilities exist. However, it is not performed, mainly due to insufficient management.

(2) Middle management abilities are not adequately developed to achieve maintenance self-sufficiency. Depot technicians require continuing training to reach self-sufficiency in 5th echelon rebuild maintenance. The current rebuild projections appear attainable. Management has attempted to reduce the projected rebuild schedule without adequate justification. Action is being taken to maintain current or higher rebuild projections. Training of ARVN personnel is continuing in management and technical rebuild techniques.

(3) The responsiveness of the supply system is inadequate.

5. (C) SUMMARY:

a. The SIMS is the backbone of the RVNAF communications. The ARVN personnel are becoming technically competent. Although management is lagging in technical competency, an acceptable level of operational standards is being maintained. These operational standards can be sustained with added experience and training. Programs currently in progress will improve the reliability of communications and increase self-sufficiency of both management and technical personnel. Limited technical assistance will remain a continuing requirement.

b. An effective management program for the ARVN tactical C-E is attainable. Additional training of management and technical personnel will increase the O&M capability.

c. The RVNAF logistics agencies have performed marginally over the past quarter. Although many supply and maintenance problems remain, progress is being made. A concerted effort is underway to eliminate zero balance as lack of parts affects all C-E activities. Of special significance is the fact that the RVNAF have achieved self-sufficiency in TMDE calibration. While this case is not typical, it is an indication that the RVNAF are on their way to achieving an effective logistic support system.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CHAPTER 11

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) TRAINING

1. (C) OFFSHORE TRAINING.

a. Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1974 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) are:

(a) Upgrade the Vietnamese Military Academy faculty by improving the quality of instruction in furtherance of attaining the announced goal of self-sufficiency.

(b) Strengthen the training base by improving the qualifications of instructor personnel, particularly in the area of combined arms training.

(c) Improve the management capabilities of ARVN by providing management training in the command and staff skills, logistics and personnel areas.

(2) The following is a brief summary of the ARVN FY74 SATP as of the end of FY 2/74:

<u>FY74</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>COST</u>
Beginning Program 2d Qtr	495	\$2,004,532
Additions	4	
Deletions	7	
Current Program	492	\$1,975,802

(3) ARVN operational requirements necessitated making two additions to the program during FY 2/74 as follows:

<u>ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL SPACES</u>
Observer Training Overseas (Okinawa)	2
Observer Training Overseas (Japan)	2

(4) The spaces originally programmed and the additions made to the program produced a total figure of 499. Seven of these spaces were deleted from the

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program as follows:

<u>REASON</u>	<u>DELETED SPACES</u>
DA course cancellation	5
English language disqualification	2

(5) The following offshore training courses were attended by ARVN personnel during FY 2/74:

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Operations	Artillery Ballistic Meteorology	2/0
Comm/Elec	Radio System Officer	2/0
Comm/Elec	C&E Staff Officer	2/0
Comm/Elec	Telephone Digital Comm Officer	2/0
Comm/Elec	Tactical Microwave Sys Repair	1/E
Maintenance	Armament Maint & Repair Officer	2/0
Maintenance	Calibration & Technician Spec	1/0
Maintenance	Turret Maintenance	2/E
Maintenance	Turret Maintenance OJT	2/E
Maintenance	Office Machine Repair	2/E
Maintenance	Meteorological Equipment Repair	2/0
Logistics	Basic ADPS Systems Analysis	2/0
Logistics	Adv ADPS Systems Analysis	2/0
Professional	Language Laboratory Maintenance	1/0
Professional	Language Instructor Refresher	17/0

11-2

CONFIDENTIAL

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<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Professional	Senior Officer Logistics Seminar	3/0
Professional	C&E Staff Officer OJT	2/0
Professional	Medical Observer Training	5/0
Professional	Management Post Graduate MS	1/0
Professional	Quartermaster Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	Transportation Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	Civilian University Training	70/0*
Professional	Observer Training Overseas	2/0

* Includes 57 carryover students from FY73.

(6) The number of students sent to Continental United States (CONUS) for training in FY 2/74 is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>COST</u>
October	26	\$67,205
November	18	40,430
December	7	37,370
TOTAL	51	\$145,005

(7) Statistical summary of FY74 ARVN offshore training as of the end of FY 2/74 is as follows:

<u>COURSES COMPLETED</u>	<u>COURSES IN PROGRESS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
73	154	227

(8) The fact that only two spaces during FY 2/74 were cancelled due to inability of candidates to attain the required English Comprehension Level (ECL) reflects the progress ARVN is making in providing qualified students for offshore training. Department of Army has determined that language training is the major

11-3
CONFIDENTIAL

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stumbling block for most countries in maintaining an efficient offshore training program that is capable of utilizing all training available. Another reflection of ARVN's increasing ability to effectively plan for offshore training is seen in the fact that no spaces during FY 2/74 were cancelled due to unit operational requirements.

(9) Types of training to receive priority during FY74 are as follows:

(a) Civil Education. Support of Vietnamese Military Academy, Training Research Branch, Signal and Engineer Departments.

(b) Management Training. Command and staff skills, logistics management, areas at upper and middle management level.

(c) Technical Training. Skills required to support introduction of new items of equipment, skills required to operate logistics support facilities transferred to ARVN.

(10) With the successful conclusion of the FY 2/74 training, continued success during the remainder of FY74 is anticipated and no major problems are expected for the ARVN FY74 SATP.

b. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).

(1) Objectives of the VNN/VNMC Fiscal Year 1974 SATP continue as follows:

(a) To provide advanced professional training for officers, NCOs and petty officers to reduce the VNN/VNMC resources management and middle-management short fall.

(b) To provide advanced technical training beyond the in-country capability and to train VNN/VNMC instructors, thus improving the technical training capability and quality of the VNN/VNMC.

(c) To support the up-grading of VNN/VNMC medical and dental care in both quality and quantity, thereby enhancing combat effectiveness and, perhaps even more important, nation building by providing medical care for the Vietnamese people.

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) To enhance the proper utilization of US materials and assets transferred to VNN/VNMC by providing qualified personnel through proper training and indoctrination.

(2) Resources Management training remains the major deficiency and the major priority of offshore training. Increased numbers of trained personnel in the field of logistics are required to improve procurement, maintenance, and transportation of materials, facilities and personnel. Although VNN has reached its maximum strength, the rapid expansion has resulted in increased demands for trained middle-management personnel. Progress has been made, but additional training is necessary to increase the VNN junior officer's management/technical expertise.

(3) Copies of Books I and II containing the FY 75-80 VNN/VNMC SATP were prepared and forwarded to Secretary of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), CINCPAC Fleet, and Chief of Naval Education and Training. Input for this program included offshore training courses and training aids, devices, books, maps and publications.

(4) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNN/VNMC personnel during FY 2/74:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
<u>VNN</u>	
Military Comptrollership/Planning Programming and Budgeting Systems	1/0
Radioman Class-B	2/E
Engineering Aids Class-A and B	1/E
Basic Elect/Elex/Fire Control Technician Class-A, Phase I and II	2/E
Storekeeper Class-A	5/E
Teletypewriter Maint Mod 28 ASR Class-C	2/E
Basic Elect/Elex/Construction Electrician Class-A	2/E

CONFIDENTIAL

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NAME OF COURSE

SPACES/STUDENT CODE

VNMC

Observership Medical Officer General 1/0
Surgery

(5) A total of 11 VNN officers and 13 VNN enlisted personnel returned from attending the following off-shore training courses during FY 2/74. No VNMC personnel returned from such training during FY 2/74.

NAME OF COURSE

SPACES/STUDENT CODE

Special Junior Foreign Officer 1/0
Supply (Advanced Student)

Foreign Officer Naval Intelligence 4/0

School Admin Class-C 1/0

English Language/Math refresher/
Engineering Electronics 1/0

Naval Supply Management Senior Foreign
Officer 2/0

Foreign Officer Supply 2/0

Gunner's Mate Class-A, Phase I and II 2/E

Dental Technician Class-A/Dental
Prosthetic Class-C 1/E

Basic Elect/Elex Class (Radar Course) 4/E

Hospital Corpsman Class-A/Operating Room
Technician Class-C 1/E

Language Instructor 1/E

Internal Current Electrician's Class-B 2/E

Electrician's Mate Class-B 2/E

(6) Problems encountered during the quarter
follow:

(a) Two courses and three spaces were cancelled
due to inability of VNN candidates to pass the English

11-6

CONFIDENTIAL

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language requirement. Courses cancelled were:

NAME OF COURSE

SPACES/STUDENT CODE

VNN

Radioman Cl-B

1/E

Engineering Aids Cl-A and B

2/E

(b) VNMC requested cancellation of one quota each for the Hospital Corpsman Cl-A, Preventive Medicine Technician Cl-C, Hospital Corpsman Cl-A and Pharmacy Technician Cl-C CONUS courses in October due to inability to provide English language qualified candidates. Subsequent to this action VNMC selected nine personnel for intensive formal English language training and requested that above cancelled courses be reprogrammed. Courses were reprogrammed for FY 4/74.

c. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)

(1) The Fiscal Year 74 SATP for VNAF is directed toward the fulfillment of four major objectives:

(a) Continuation of fixed and rotary wing pilot training within the capability of the VNAF to provide qualified candidates in order to achieve 100% manning of all squadrons.

(b) Provision of training necessary to support new equipment and systems peculiar to VNAF.

(c) Revitalization of the in-country schools by training replacement technician level instructors.

(d) Improvement of managerial efficiency by supporting professional and resources management (REMAN) training.

(2) To achieve the above objectives, offshore training listed below was programmed for FY74. The SATP was changed according to the real needs of VNAF. Adjustments were also made to reflect the lack of qualified candidates for training in the CONUS and the academic elimination of trainees.

<u>Aircrew Training</u>	<u>Students Programmed</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Rotary Wing Aviator	431	\$10,822,410

11-7

CONFIDENTIAL

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<u>Aircrew Training</u>	<u>Students Programmed</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
UH-1 Instructor Pilots	16	252,320
Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) - T41/T37	395	11,308,850
F-5E Instructor Pilots	38	1,312,760
T-37 Instructor Pilots	5*	50,100
A-37 Combat Crew Training School (CCTS)	89*	2,411,010
Undergraduate Navigator	12*	187,080
<u>Operational Training CONUS</u>	63	210,970
<u>C&E Training CONUS</u>	53	288,840
<u>Maintenance Training CONUS</u>	132	251,690
<u>Logistics Training CONUS</u>	38	104,130
<u>Administrative Training CONUS</u>	10	49,310
<u>Professional/Specialized Training CONUS</u>	86	2,804,400
<u>Orientation Training CONUS</u>		302,500
<u>Field Training Services</u>		375,500
<u>Extraordinary Expenses</u>		36,010
<u>Other Training Support</u>		38,810
<u>Operations Training Overseas</u>	6	2,910
Total:	1268	\$30,809,600

* Filled by students already in CONUS.

(3) In FY 2/74, 378 students were programmed and 372 students were processed for CONUS training. The cancellation of six spaces brings the total number of spaces cancelled to ten for the current fiscal year. Also, during the 1st half of FY74 there were 25 training spaces rescheduled for later entry dates due to the lack of qualified candidates. Following is a list of CONUS training spaces programmed/filled during FY 1/74

11-8
CONFIDENTIAL

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and FY 2/74:

<u>Aircrew</u>	<u>1st Quarter</u>		<u>2nd Quarter</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Prog</u>	<u>Filled</u>	<u>Prog</u>	<u>Filled</u>	<u>Prog</u>	<u>Filled</u>
Rotary Wing Aviator	108	108	126	126	234	234
UH-1 Instructor Pilot	12	12	4	4	16	16
UPT-T41/T37	60	60	135	135	195	195
F-5E Instructor Pilot	8	8	22	22	30	30
Operational Training	22	22	17	12	39	34
C&E Training	30	26	11	10	41	36
Maintenance Training	50	50	19	19	69	69
Logistics Training	10	10	8	8	18	18
Admin Training	0	0	2	2	2	2
Professional/ Specialized Training	24	24	34	34	58	58
Total	324	320	378	372	702	692

(4) The F-5E program is progressing as scheduled for both pilot and maintenance training. The first class of eight F-5E instructor pilots returned on 20 Dec 73. Twenty-two F-5A pilots are undergoing F-5E Advanced Fighter training and ten others are awaiting class dates. A total of forty instructor pilots will be trained in the F-5E program. Additionally, the Air Force Workshop has tentatively approved the CONUS T-38 pilot training of 52 UPT/T-37 graduates in FY 75 for in-country transition into the F-5E program. This will provide a nucleus of younger pilots with longer retention in the program. The 54 CONUS trained technicians for the maintenance/instructor cadre returned to Vietnam and joined the 14-man Contract Field Service Team (CFST) in installing the F-5E Mobile Training Set and commenced the training of maintenance personnel (see para 2e).

11-9

CONFIDENTIAL

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(5) The Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) and Undergraduate Helicopter Training (UHT) programs for VNAF students are progressing satisfactorily. A total of 429 pilot candidates were sent to CONUS training in the 1st half of FY74. Thus far, seventeen of these candidates have failed to qualify for entry into pilot training because of language difficulties. Entry English comprehension level (ECL) into pilot training is 80. Fifteen candidates were given six weeks additional training in order to qualify and the other two were eliminated from training. In order to minimize the number of students failing to qualify in CONUS, the Training Management Section (TMS) has increased the in-country ECL requirement from 55 to 65. This should sharply reduce the requirement for programming additional CONUS language training.

(6) Student elimination for academic reasons remains at an acceptable level. Thus far only seven students have been eliminated (two UPT students and five other students). This number is expected to increase at an accelerated rate as the UPT and UHT students progress to the advanced phases of training where the elimination rate is approximately 25 percent. In some cases it was necessary to program pre-requisite training to better prepare students to enter the more difficult courses such as budget specialist training.

(7) The FY75 SATP for VNAF has been developed jointly by VNAF training personnel and DAO TMS. This training program was approved at the Pacific Command (PACOM) Air Force Workshop as follows:

	<u>Training Spaces</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Flying Training	118	\$2,527,360
Operations Training	86	138,520
C&E Training	67	361,390
Maintenance Training	106	186,180
Logistics Training	62	101,160
Administrative Training	48	45,520
Professional/Specialist Training	247	591,370
Orientation Training	4	97,860

CONFIDENTIAL

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	<u>Training Spaces</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Field Training Services	1	20,620
Extraordinary Expenses	-	6,620
Other Training Support	-	8,150
Training Aids	-	<u>536,134</u>
Total	739	\$4,620,884

A total of 442 students will receive training in the 739 spaces listed above. There will be additional expenditures in the purchase of fixed wing and rotary wing trainers not included in the above training aids cost figure. There is no UPT or UHT programmed. Fifty UH-1 pilots will be transitioned into the CH-47, 52 T-37 graduates will receive follow-on training in the T-38 aircraft, and two F-5A pilots will be transitioned into the F-5E aircraft to become instructor pilots. A significant change in the programming of CONUS training for FY75 was the reduction in CONUS English language training (ELT). In FY74 approximately 92% of the students going to CONUS for training received CONUS ELT. In FY75 only 34% are programmed for CONUS ELT. The RVNAF have the capability to train students to an ECL of 70. Therefore, only those students entering courses requiring an ECL in excess of 70 or mandatory English language training will be programmed for CONUS ELT. The VNAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Training was furnished the FY75 training schedule and course requirements on 14 December 1973 and urged to take necessary steps to commence qualifying students for entry.

2. (C) IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

a. RVNAF

(1) Of the 28 RVNAF service schools, the following listed were visited during FY 2/74: Infantry School, Artillery School, Adjutant General School, Signal School, Military Police School and Junior Military Academy. Of that sampling, all were rated excellent. The Central Training Command (CTC) exercises firm control over the schools through the media of directives and inspections and the school commandants and faculties were uniformly confident of their expertise.

(2) "Sister School" relationships (except for the

11-11

CONFIDENTIAL

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Junior Military Academy, which has none) with counterpart US Army service schools were reportedly well established and, working through CTC, were instrumental in the regular receipt of printed matter from the US schools.

(3) Doubtless, the doctrine of the Joint General Staff (JGS), as promulgated through CTC to the service schools, permeates the RVNAF, since the schools train a portion of all ranks of the Vietnamese armed forces in common subjects. That is, the doctrines of Infantry, Artillery, Adjutant General, Signals and Military Police, etc, are all basically taught at the service schools for all of the armed forces. All of the schools visited were pedagogically correct, had at least adequate facilities, and were discharging their missions (except that the MP School lacks certain criminal investigation (CI) personnel which precludes its operation of a CI laboratory and conduct of certain training related thereto).

RVNAF SERVICE SCHOOLS CY73

NAME	PROGRAMMED	INPUT	OUTPUT	IN TNG 31 DEC 73
Natl Def Coll	40	0	37	0
Comd & Stf Coll	400	592	397	195
VNMA	1200	0	0	957
POLWAR Coll	2100	1297	1020	485
Inf Sch	7555	8800	10841	3129
NCO Sch	4800	6514	7691	3117
Armor Sch	4445	2793	2716	355
Arty Sch	3504	2331	2535	570
WAFC	1520	895	607	121
Jr Mil Acad, Vung Tau	1400	202	121	1437
Jr Mil Sch, Pleiku	400	0	22	394
Ord Sch	2610	2125	2560	504

11-12
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NAME	PROGRAMMED	INPUT	OUTPUT	IN TNG 31 DEC 73
QM Sch	1765	691	951	95
Med Sch	3216	1759	2000	1184
Intel Sch	2783	1612	1530	296
MP Sch	2320	2288	2617	434
Band Sch	719	456	178	167
Trans Sch	6955	6833	7298	427
Sig Sch	6147	3415	4678	1618
Engr Sch	6289	6870	5157	2072
Admin & Fin Sch	1150	450	304	167
AG Sch	4940	2970	2847	859
RVNAFLS	3000	2297	3334	1136
Log Mgt Sch	610	604	465	60
Soc Svc Sch	857	227	35	20
Martial Arts & PT Sch	410	200	155	80
Dog Tng Sch	508	199	184	14
POLWAR Cadre Sch	<u>1920</u>	<u>724</u>	<u>995</u>	<u>175</u>
	73563	57144	61275	20068

(4) The Anti-Armor Team.

(a) In view of the enemy armor threat, the DATT requested USARPAC to provide a technical assistance team to study the ARVN anti-tank capability and recommend actions that ARVN could undertake to improve their anti-armor capability - both short and long term. The team, consisted of COL W. F. Ulmer, Jr, (Team Chief) Commander, 194th Armored Brigade, Ft Knox, Kentucky; COL R. S. McGowan, President, Combat Arms Training Board, Ft Benning, Georgia; LTC B. L. Robinson, US Army Armor School, Ft Knox and MAJ L. M. Jackson, US Army

11-13

CONFIDENTIAL

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Armor School. The team visited I, II, and III Corps over a three-day period, 13-15 Nov 73, and submitted twenty short term and sixteen long term recommendations in their final trip report. The report represented an excellent comprehensive course of action to be taken by ARVN and was the first comprehensive analysis made of ARVN's anti-armor capability since the departure of US Forces. The DATT ordered DAO to take immediate action on the recommendation to assist ARVN. The DATT submitted the report to General Vien who on 7 Dec 73 issued an all encompassing directive ordering compliance with almost all of the recommendations of the anti-armor team. In addition, the ARVN Inspector General (IG) has prepared a check list that includes the twenty short term recommendations and will visit all ARVN divisions over the next ninety days to insure compliance with the JGS directive. The following actions, representing major improvements for ARVN anti-armor capability, have taken place or are in the process of being completed:

1. Light Anti-Tank Weapons (LAWs) at the using units are being inspected to insure operational readiness.

2. Units in Military Region I, II and III, that have a high enemy tank threat in their Area of Operations (AO), are being equipped with one LAW per soldier.

3. LAW training is being stepped up at the NTCs. Also, 1,200 subcaliber devices and 250,000 M73 practice rounds will begin arriving in Jan 74 to allow trainees to practice firing the LAW. Parallel to this, General Vien has requested that tanks be provided for practice firing to add realism and build ARVN confidence in the LAW.

4. The DTCs have been directed to form seven-man MTTs to present LAW refresher training at company level for all infantrymen. This is in addition to that normally received as part of unit training and should take about 60 days to complete.

5. Formation of tank killer teams has been directed by General Vien, four men in each ARVN platoon and nine men in each Regional Force (RF) company. The teams will be equipped with LAWs as their basic anti-armor weapon. Training of the RF teams is currently underway.

6. XM-202. Because of the limited anti-armor

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capability of this weapon, and the high cost of the rounds, DAO is recommending that ARVN replace it with the LAW.

(5) Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided (TOW) Missile System.

(a) In the latter part of FY 2/74 a series of trips was made to visit almost all TOW missile systems in RVN. More than one hundred systems were inspected by a combined team including two members of the Training Management Section, the Hughes Aircraft technical representative and two members of the Central Training Command. The team's findings exposed serious problems with ARVN TOW missile system readiness centering largely in the areas of command responsibility, training, support and tactical mobility. A report of these findings was forwarded on 9 Nov 73 to the DATT who directed that immediate action be taken by both ARVN and DAO. In addition, the DATT immediately met with General Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, and outlined the problem areas found and recommended several remedial actions be taken.

(b) Response by both ARVN and DAO has resulted in actions that have greatly upgraded the TOW system readiness. Thirty TOW maintenance personnel, recently returned from CONUS training, underwent a comprehensive OJT program conducted by the Hughes Aircraft Company technical representatives thus providing ARVN with a fully capable maintenance support system. Nine of these maintenance personnel will be assigned along with three mobile support sets to Hue, Danang and Pleiku to provide closer response to field repair and maintenance needs. Command emphasis in ARVN is being generated as it should be: from the top down. In a letter and several messages General Vien has ordered that the TOW Missile systems be given top priority in being maintained operational. A weekly report on each TOW system was ordered to be sent to each Corps by each unit equipped with TOWs and forwarded to JGS/J3/CLC. The IG has been ordered to inspect the TOW systems during his visits to all the ARVN divisions during the next 90 days. This will include not only each system's operational readiness (charged batteries) but will include inspecting for alternate firing positions and overhead cover.

(c) Twenty mini-battery chargers have been requisitioned to help improve the problem of long delays

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for the using unit in receiving its batteries sent in for charging. DAO has submitted a proposed distribution which differs in some key areas from the ARVN proposal but both proposals recommend placing one mini-battery charger with each division. This should greatly reduce the turn around time for batteries and reduce dependence on the Area Logistics Commands (ALCs).

(d) Seven of the eight original TOW recommendations have been completed or are in the process of being completed. Only the recommendation to increase crew size from four to six has not been acted on by ARVN who may feel that this recommendation is not as critical as the other seven.

(e) While ARVN has made progress in improving training and providing organic transportation to the TOW systems, action has been diffused and not rapid enough. Other than having a charged battery to enable firing, transportation represents the most critical deficiency of the TOW system readiness. Mobility is paramount to the system's survival on the battlefield. The Vietnam Army Arsenal is presently conducting tests on the development of an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) mount with full confidence they can develop a working prototype by the end of January. Present plans call for each division to have three APC mounted TOWs. In the meantime action must be taken immediately by ARVN to provide the authorized jeeps and trailers to the large majority of these systems that have no transportation at all and which would readily be overrun by the enemy's mobile armor.

(f) The CTC has made major improvement in TOW training. TOW instructor training was carried out for all TOW instructors last October and November. Crew retraining is now being stepped up at the three national training centers (NTCs) that have the TOW instructor kits and which recently received the TOW blast simulator to provide more realistic training. The divisions are also emphasizing TOW training as part of their Period II unit training with the assistance of the TOW instructors from the NTCs. Yet ARVN still has not committed its full expertise to TOW training and therefore TOW instruction is lacking the quality it should possess. It is necessary that the TOW instructors from Quang Trung, Hoa Cam, and Pleiku training centers be retrained to upgrade their training capability to a higher and necessary level. ARVN has the expertise available to do so. This training could be carried out at Quang Trung Training Center. The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

training should be conducted by the CTC representative, who has trained at Fort Benning on this system and who has fired the TOW, and by the CONUS trained maintenance personnel. Present training lacks lessons learned, information on common field problems, accurate technical and maintenance information, TOW tactics, and repair/turn-in procedures. The aforementioned personnel could remedy these training deficiencies.

(g) Overall, ARVN has made great progress in upgrading their TOW missile system readiness. Some redirection of effort on training and the provision of organic transportation will provide ARVN with the final improvements needed to make TOW fully effective.

(6) M-48A3 Tank

(a) Logistical problems relating to ammunition and fuel have received top priority. The Armor School in mid-December stated that it was no longer having problems obtaining enough fuel or main gun ammunition for armor training. JGS has directed that the ALCs make available sufficient fuel and ammunition for armored unit training and combined arms training. Compliance with this directive will be monitored by the IG on his ensuing visits to ARVN units over the next 90 days. Corps commanders are also reshuffling tank unit deployment to obtain maximum anti-armor defensive posture.

(7) Recoilless Rifles (RR).

(a) 106 RRs are receiving priority for sight replacement and repair and return to operational units.

(b) The 57 and 90mm RRs are being reviewed to improve both training and utilization.

(c) The above improvements indicate the emphasis that ARVN is placing on upgrading its anti-armor capability. The resulting increase in confidence the ARVN soldier possesses in his ability to defend himself against tanks may prove to be a vital factor in any future major hostilities.

b. ARVN

(1) The ARVN training program, in spite of interruptions caused by continued war, lack of fuel, ammunition and support has made progress toward achieving the goals initially set for CY73. It has also shown a great

CONFIDENTIAL

deal of flexibility in being able to adjust to changing training requirements as the tactical situation demands. This has been demonstrated by the step-up and emphasis placed on anti-tank and anti-aircraft training.

(2) National Training Centers.

(a) The National Training Centers (NTCs) are tasked with providing the bulk of all individual training. Over 200,000 trainees are handled each year by the NTCs with POIs ranging from ARVN, RF and PF recruit training to TOW missile system training. In addition the NTCs provide special unit training for the Airborne, Rangers and Marines. Self-help projects continue to supplement funded support for training center improvements.

(b) Recruit training for ARVN/Regional Force (RF) by the NTCs now totals 148,391 from January through November. Input for October and November tapered off to 9,965 and 7,738 respectively compared to an average of 14,000 for the previous four months and from a high of 20,607 in April. The Division Training Centers (DTCs) have contributed heavily to the recruit training program and have trained a total of 31,952 as of November - all volunteers to the various divisions. In addition to the ARVN/RF, the NTCs have trained a total of 22,736 Popular Force (PF) troops through November. PF training increased substantially in October and November partly resulting in a drop in ARVN/RF recruit input. Whereas of the last quarterly assessment, it appeared that main force recruit training would reach its stated goal of 203,000, it now appears that a small shortfall will exist. As of the end of November, 180,343 ARVN/RF had entered training leaving 20,000 spaces to be filled in December to reach the recruit training goal.

(3) Unit training and the Division Training Centers (DTCs).

(a) The unit training program has made great strides during its initial year. With three months still remaining in the unit training cycle almost all (99 out of 105 infantry battalions) but the most heavily committed units have received initial unit training, nineteen of the infantry battalions having completed period II training. The 1st Division has been the only division that has shown lack of enthusiasm in applying the unit training program. It has sent nine of its twelve battalions through a two-week refresher course

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

and has done nothing further. As Period I training is supposed to be conducted in place and on a flexible time scheduled as determined by the unit commander, it is difficult to understand why progress has not been forthcoming from the 1st Division. The CTC has shown a great interest in the unit training program and has directed the program in a very professional manner.

(b) Period I training is a 315-hour program of instruction, individual through company, conducted in the unit area of operation by unit cadre. As no set time period is established for Period I, it is extremely flexible and can be easily scheduled around operational requirements. Units cannot start Period II training until satisfactory completion of Period I.

(c) Period II is a five-week program conducted by the battalions at the Division Training Centers. During Period II the battalions review key subjects covered in Period I to include battle drill, formations etc., fire their organic weapons if they were not able to do so in Period I, conduct company Army Training Tests (ATTs) and conduct a battalion Field Training Exercise controlled and supported by the parent regiment.

(d) Period III training consists of a regiment and division Command Post Exercise (CPX) which will be conducted if the operational situation permits. The following chart presents the present status of the infantry battalions of the ARVN divisions by corps as 15 Nov 73.

PERIOD I

	<u>No of Battalions</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Presently In-training</u>
<u>I Corps</u>			
1st Division	12	0	*6
2d Division	9	9	0
3d Division	9	9	0
<u>II Corps</u>			
22d Division	12	9	3
23d Division	9	3	6

11-19

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>No of Battalions</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Presently In-training</u>
<u>III Corps</u>			
5th Division	9	9	0
18th Division	9	9	0
25th Division	9	9	0
<u>IV Corps</u>			
7th Division	9	2	7
9th Division	9	6	3
21st Division	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>
	105	71	28

PERIOD II

	<u>No of Battalions</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Presently In-training</u>
<u>I Corps</u>			
1st Division	12	0	0
2d Division	9	1	1
3d Division	9	3	1
<u>II Corps</u>			
22d Division	12	4	1
23d Division	9	1	0
<u>III Corps</u>			
5th Division	9	1	0
18th Division	9	3	1
25th Division	9	2	1
<u>IV Corps</u>			
7th Division	9	1	0

11-20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>No of Battalions</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Presently In-training</u>
<u>IV Corps</u>			
9th Division	9	2	0
21st Division	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
	105	19	05

* Combat requirements precluded the units in I Corps from initially participating in the unit training program. In lieu of this, the units were sent to the DTCs to receive a two-week refresher course which was to serve as a booster to be followed by the units conducting their own Period I training. While the 2d and 3d Division have followed this plan, the 1st Division has not conducted its own Period I in place training for any of its units.

(e) Infantry Training. The chart above details the progress in unit training made by the eleven infantry divisions. All but six of the 105 regular infantry battalions have completed or are conducting Period I unit training. The number of battalions that have completed Period II has jumped from eleven to nineteen since the last assessment. This training has taken place in spite of continuing combat commitments and is a good indication of the emphasis that the unit training program has received from the divisions and the CTC.

(f) The Airborne and Marines are still committed to the precarious Northern Defense Perimeter in I Corps. However, while not undertaking formal unit training, both divisions have cycled all their battalions through a two-week refresher course at Dong Da Training Center. The 1974 training plan calls for both the Marines and Airborne to implement the unit training program in 1974 to insure proper unit training and readiness.

(g) Rangers. In I Corps nine of the eleven battalions have received two-week refresher training. II Corps has not completed any Period I Ranger training largely due to heavy commitment of the Rangers. III Corps has had six Ranger battalions complete the five-week Period I unit training program. Reorganization of the Ranger groups will increase the size of the Ranger battalions and result in differing POI for unit training which will be applied in 1974.

(h) Armor. Of the 21 armored squadrons and

CONFIDENTIAL

battalions, eleven have completed Period I and another ten are undergoing Period I. Two armored cavalry squadrons are presently undergoing Period II training at their respective DTCs.

(i) Artillery. Forty-three of the 68 artillery battalions have completed Period I training while another ten battalions are continuing to undergo Period I training. Fifteen battalions have completed Period II with five others undergoing, but yet to complete, Period II training.

(j) Support Unit Training. Support units organic or attached to the divisions also undergo unit training. The chart below shows the training status of these units as of 16 Nov 73.

Name of Unit	No and Type	Period I		Period II	
		Tng Com-pleted	In-Train-ing	Tng Com-pleted	In-Train-ing
Signal	4 Gp 22 Bn	01 Gp 05 Bn	11 Bn	01 Bn	02 Bn
Medical	04 Gp 13 Bn	01 Gp 03 Bn	01 Bn		
Ordnance	10 Gp	03 Gp	04 Gp		
Quartermaster	05 Gp	03 GP			
Transportation	05 Gp	01 Gp	02 Gp		
MP	10 Bn	01 Bn			
Polwar	05 Bn	01 Bn	01 Bn		

(k) Summary. Unit training is progressing well under good guidance and support from the Unit Training Branch of CTC. It is evident that previous combat unit command experience possessed by members of the Unit Training Branch has fostered this well-founded guidance. Questionnaires have been sent out to the various division and small unit leaders requesting their recommendations on the unit training program so that further refinements may be incorporated into the 1974 program.

11-22

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

c. VNN

(1) VNN formal individual training for FY 2/74 proceeded well. Funding remains austere; however, training requirements as planned have essentially been met.

(a) Training common to all services is provided VNN by RVNAF service schools thus avoiding duplication of effort and expense.

(b) Training continues adequate and well-planned. Courses are modified and/or expanded as knowledge and nuclei of trained personnel are assembled.

(2) Officer training. VNN Training Bloc reports that 87 officers completed formal individual training during FY 2/74. The training was conducted at various naval training facilities and RVNAF service schools. Training completed at VNN facilities consisted of Navy Command and Staff Courses. Courses were completed at RVNAF service schools in the following areas: Political Warfare (Polwar), Signals, Logistics, Cryptography, Command & Staff, Ordnance, English language and National Defense College.

(3) Midshipman training. No midshipmen graduated during FY 2/74; however, a new class entered training and there are now 366 midshipmen at the Vietnamese Naval Academy (VNNA).

(4) Enlisted Training. VNN Training Bloc reports that 1072 enlisted men completed formal individual training during FY 2/74. Training completed at VNN facilities was in the specialties of Electrician's Mate, Engineman, Electronics Technician, Storekeeper, Commissaryman, Radioman, Gunner's mate, Yeoman, Damage Controlman and Disbursing clerk. Training completed at RVNAF service schools was in the following areas: English language, POLWAR, Adjutant General (AG), Intelligence, Signals, Engineer, Transportation, Ordnance, Quartermaster (QM, Army definition), Military Police (MP), Sensor and Frogman. VNN trained no recruits during FY 2/74.

d. VNMC.

(1) Formal individual training during FY 2/74 has proceeded well although training funds remain austere. Planned training requirements have essentially been met except that offshore training spaces have been lost due

CONFIDENTIAL

to lack of language-qualified candidates. The problem of language qualified candidates may be alleviated soon due to the assignment of nine marines to RVNAFLS for language training. VNMC makes good use of RVNAF service schools for common training.

(2) Officer training. VNMC Logistics Support Branch (LSB) of DAO has supplied information that 58 officers completed the officer refresher course of the VNMC Training Center, and 27 officers completed courses at RVNAF service schools in the following areas: English language, Jungle Warfare, Polwar, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), Artillery, Ordnance Supply, Senior Infantry Officer and Instructor.

(3) English training. LSB reports 1332 enlisted men, including 684 recruits completed training at VNMC Training Center during FY 2/74. Enlisted training at the center consisted of the following courses: Squad Leader, Team leader, and Recruit. Further, 358 EM completed courses at RVNAF service schools in the following areas: AG, Artillery, Administration and Finance, Engineer, Medical, MP, Ordnance, QM, Signal, Transportation, Jungle Warfare, Supply, Instructor, Polwar and LRRP.

e. VNAF

(1) VNAF formal in-country training. On 31 Dec 73 there was a total of 5356 VNAF personnel in all types of VNAF conducted training in RVN, excluding US contractor administered training. During FY 2/74 4517 VNAF personnel entered formal in-country training and 5422 personnel graduated from that training. A total of 199 personnel were eliminated from training for medical, academic or disciplinary reasons. During the same period of time 1370 personnel entered into VNAF On-The-Job Training (OJT) while 877 graduated from the OJT program. Currently 1370 personnel are undergoing OJT.

(2) The following is a summary of personnel in formal training for the quarter ending 31 Dec 73:

<u>Pilot Training</u>	<u>Entered</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>	<u>Graduated</u>	<u>In-Training</u>
T-41, T-37, UPT	0	0	0	90
UH-1, UNT	42	0	0	169

11-24

CONFIDENTIAL

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<u>Pilot Training</u>	<u>Entered</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>	<u>Graduated</u>	<u>Trainer</u>
Advanced 0-1	0	0	0	1
Liaison Pilot T41/01	0	0	27	3
	—	—	—	—
Totals	42	0	27	269

Technical Schools

Air Training Command, Nha-Trang, (ATC, NHA)	175	39	817	496
3d Air Division, Bien Hoa (BNH)	66	4	56	36
5th Air Division, Tan Son-Nhut (TSN)	74	9	74	56
Air Logistics Command, Bien Hoa (ALC, BNH)	28	4	7	250
Sub-Technical School (Sub-Tech Sch) TSN	214	31	660	531
Sub-Tech, BNH	225	1	193	249
Totals	782	88	1807	1618

Communications & Electronics

ATC, NHA	226	58	208	310
HQ VNAF, TSN	58	5	45	78
	284	63	253	388

General Service Schools

ATC, NHA	370	2	400	95
3d Air Division, BNH	65	1	0	83

11-25

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

General Service Initial Continued Final

General Service

5th Air Divi- sion, TSN	10	10	10
ALC, BNH	9	441	450
Total	1253	22	1027

Civil Engineering Schools

ALC, BNH	4	384	340
3d Air Div, BNH	1	42	60
Total	358	5	426

Crew Tng & Aerial Gunner

2d Air Div, NHA	7	0	7
3d Air Div, BNH	8	0	0
6th Air Div, PKU	23	6	0
Total	38	0	31

Air Command & Staff Sch	0	2	70
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Basic Military Training

ATC, NHA	17	295	0
Sub Tech Sch, TSN	0	466	0
3d Air Div, BNH	0	107	114
4th Air Div, BTY	2	36	0
5th Air Div, TSN	0	0	209
Total	390	19	904

(3) Pilot Training.

(a) The ground school phase of the T-37 Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) is conducted at ATC Nha

11-26

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Trang. The initial phase of flying training consists of fifty hours in the T-41 conducted at ATC, while the final flying training phase in the T-37 aircraft consisting of 100 hours is conducted at Phan Rang Air Base. Ground school and T-41 flying training is programmed for 80 T-37 cadets per year at ATC and the quality of training is considered satisfactory.

(b) The initial T-37 flying training program has experienced numerous problems and as a result, is about sixty days behind schedule. Shortages of life support equipment, delay in aircraft delivery, and a shortage of oxygen have contributed to the slippage. Plans have been developed by VNAF to increase the number of T-37 training sorties to make up the lost time. This is dependent on availability of additional life support equipment, oxygen and fuel. The separation of the T-37 flying training from Nha Trang has created a number of administrative, logistical and organizational problems and has been a distracting influence on the training program. The training aids requisitioned to support this program have never been located and the T-4 instrument simulator is yet to be installed at Phan Rang. The program has been in operation without benefit of any training aids or devices so far. The overall T-37 UPT program has to be considered marginal.

(c) The UH-1 co-pilot training program initiated in Aug 73 has been remarkable in its simplicity of operation and effectiveness. The program starts with a class of forty cadets in ground school at ATC Nha Trang then transfers them to Can Tho for one month (about twenty hours) of flight orientation and aptitude screening. The first three classes received flight orientation and screening in the U-17 fixed wing aircraft but the 4th and subsequent classes will receive this phase of training in UH-1. After flight aptitude screening, the cadets then enter UH-1 flight training at one of three locations: Can Tho, Bien Hoa or Da Nang Air Bases. There are presently three classes in UH-1 flight training at each of the above locations and one class in flight aptitude screening. The first class at Bien Hoa is scheduled to graduate in Feb 74. The only distracting elements of this program are the total lack of US furnished training aids and two flying accidents which occurred at Da Nang. One accident resulted in a total loss of one UH-1 and four injuries and in the second, minor damage to another UH-1 with no injuries. The over all evaluation of this program is excellent.

11-27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) The Advanced B-1 and Liaison Pilot Training programs conducted at ATC Nha Trang are well established and operate in a professional manner. This program has an annual capacity of 80 pilots. The quality of training is excellent.

(4) Technical Schools.

(a) Formal technical courses (aircraft maintenance AFSCs) are conducted at six different VNAF locations. These organizations are the ATC Nha Trang, ALC Bien Hoa, 3d Air Division, Bien Hoa, 5th Air Division, Tan Son Nhut and two subsidiary technical schools, one at Tan Son Nhut and the other at Bien Hoa. The ATC and Sub-Tech School at TSN carry the largest student load. The 3d and 5th Air Divisions' student loads are dependent on the needs of their operational units. ALC conducts technical training at the depot maintenance level.

(b) The ATC Technical School has an extensive and impressive program. It can produce up to 2000 graduates per year and currently has 496 students in training. The evaluation of technical training at ATC is considered excellent.

(c) The two Sub-Tech schools are separately operated and HQ VNAF plans that these schools will be consolidated at Tan Son Nhut in the future, pending the acquisition of adequate facilities on TSN Air Base. Both Sub-Tech schools are rated marginal in quality of training because of lack of training aids and marginal facilities. The TSN Sub-Tech school graduated 660 students, while the BNH school produced 193 graduates during this quarter.

(d) The F5E Mobile Training Set (MTS) arrived in-country and training is under the supervision of BNH Sub-Tech school. The initiation of F5E maintenance training is a Contract Field Service Team (CFST) operation, however, this will be a totally VNAF conducted program by the end of FY74. Each unit of the MTS covers a major system of the F5E aircraft, and while all of these units have arrived, the Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) in support of the F5E MST, primarily test equipment peculiar to the F5E aircraft, was incomplete. Every effort is being made to obtain this test equipment, but progress has been slow. Not all F5E systems trainers require the special test equipment and training on these systems is on schedule, and some students have been certified on completion of

11-28

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

training. Students receiving training on these units or systems that require the special test equipment cannot be certified at this time because they lack operational training and use of the test equipment. The CFST is teaching the first class of 170 VNAF students, and CONUS trained VNAF instructors will teach the second class with the CFST monitoring. After the second class the CFST departs for CONUS, and VNAF will be on their own. The evaluation of this training is satisfactory.

(5) Communication and Electronics (C&E) Schools.

(a) The C&E school at ATC, Nha Trang includes operational courses as well as maintenance courses on equipment associated with the C&E field. The scheduled student output per year is slightly less than 1000 and the quality of training is very good. The student output for this quarter is 208, and 310 students were in training as of 31 Dec 73.

(b) The C&E School located at VNAF Headquarters, TSN Air Base conducts special courses (lateral) related to communications and electronics. The input into these courses is intermittent and not based on any projected program. This school has never been evaluated.

(6) General Service Schools. The ATC and ALC conduct most of the general service training. The Air Divisions, also conduct training in general service AFSCs, but their training input is based on VNAF units' operational needs. Both the ATC and ALC schools are rated satisfactory. Total output for all training locations was 1027 graduates during the quarter just ended and 979 students are in training.

(7) Civil Engineering Schools. ALC and 3d Air Division, both at BNH Air Base, conduct civil engineering schools. The training program for civil engineering has developed into an unusual problem. VNAF will have no civil engineering school starting CY74 because VNAF personnel are scheduled to be sent to the ARVN Engineer School. The number of VNAF personnel programmed for civil engineering training in CY74 exceeds 400, but the ARVN Engineer School will not be able to train this amount due to limited facilities. This causes VNAF to have doubts about completely closing their own civil engineering schools and they are prepared to conduct some training if required to make up the difference between the VNAF requirement and the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ARVN output.

(8) Crew Training and Aerial Gunners. The Air Divisions usually conduct this training. The requirements of the operational units within each Air Division determine the number of classes and student load. These schools have not been evaluated.

(9) Air Command and Staff School. The mission of this school is to train junior VNAF officers for squadron level command and staff positions. Originally the school was located at ATC Nha Trang, but was moved to Tan Son Nhut Air Base in March of this year. The improved classroom facilities permitted the school to enlarge the size of the classes from 48 to 72 students per class. This will increase the annual output from 144 to 216 graduates per year. Three classes are programmed per year. The scheduled output is 192 graduates for CY74. The school and quality of instruction is excellent.

(10) Basic Military Training. Basic Military Training (BMT) is conducted at ATC, the Sub-Tech schools and at all of the Air Divisions. The input to all locations is rather irregular, therefore, only the locations that conducted BMT during this quarter are reflected in this report. The educational background of the recruit determines his placement in either the NCO BMT or recruit BMT. VNAF, at this time of the year reduces its recruiting program to a dormant status and it will remain this way until after the Tet holidays. The BMT program in VNAF is rated satisfactory.

(11) On-The-Job Training (OJT). The previous quarterly report indicated that OJT has a low priority with the VNAF Commanders; however, it has now moved off dead-center. The VNAF Commander initiated a letter instructing all levels of command to take more interest in OJT. Requests for Speciality Training Standards (STS) have been initiated and some STSs have been received by DAO and delivered to VNAF. These STSs are being translated by VNAF and are to be inserted into the OJT folders at each unit. This quarter has reflected a larger input to OJT than any previous quarter.

3. (U) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM
(ELTP) 0

11-30

CONFIDENTIAL

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a. Intensive ELTF.

(1) The RVNAF Language School (RVNAFLS), Saigon, although Army operated, is the only central coordinating agency tasked with English language training as a joint project for RVNAF. The quality of instruction remains excellent. The school mainly produces candidates qualified to take the Defense Language Institute (DLI) English Comprehension Level (ECL) test. Upon passing these tests the students are made available for in-country needs or for filling CONUS training spaces. Some problems have surfaced lately because at times over one hundred VNAF have qualified for CONUS training but have had to be retained in school, pending receipt of their final security clearance. This clearance is sometimes hard to get because of the small VNAF security processing staff and the inaccessibility of references and/or relatives of VNAF personnel.

(2) The student load at the school had a shortfall of programmed students. At the end of CY73 2400 entered versus 4320 programmed. The student load will gradually diminish due to the decrease in VNAF offshore training programs in June 74. Related to this is an erosion of the instructor staff. The best instructors are leaving the school in search of higher promotion chances or even early outs and three have been temporarily transferred to CTC to assist in translation functions. One civilian instructor has been selected, with DLI assistance, and hired on a part-time basis. This person has not been trained in US military/DLI methodology in CONUS.

(3) The inability of CTC to supply components needed to have several laboratory air-conditioners reconditioned contributes to a rapid deterioration of the electronic laboratories.

(4) The Vietnamese Air Force English Language School (VNAF-ELS) at Nha Trang continued to fulfill the requirement of training VNAF personnel up to the intermediate level of English before they are transferred to the school in Saigon for further ELT. The school lacks local US evaluators or monitors; however, DLI personnel make regular visits to update methodology and survey training materials or equipment that needs replacement. It is not clear at this time whether the intensive program at the school will be transferred to the RVNAFLS in Saigon in FY75 as directed by JGS. Therefore, justification for any major MASF supplies in FY75 is difficult to establish at this time.

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(5) Intensive ELTP Data for FY 1974:

(a) Number of Students:

ARVN	160 (RVNAFLS)
VNN	100 (RVNAFLS)
VNMC	9 (RVNAFLS)
VNAF	1025 (RVNAFLS)
VNAF	457 (VNAF-ELS)

(b) Number of Laboratory Positions:

RVNAFLS	320
VNAF-ELS	195

(c) Number of ECL Tests:

RVNAFLS	880
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(d) Number of Students sent to DLIEL (Lackland AFB, Texas):

ARVN	0
VNN	0
VNMC	0
VNAF	352

(e) Number of Other Students sent direct entry to CONUS:

ARVN	51
VNN	15
VNMC	1
VNAF	20

b. Non-Intensive ELTP. There are six RVNAF facilities conducting non-intensive ELTPs at this time. They are the VNMA and the POLWAR College at Dalat; the Highland Junior Military Academy (HUMA), Pleiku; the Junior Military Academy (JMA), Vung Tau; the VNNA at

CONFIDENTIAL

Nha Trang and the Naval Training Center (NTC) at Tam Ranh. The DLI team has not noticed any appreciable change in these programs and has tendered limited support in updating methodologies and replacement of texts and equipment through CTC and/or MASF supplies.

(a) Number of Students:

VNMA	955
POLWAR	959
HJMA	292
JMA	1315
VNNA	269
NTC	400

(b) Number of Lab Positions:

VNMA	110
POLWAR	52
HJMA	40
JMA	60
VNNA	60
NTC	20

c. Accomplishments.

(1) The VNAF-ELS has given its cooperation in field testing newly developed DLI American Language Course materials. The school provided 75 students and entered them at two-week intervals for closely monitored experimental training. The instructors supplied extensive data and annotated tests which are now under study at the DLI English Language School at Lackland AFB, Texas. The field test is being concluded with the same students (minus wash backs) at RVNAFLS.

(2) DLI Language Training Detachment team members rendered staff visits to POLWAR, Dalat and to VNAF-ELS, and VNNA, Nha Trang, providing technical assistance and monitoring English language programs, which were found progressing satisfactorily.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) CENTRAL TRAINING COMMAND DAO TECHNICAL TRANSLATION BRANCH (TTB).

a. TTB has provided continuous translation support to the RVNAF since 1955. US funding of the TTB was to have ended in January 74, but has been extended to 30 June 1974 to allow the RVNAF enough time to organize and approve a TO&E for military translators to replace DAO employees.

b. The TTB is structured for the translation of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force Field and Technical Manuals. In addition, extensive work is done in dubbing the technical Vietnamese language sound tracks for ARVN/VNAF training films. The expertise of the TTB's civilian translators, illustrators and typists is consistently superior, as is their accuracy and speed. Currently, at the TTB it is possible to have a moderate sized technical manual translated within a 24 hour period.

c. The TTB is the only US funded group which translates US field and technical manuals into Vietnamese for the Central Training Command of the Joint General Staff. TTB translators and illustrators are capable of translating 2500 pages per month and preparing a similar number of camera master pages containing the accompanying art work and illustrations. Personnel resources are 98 Local Nationals. The logistic support and salaries for the TTB approximate \$5,200 a month. TTB's average cost per FM/TM publication of \$400 for translation and preparation for printing has proven in the past to be the most cost-effective means of providing translation services to the Central Training Command. TTB's revised editing and printing plans, when implemented, will reduce the above cost by 25 percent. Many technical translation attempts are made each year by American and Vietnamese organization to duplicate TTB's performance. To date, their efforts have produced either substandard products, or their methods have proven too costly or slow.

d. TTB production is regulated through the RVNAF Publication Review Board (PRB) which plans and programs all RVNAF translation requirements for a calendar year. The PRB determines annual translation and printing requirements and establishes priorities based upon workload, capabilities and the funding of TTB. This board is chaired by the Chief of the CTC. Members are selected from CTC, Central Logistics Command (CLC), J-6, VNAF and VNN. The TTB workload status as of

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31 Dec 73 as follows:

CY73 projected requirements for translation of Field and Technical Manuals	22
TMs & FMs received from PRB for translation	150
TM & FM translations completed by TTB	123
Unscheduled translations of miscellaneous documents	72
	<hr/>
Total documents and publications translated, CY73.	195

e. As a regulatory body, the PRB is highly efficient in monitoring the scheduled output of TTB, but does not police its own members for timely review of translated FM/TMs. Dollar wise, TTB has given PRB more than \$200,000 worth of translated work in the past three years which has never been sent to the printers. The biggest offender is CLC. To date, the Chief of CTC appears reluctant to pressure CLC's PRB board member.

f. As part of reducing US expenditures, TTB will reduce its DAO manning by 30 percent in Jan 74. DAO will continue to support the TTB through 30 June 74 at a reduced level (63 versus the present 98 personnel) while requiring RVNAF to provide 35 personnel to augment the U.S. supported personnel. The assigning of military personnel to TTB will be the initial step toward RVNAF self-sufficiency in translation activities.

g. Continued CTC interest and control of publication review for all services is necessary. CTC must institute a more efficient and less time consuming program for the review and printing of military publications.

5. (U) CONTRACT TRAINING.

a. Contract monitored by DAO C&E Division.

(1) C&E Division, under Contract DAEA18-74-C-0026, monitored four programs within C&E purview.

(2) A Tandem Switching Centers Quality Assurance (QA) Training Program, beginning 27 Jun 73 and ending

CONFIDENTIAL

20 Oct 73, graduated two ARVN and six VNAF students. The objectives of the program were to train RVNAF to operate its own QA program in order to assure continued reliable operations of the Single Integrated Military System (SIMS), the Integrated Communications System (ICS), Technical Control, Tactical Microwave, Dial Telephone Exchange and Tandem Switching Centers. C&E personnel have rated the program as "good to excellent" and credited it as partly responsible for an improved SIMS reliability noted during the latter part of FY 2/74.

(3) A Communications Management Agency (CMA) Data Analysis Training Program which started in FY 1/74 graduated four ARVN students and one VNN student in FY 2/74. The program's objectives were to train selected CMA personnel in the reduction and analysis of data obtained from SIMS. C&E personnel credit this program with providing a nucleus of personnel capable of providing nine types of technical reports concerning systems outages, reliability and condition and link reliability. Despite such accomplishments however, it is possible that additional training in the areas of scaling, processing and plotting of Link Quality Monitor (LQM)/Carrier Intensity Recorder (CIR) data will be necessary in FY3/74.

(4) An LQM/CIR Training Program with the objectives of instructing ICS personnel in the repair, calibration and alignment of LQM/CIR data recording equipment, graduated fifteen ARVN students during FY2/74. The program is credited with improvement and reliability of data arriving at CMA from SIMS sites - due to equipment repair performed by students undergoing OJT.

(5) A Patching and wiring Training Program, with all students (12) still in training as of 31 Dec 73, has the objectives of teaching ICS personnel the techniques and procedures for patching and wiring of terminating and through groups, and to create a nucleus of personnel qualified in the reconfiguration of groups at ICS sites. An assessment of the program has not been made because the program is not yet complete, but the students are considered qualified and enthusiastic.

b. Contracts monitored by DAO Navy Division.

(1) Contract Number DAJB02-C-0011, with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), scheduled to end

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during Jan 74, has the objective of providing technical and educational assistance in the development and implementation of a training curriculum for all levels of VNN logistics management. There were 149 students who entered training during FY 2/74, 178 who completed training in FY 2/74 and none remaining in training at the end of that quarter. The program has been assessed as successful in imparting basic principles of management and management practices to VNN personnel, and as having met its objective.

(2) Contract Number N00024-73-C-5431, with Potomac Research, Incorporated has the objective of teaching VNN personnel how to maintain and overhaul the diesel engines that drive their craft. Forty-eight students entered training during FY 2/74, 36 completed training and twelve remained in training at the end of FY 2/74. This program, referred to as the Diesel Engine Overhaul School, is considered the single most important logistic training facility in VNN. Assessment is that the contractor has been successful in Vietnamizing this training to the point where all classes are now conducted entirely by VNN personnel without assistance from US contractor instructors.

c. Contracts monitored by DAO Air Force Division.

(1) Contractor Training at Bier Hoa. The VNAF Chief of Maintenance has expressed satisfaction with the Logistics Training Plan; he indicated satisfactory progress in training. In addition he mentioned a number of problem areas in shop training which require correction. These areas are:

(a) Power Train: Repair and Assembly Section are plagued by lack of tools; however, training in the receiving and disassembly area is progressing very well. A lack of qualified contract personnel to operate the power train test cells exists.

(b) Plant Services: Training is presently being conducted in 7 AFSCs within this area; 56 personnel are in training; excellent records administration prevails, and program is well organized. Training objectives should be achieved within scheduled time-frame.

(c) Accessory Repair: Forty-three trainees are undergoing training in the Electrical Shop, although this shop lacks essential tools, equipment, and supplies. Training in the following areas has had a delay

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in implementation due to construction of new facilities and provision of new equipment. Pneumatics, environmental, egress, fuel systems and oil cooler facilities are scheduled to be completed in Mar 74.

(d) Manufacture/Repair: Training in this area is mostly of the projection/OJT type in the following areas: Machinist, Welding, Plating, Crash/Battle Damage, Sheet Metal, Airframe. The lack of facilities for heat treatment, plastics, fiberglass and welding hampers training.

(e) Aircraft Repair: This activity is under a production-type program, but some formal training is being conducted in the aircraft, electrical, helicopter mechanics and structural repair. Training is restricted due to overcrowded conditions in shops.

(f) Production Control and Management Services: There are no major problems in these areas, and training is proceeding smoothly.

(g) Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E)(Supply Training): Training is being administered by 19 local national instructors with augmentation assistance by approximately 193 PA&E local nationals. Three hundred and seven VNAF students are receiving training. There are no major problems.

(h) Persons Rotor Blade: Training is of production/OJT type at this time. Lack of tools, equipment, and supplies have hampered this activity since its beginning.

(i) Lycoming Jet-Engine: Training is being administered in all areas by Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) personnel (production/OJT type). Training is progressing well, although lack of parts, tools, and equipment hinder training. CETS reports a shortage of trainee in-put.

(j) General Electric Jet-Engine: This activity is of the same nature as the Lycoming activity, with the same progress and problem areas.

(k) Kentron Power Production: There is very little training involved in this activity. With self-sufficiency realization very close; no training problems exist.

(2) Contractor Training at Da Nang Air Base.

11-38
CONFIDENTIAL

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(a) Lear Sigler, Incorporated (LSI) currently has 247 students in training, which is 147 more than required by the Logistics Training Plan. The LSI Chief of Training stated that there are now students available for training for an average of four hours per day (with some students available for six hours); There is an over-all requirement of VNAF to man their shops 24 hours a day, and they are meeting this requirement with a work schedule of 24 hours on and 24 hours off.

(b) An improvement in the quality of training at Da Nang was noted. The issue of tool boxes to 40 students by LSI has had a good affect. All shops, however, report a shortage of parts, e.g., Jet Engine Shop has 12 engines awaiting testing; Corrosion Control Shop requires over-all improvement; training in the Electrical Shop is still all classroom due to the failure of arrival of new test equipment.

(c) CETS personnel tasked with training are behind schedule in developing an effective training program. Reasons given were lack of training aids, lack of classrooms, and lack of time to prepare lesson plans. To date, communication between CETS personnel and the VNAF Wing Commander has not been carried out effectively.

(d) PA&E Supply and Civil Engineering Training Programs, as well as Kentron power production, have developed into satisfactory VNAF-integrated training programs.

(3) Contractor Training at Nha Trang Air Base.

(a) LSI Training at Nha Trang is exceeding the projection of the Logistics Training Plan. The current number of students in training is 83; however only 51 students have been certified. The goal is to train and certify 104 VNAF personnel by the end of FY74. This is their total training requirement with the exception of 12 airframe mechanics (under the Logistics Training Plan). LSI attributes success in training to the fact that students are assigned to them full-time (39 to 40 hours per week).

(b) LSI's Training effort at Nha Trang is OJT-oriented, with theory as required. A problem area was noted in the Corrosion Control Shop, where lack of tools and supplies has been detrimental to training. LSI records indicate three completions in the Corrosion Control Shop. Due to the negative factors in training,

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quality is to be questioned.

(c) The Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) shop has teenage students assigned to training, and there is ample dead-line equipment for the conduct of training; however, lack of parts degrades training. There is a shortage of batteries and spark plugs.

(d) CETS training represents a problem, being slow in accelerating the process of training administration. AVCO Lycoming has made progress in CETS training, having developed lesson plans, and is providing two hours of training per day.

(e) In terms of meeting Logistics Training Plan requirements, training at Nha Trang is outstanding, but due to parts and tool shortages, overall training at Nha Trang can be classed as satisfactory. The need to develop more effective communication with the VNAF remains an outstanding requirement.

(4) Contractor Training at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

(a) During FY 2/74, LSI had 105 VNAF personnel in training in accordance with Logistics Training Plan requirements. Their current training effort is averaging 50% classroom and 50% practical OJT. All classroom training, with exception of three AFSCs, is conducted in the respective shops.

(b) An augmentation effort by LSI in the C-7 hangar appears exceptional, with classroom training and LSI VNAF relationships considered commendable. There are some shortages, which require correction, in the Sheet Metal and Corrosion Control Shops, i.e., spare parts and chemicals.

(c) PA&E supply is not conducting classroom training. Their workforce is integrated with VNAF and they work side by side. PA&E Civil Engineer training is considered very good at Tan Son Nhut, a total of 51 VNAF being certified during the quarter. The Kentron power production effort is likewise very good, a total of 43 VNAF being certified during the quarter.

(5) Contractor Training at Phan Rang Air Base.

(a) LSI has 61 trainees currently in production/OJT type training within six AFSCs. This is a result of the heavy operational mission requirements utilizing the A/T37 aircraft. The average production type

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training, per trainee, is four hours per day, with efforts by LSI and VNAF to increase this time as much as possible. The Maintenance and Supply (M&S) Wing Group are working on a 24 hours on and 24 hours off basis.

(b) Within the areas of Fuel Systems, Electrical, Sheet Metal, Jet Aircraft Mechanic, and Jet Engine; training is progressing on schedule with no major problems. Training in Corrosion Control is lagging, but problems in this area should be resolved. In the AGE Shop, most of the support equipment is not being utilized due to lack of parts and supplies, i.e, spark plugs, batteries, etc. Training records and progress charts are being maintained very well.

(c) J-85 Engine Training is being hampered by lack of tools and equipment. Also, a conflict materialized through a duplication of training by LSI and General Electric CETS contractor personnel.

(d) The Kentron Power Generator and Civil Engineering Training is virtually completed. The Power Generator function has been turned over to the VNAF. Civil Engineering has a total of 77 trainees scheduled to graduate in March 74.

(e) The Cessna (A/T-37), General Electric (J-85 Engine), and Teledyne (J-69 Jet Engine) are initiating training programs, having adjusted programs which heretofore had been solely relegated to technical advisement.

(f) Further compromise, between ATC and 2d Air Division, to consolidate their efforts, manpower, facilities, equipment, supplies, etc., is required in order to enable this group to keep functioning at its present rate of efficiency.

(6) Contractor Training at Pleiku Air Base.

(a) LSI currently has 49 students in training. The LSI training function has been considered largely ineffective at Pleiku AB as a consequence of losing key personnel and an unfavorable turnover of training managers. Some improvement in training, however, has been noted recently, through the retention of reliable personnel. Mainly required, overall, to improve training at Pleiku, is a more effectively administered and managed training program, with optimal coordination between contractor and VNAF.

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(b) The Engine Area's training function stands out well at Pleiku for the manner in which it is being conducted by the senior LSI instructor. There is enthusiasm and a well-organized effort in training in this functional area of training.

(c) The CETS training program, covering UH-1H training, requires additional organization to resolve problems related to acquisition of training aids and technical data. Also, the need for acceleration of the CETS training effort at this time at Pleiku is important to the meeting of training requirements within a specific time-frame. Similarly, Lycoming CETS requires up-grading of its organization and effort in training at Pleiku.

(7) Contractor Training at Binh Thuy Air Base.

(a) At Binh Thuy, LSI contract personnel are manned to authorized strength. Their trainee input is presently 63 personnel in training, with 24 trainees having completed their training. Training completions should show an increase presently at Binh Thuy. LSI has programmed its entire training commitment through Mar 74, and at present are well on schedule on contract training requirements.

(b) LSI has made favorable strides in developing training facilities at Binh Thuy, and is providing for existing requirements in training aids, charts, hand-out materials, etc. Problems which exist in the need to update individual training records, standardization of lesson plans, and writing bilingual descriptions of AFSCs, are being corrected.

(c) Improved relationships between the VNAF and contractors are being achieved through training meetings. Such problem areas as instructor duties, student attendance, supplementary classroom training, issuance of work orders to trainees, etc., are being favorably resolved.

(d) Cessna, Boeing, Lycoming, and General Electric CETS representatives at Binh Thuy are performing commendably in developing respective training functions, and appear to be establishing confidence among the VNAF in their abilities and leadership.

(e) In the AGE Shop, there is a dire need for some electrical training on their various pieces of equipment. LSI is trying to remedy this problem by

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providing electrical test equipment. Commonly, there is a shortage of spare-parts, i.e., spark plugs, batteries etc., Overall the AGE Shop is well-organized and operational. The maintenance activity is performing well, but some problems are caused by the responsibility of assisting Can Tho field maintenance and supply functions.

(8) Contractor Training at Phu Cat Air Base.

(a) LSI currently has 173 students in training. This is 28 more than projected by the Logistics Training Plan. Their training effort averages one hour of classroom work to seven hours practical OJT. Part of their students are available in the morning and part of them in the afternoon. This is because the VNAF need to man their shops 24 hours a day. This is accomplished with a work schedule of 24 hours on and 24 hours off.

(b) Training in the UH-1H Helicopter Shop is progressing very well. All of the trainees have completed training on approximately 75% of the Speciality Training Standard (STS) items. Training in the Engine Shop is very limited, with an acute need for special tools. The OJT program in the Instrument Shop is found to be thriving and successful.

(c) The overall training effort at Phu Cat is progressive and energetic, with evidence of exceeding the projection of the Logistics Training Plan. LSI Training Managers are impressive in their attempts to improve training at Phu Cat AB.

(9) Contractor Training at Can Tho Air Base.

(a) LSI has 26 trainees in training in 4 AFSCs: Electrical, Fuel Systems, Rotor Wing, and Corrosion Control (on the UH-1H Helicopter, these trainees receive approximately 2 hours of formal training each weekday and 4 hours each Saturday). Operational commitments require a 24 hour shift, which adversely affects training during the limited time allotted.

(b) The building and classrooms renovated at Can Tho for training purposes have been supplied with all necessary equipment, materials, and training implements, and are considered excellent for formal training. LSI personnel have made contributions of time, effort, and expense to develop the training establishment, and are to be commended for the attention they are giving to both program and students.

11-43

CONFIDENTIAL

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(c) Major problems were identified in shops, i.e. AGE, Electrical Fuel Systems, Corrosion Control, Engines, Hydraulics, and Instruments - where training facilities are sub-standard. These problems are due to recent transfer from Soc Trang. Efforts are being made to correct these deficiencies. There is an outstanding requirement in each shop area for technical orders, manuals, supplies, equipment, or tools.

(d) Overall, LSI is doing a commendable job in training personnel and assisting the VNAF in resolving aforementioned problems.

(10) Contractor Training at Bien Hoa Air Base (3d Air Division).

(a) There are currently 26 LSI contract personnel assigned to the 30th M&S Group conducting training within 8 AFSCs for approximately 120 trainees. Training in these areas is showing improvement over the past and many problems in the shops are being resolved. An outstanding contributing factor to the improvement of training at Bien Hoa (3d AD) is the provision of a new, efficient group of LSI managers and training administrators. The favorable turn-over of key training personnel is expected to make a highly favorable impact on training in the future.

(b) A negative, aspect to training is the relatively poor condition of classrooms and training facilities, i.e., no student chairs, no desks, poor lighting, no blackboards, and poor ventilation. A request has been made for funds to construct new, improved classrooms.

(c) The Wing Group Commander expressed interest and satisfaction with the Logistics Training Plan and its contents (as applies to Bien Hoa, 3d AD).

d. Contracts monitored by DAO Army Division.

(1) Under Contract Number DAJB04-74-C-0018, Eastern Construction Company conducted formal and OJT training at Medium Maintenance Centers in the following general areas: Operation and maintenance of major weapons systems and combat vehicles; maintenance management procedures and the effective utilization of organic reports and data; and proper use of special tools. Although interruptions were experienced at some locations due to unit reorganization, the training provided is considered to have been effective. The

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perennial problems of incomplete technical reference material and shortage of training aids continue to be present; however, these problems are overcome through improvisation and satisfactory instruction is rendered.

(2) Under Contract Number DAJBOT-73-C-009, Hughes Aircraft Company provided TOW System direct support maintenance training on an OJT basis. Although the caliber of training rendered has been observed to be effective, the program has experienced problems due to poor scheduling of personnel by ARVN. Action to rectify this condition is now being taken at the highest levels of the CLC.

(3) Under Contract Number DAAK01-70-C-5873, Dynelectron Corporation provided OJT at the 1st ARVN Associated Depot, Medium Maintenance Centers, and selected Direct Support Groups and Ammunition Depots in the following areas: Operator, organizational, and general support/direct support material handling equipment maintenance; and pre-repair inspection of unserviceable material handling equipment. Training is considered highly effective with the concurrent benefit that a large number of material handling equipment assets have been removed from deadline and returned to service.

(4) Under Contract Number DAJB11-72-C-0333, Vinnell Corporation provided OJT at the 40th Engineer Base Depot in the following general areas: Management and rebuild of major and secondary components, including hydraulic items; quality assurance and production control; and technical supply procedures. Training has been observed to be highly effective. However, as the result of a recent introduction of new items (hydraulics) to the program, and a changeover to production line operation, continued training will be required in FY75.

6. (U) REGIONAL FORCES (RF) AND POPULAR FORCES (PF).

a. There have been no significant changes since previous quarterly assessments; however, reliable JGS sources have stated that less than the required number of RF/PF units are standing down to conduct in-place readiness training as prescribed by JGS/CTC directives. Primary reasons given were: Increased operational requirements for RF/PF units resulting from increased enemy activity; increased redeployment of RF units outside their home sectors; and general RVNAF preparedness for a suspected general enemy offensive in

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early 1974. It appears that for the time being RF/PF unit in-place training and unit refresher training will continue to lag behind schedule, at least in areas where operational requirements take precedence; and until such time as enemy intentions toward a major offensive can be confirmed.

b. RF/PF personnel and units receive training at all of the NTCs except that at Duc My. Courses and statistics for FY 2/74 are presented below:

ARVN. RF*

COURSE TITLE	PROGRAMMED	INPUT
Recruit Training	54,739	32,915
Reconnaissance Platoon Refresher	2	6
Battalion Refresher	25	26
Company Refresher	3	4
Separate Company Refresher	0	6
Heavy Weapons Platoon	20	28
Leadership Training	640	175
CC1/Infantry Training	6,715	2,557
CC2/Infantry Training	4,480	2,344
Officer and NCO Instructor Training	445	439
NCO Refresher Training	300	218
LRRP Training	450	1,122
Squad Leader Training	UNK	191
Platoon Leader Training	UNK	134

* Statistics are not separated into ARVN and RF, but given as ARVN/RF.

PF

Recruit Training	1,619	8,484*
Platoon Leader Training	859	816

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COURSE TITLE	PROGRAMMED	INPUT
Squad Leader Training	323	472
Platoon Refresher Training	314	299
Assistant Platoon Leader/POLWAR	0	65

* The large difference between "programmed" and "input" is reported to have resulted from the volunteering of large numbers of men for PF service.

(Figures 11-1, 11-2, 11-3 and 11-4).

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ARVN SERVICE SCHOOLS

Pleiku:
Jr Military School

Phu Cuong (Binh Duong):
Engineer School

Saigon:
Admin and Fin School
AG School
ARM Force Language School
Intelligence School
Mil God School
National Defense College ***
Ordnance School
POLWAR Cadre TC
QM School
Social SVC School
Transportation School
WAFC School
Medical School ****

Duc My:
Artillery School

Qui Nhon

Dalat:
POLWAR Col

Phan VNMA
Rang

Bien Hoa:
C&GS Col (Long Binh)
LOG Mgt School *
Armor School (Bear Cat)

Vung Tau:
Power Gen & Air Cond Main School
Jr Military School
MP School
Signal School

Thu Duc:
Infantry School
Band School
Martial Art and PHY
Trng School

Note:

- * Monitored by CLC, JGS
- ** Controlled by General POLWAR Dep, JGS
- *** Monitored by JGS
- **** Monitored by RVNAF Surgeon General

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ARVN

TRAINING CENTERS




Figure 11-2

11-51

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VNN AND VNMC
TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-3


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VNAF

TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




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Figure 11-4

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VNAF

TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS



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CHAPTER 12

RVNAF Programs, Plans and Morale

1. (U) Introduction. Chapter 12 contains unrelated topics concerning all services, including:

- a. Lines of Communication (LOC)
- b. Military Construction (MILCON)
- c. Dependent Shelter Program
- d. RVNAF Retirement Program
- e. Reduction Program - Bulk POL
- f. RVNAF Morale

2. (U) LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

a. There was only token progress made in the highway reconstruction/improvement program as reported last quarter. The only significant progress was made by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Corps of Engineers. As of 1 December 1973, the Corps of Engineers had completed 382 kilometers of the approximately 659 kilometers assigned. This was an increase of 24 kilometers completed during the last quarter of 1973 (Figure 12-1). In addition to the progress, ARVN Engineers made on the highway construction/improvement program, they also completed 358 meters of bridges during the quarter, for a total of 1,853 meters completed as of 1 January 1974 (Figure 12-2).

b. During December 1973 the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) let contracts for five Architect Engineer teams (A&E teams). There will be one A&E team assigned to each of the five highway districts (Figure 12-3). These teams will vary in size, according to the workload in the district of assignment. The teams will consist of from 4 to 9 American Engineers with a local national staff of from 40 to 80 personnel. The

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ARVN - LOC ROADS (KILOMETERS)





Figure 12-1

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ARVN - LOC BRIDGES (METERS)



TOTAL PROGRAM - 5298 METERS
COMPLETED AS OF 1 JAN 74 - 1853 METERS
WORK IN PLACE (SCHEDULED)

Figure 12-2

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RVN ROAD NETWORK AND ARVN - LOC




Figure 12-3

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responsibility of an A&E team is the design of, repair and reconstruction of the National Highway System (to include bridges), supervision of USAID-let contracts and to advise all elements of the GVN concerned with highway construction/repair. The A&E team contracts are for a three-year period.

c. Waterways. Interest in improving the waterway system has heightened in consideration of POL shortages. Dredging operations are continuing, however, at a somewhat diminished rate of productivity, primarily due to an increased enemy threat in some areas along the waterways.

d. There was little change in the railroad system during the last quarter. The inventory of rolling stock remained unchanged. A new roadbed for a five-kilometer spur line into the ARVN Depot at Go Vap (just north of Saigon) was 80% complete at the end of December. One and one-half kilometers of track had been laid on the new roadbed. Survey work is underway for a new spur line at the Cam Ranh Depot.

e. Traffic on the railroad during the last quarter was reported as follows:

October	-3,370 metric tons/366,958 passengers
November	-4,434 metric tons/525,769 passengers
December	-1,300 metric tons/466,046 passengers

3. (U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/Military Construction (MILCON) Program provides for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities.

b. Projects under construction are administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON). All work is done by lump sum contractors. Problems arise for Vietnamese contractors when offshore procurement is required due to long lead times and complicated importing procedures set by the GVN.

c. The present program consists of the following:

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(1) Projects Under Construction:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>\$ Value*</u>
Hospital	1	2387
Ammo Depots	1	50
Communication Facilities	3	133
POL Facilities	2	385
Logistics Depots	2	531
Port Facilities	1	112
Training Facilities	3	4173
Construction Battalion	1	210
TOTAL	14	7981

(2) Projects Under Design:

Logistics Depots	2	1215
Port Facilities	1	1110
TOTAL	3	2325

(3) Projects Funded, on hold by SECDEF and sponsor:

Ammo Depots	5	4401
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*Thousands of dollars.

d. Inflation during the last half of CY74 has posed severe problems for construction contractors in Vietnam. The price of cement has more than doubled from VN\$610 to VN\$1400 per bag and there are periodic shortages due to inability of local manufacturer to meet demand. The price of reinforcing steel and other construction materials has increased rapidly; likewise, the price of POL products has skyrocketed.

4. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM. This subject covered in paragraph 10 of Chapter 5.

5. (U) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN FOR CY 74.

a. The RVNAF demobilization plan for CY 74 is based on Law #13-CT/LDQGQL/SL, signed by MG Duong Van Minh on 20 October 1964. There are three new Laws (#38, 59 and 486) on the books, Laws (#58 and 59) signed 26 December 1972 and Law (#486) signed 26 May 1973 by President Thieu.

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Law #58 prescribed statute for Regular Force Personnel, Law #59 prescribed statute for Reserve Personnel and Law #486 prescribed statute for Regional Force Personnel. Plans are to implement the new Laws in 1974 which will modify demobilization requirements by lowering the age limits by 1 to 3 years.

b. The last assessment reported 55,569 personnel to be demobilized during CY 73. This was a planning figure. After demobilization was completed on 31 December 1973, the total number demobilized was 56,278. The breakout is shown in Figure 12-4.

c. There has been no change in the military pension regulations covered in the previous quarterly assessment. Seniority pensions are granted to all service personnel who complete 25 years of civil and military service. Extra credits toward the 25 year eligibility can still be obtained from the special category service or circumstances formerly enumerated.

d. The scope of responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans (MWV) as outlined in this portion of the last assessment remains unchanged. Of the 33 provincial city service centers the MWV was authorized to open, all were opened during CY 73. All 44 Provincial City Service Centers are now reported functioning throughout the country.

e. The RVNAF predicted demobilization plan for CY 74 is at Figure 12-5.

6. (S) REDUCTION PROGRAM - BULK PETROLEUM (POL).

a. The petroleum support program to RVNAF was interrupted by the Arabian embargo against sale of POL to the United States. Supplies to RVNAF via commercial oil companies ceased on 12 November 1973 with the cessation of imports to RVN.

b. Action was taken prior to the embargo to reduce RVNAF consumption of POL consistent with measures being taken world-wide in light of the energy crisis.

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DEMOBILIZATION OF RVNAF CY 1973

1. Personnel demobilized during period 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1973.

a. Over Age Personnel.

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Regular Forces	1,489	7,587	9,870	18,955
RF	304	2,496	6,510	9,310
PF		<u>86</u>	<u>1,608</u>	<u>1,694</u>
Total	1,802	10,169	17,988	29,959

- b. WACs Contract Expires and Retirement. 162

c. Category #2. Physically unfit:

Regular Forces	699	1,792	8,232	10,723
RF	39	501	3,819	4,359
PF		<u>116</u>	<u>2,480</u>	<u>2,596</u>
Total	738	2,409	14,531	17,678

d. Category #3. Disabled.

Regular Forces	519	1,511	4,274	6,304
RF	115	629	670	1,414
PF		<u>175</u>	<u>586</u>	<u>761</u>
Total	634	2,315	5,530	8,479

e. Grand Total of all Categories.

Regular Forces	2,716	10,890	22,376	35,982
RF	458	3,626	10,999	15,083
PF		377	4,674	5,051
WAC		<u>162</u>		<u>162</u>
Total	3,174	15,055	38,049	56,278

(Figure 12-4)

12-11

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PREDICTED DEMOBILIZATION OF RVNAF CY 1974

a. Over Age Personnel.

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Regular Forces	1,170	3,554	7,692	12,416
RF	379	1,175	10,238	11,792
PF		<u>34</u>	<u>538</u>	<u>572</u>
Total	<u>1,549</u>	<u>4,763</u>	<u>18,468</u>	<u>24,780</u>

b. WACs Contract Expires and Retirement. 404

c. Category #2. Physically unfit.

Regular Forces	231	786	4,156	5,173
RF	139	376	2,165	2,680
PF		<u>12</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>228</u>
Total	<u>370</u>	<u>1,174</u>	<u>6,537</u>	<u>8,081</u>

d. Category #3. Disabled.

Regular Forces	203	732	3,480	4,415
RF	113	318	1,756	2,187
PF		<u>12</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>168</u>
Total	<u>316</u>	<u>1,062</u>	<u>5,392</u>	<u>6,770</u>

e. Grand Total of all Categories.

Regular Forces	1,604	5,072	15,328	22,004
RF		1,869	14,159	16,659
PF		58	910	968
WAC	<u>10</u>	<u>225</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>404</u>
Total	<u>2,245</u>	<u>7,224</u>	<u>30,566</u>	<u>40,035</u>

(Figure 12-5)

12-13

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c. Because conservation of POL was stressed and enforced, the embargo found RVNAF with the following days of supply on hand country wide:

<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>JP4</u>
40	7	24	80

d. To sustain operations without interruption because of fuel shortage, sufficient diesel fuel was borrowed from commercial oil suppliers to meet requirements. Emergency shipments of POL were made from PACOM and by 15 December 1973 there was sufficient fuel to maintain normal consumption through December 1973 and on 1 January 1974 have 30 days reserve stock on hand. We also repaid borrowed diesel fuel stocks.

e. Imposed conservation initiated jointly by RVNAF and DAO on RVNAF resulted in the following quantity reductions with monetary savings shown:

(1) Consumption:

<u>DAILY CONSUMPTION</u>	<u>MOGAS (BBLs)</u>	<u>DIESEL (BBLs)</u>	<u>AVGAS (BBLs)</u>	<u>JP4 (BBLs)</u>	<u>TOTAL (BBLs)</u>
JUL 73	3,240	10,287	2,337	8,080	23,944
SEP 73	3,067	9,667	1,800	4,800	19,334
NOV 73	2,927	8,703	1,499	4,880	18,009

(2) Percentage reduced from July consumption:

	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>JP4</u>	<u>OVERALL</u>
SEP 73	5%	6%	23%	41%	19%
NOV 73	10%	15%	36%	40%	25%

(3) Monetary savings forced by the conservation program. Computations made using as a basic cost the July support level:

<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>JP4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
\$78,750	\$478,800	\$443,470	\$1,048,320	\$2,049,290

12-14

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7. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. JGS sources state that problems concerning RF/PF morale continue to be a matter of command interest on all field visits and results of these visits reflect morale in general has not significantly improved. JGS, the General POLWAR Department (GPWD), and the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) are continuing in their efforts to encourage field commanders to search for new ideas and to promote and initiate programs at troop level that will substantially improve morale. Morale continues to be an item of major emphasis at all levels, but military sources are quick to point out that there is no magic formula or fast and easy solution that will reverse this long-standing problem.

b. Past assessments have covered various aspects concerning morale/desertion. Inflation and corruption relate directly to disaffection among RVNAF.

c. RVNAF commanders at all levels agree that pay is by far the biggest morale problem. Commanders are virtually unanimous in stating that no soldier can adequately support his family on his pay and allowances. For example, a sergeant with 14 years service makes US\$25.00 a month, not including family allowance (maximum of US\$9.50 for a wife and at least 4 children). The cost to feed one person averages about 400 piasters a day, or \$23.00 a month. Moonlighting, theft or corruption become necessities for survival.

d. The soldier's inability to survive on his pay and allowances forces him to divide his time between military duties and activities which permit him to alleviate this basic problem. Commanders in MR 1 freely admitted that they cannot keep sufficient ponchos, entrenching tools, mechanic tool kits, etc., on hand because the soldiers, whose families are in desperate need, sell these items on the black market to buy food. Others commit criminal acts, "cowboying." Officers have used more sophisticated means such as accepting monthly remuneration from subordinates who desire to retain their choice assignments. The "selling" of command/political positions is commonplace. As units move from one locale to another, soldiers

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engaged in moonlighting are prone to go AWOL or desert because opportunities for outside income evaporate with such a move and established businesses cannot be maintained. Both morale and discipline decline when the soldier finds it more and more difficult to balance military duties with outside work. The Rangers, in redeploying nine battalions from MR 4, may reflect an increase in desertions for December 1973-January 1974 due to the movement of forces from their homes.

e. A pay raise for all RVNAF members to include territorial forces would be an immediate solution. This may be considered to be inflationary and some senior RVNAF commanders believe that a compromise solution would be to provide "in kind" compensation to the military for essential nutritional needs. Monthly allotments of rice, sugar, milk, flour, cooking oil, etc., as is the practice of the Nationalist Chinese Armed Forces, would have a beneficial effect on RVNAF.

f. The 2d Infantry Division has initiated a self-help program to alleviate the financial burden on combat troops. Main points of the program are:

- (1) Use rear base areas to cultivate rice and bananas.
- (2) Develop fish breeding ponds.
- (3) Produce 40 head of cattle each year.
- (4) Use 2% of division strength and deserters for laborers.
- (5) Make each unit self supporting budgetwise, either by unit funding or individual sharing.

g. Figures from government sources reveal the following discrepancy concerning income of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Military/Civilians vice national rate of inflation for calendar year 1973.

- (1) RVN rate of inflation - 61.5%.
- (2) RVN Military/Civilian pay raise - 36%.

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Government employees (military and civilian) do receive extra benefits; i.e., commissary privileges, rice at official prices, etc. Whether or not these privileges compensate for the 35% difference is debatable. In contrast, DAO employees (local national) received an increase in salary of 68% 11 November 1973.


h. Desertions have remained reasonably stable during the quarter. Except for the Marine Corps, September-November rates compare favorably with those of June-August as shown in the following table:

DESERTION RATE (PERCENT)

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>JUN-AUG 73</u>	<u>SEP-NOV 73</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>
ARVN	2.25	2.31	+.06
VNAF	.28	.23	-.05
VNN	.30	.26	-.04
VNMC	1.52	1.74	+.22
RF	1.46	1.49	+.03
PF	.78	.57	-.29

i. RVNAF desertion trends are shown in Figure 12-6.

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(Figure 12-6)

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CHAPTER 13

JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (C) CHAIN OF COMMAND.

a. Previous quarterly assessments covered the organization for national defense within the GVN from the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, down to the Military Region/Corps. Also covered was the relationship between the Joint General Staff and the Headquarters of the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy, wherein coordination rather than command and control exists, and Air Force and Navy combat assets are commanded by the Military Region/Corps Commanders to which they are OPCON. This quarterly assessment continues to outline how the JGS operates related to the operation of the major combat branches of the armed forces, the Airborne and Marine Divisions and the Artillery, Armor and Ranger Commands. In each instance, the JGS manages rather than commands and controls combat resources. Actual command and control is vested in the MR/Corps commanders who accomplish assigned missions with the resources furnished their commands by the JGS.

b. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Artillery and Armor Commands (Figures 13-1 and 13-2) and organized and commanded generally along the same lines as the U.S. Artillery and Armor Centers/Schools. The Ranger Command (Figure 13-3) has no like counterpart in the US Armed Forces. These Commands differ from their US Armed Forces counterparts as they also function as Special Staffs to the Joint General Staff (Figure 13-4). In their role as Commands they provide supervision, inspections, technical training, organization and doctrine development, personnel administration and operational training for their respective branches. As a member of the Special Staff of the JGS/RVNAF, they advise the Chief/JGS on all problems relative to their Arms of Service. When directed by the Chief/JGS/RVNAF they will command and/or control designated elements of their Arms.

(1) The RVNAF Artillery is employed as follows:

(a) There are five 175mm Gun Battalions and four 155mm Howitzer Battalions organic to the four Corps. The Divisions each have three 105mm Howitzer Battalions

13-1

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Artillery Command/5VHAF Organization Chart




Figure 13-1

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Armor Command/AVHAF Organization Chart




Figure 13-2

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PVN/AF/Ranger Command Organization Chart




Figure 13-3

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


Figure 13-4

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and a 155mm Howitzer Battalion organic. The exception to this is the Airborne and Marine Divisions. These two divisions are light, highly mobile General Reserve Divisions and each have only the three 105mm Howitzer Battalions assigned. In addition to the above artillery units there are 176 two gun platoons of 105mm Howitzer assigned to the territorial forces. Forty-four Territorial Forces Artillery Headquarters Sections are assigned to the 44 provincial Headquarters (Sectors) with the 176 platoons assigned to Districts as required.

(b) The Corps Artillery Commander is a member of the Special Staff to the MR Commander. Support for artillery units within the mission stated in paragraph 1, is provided by the Artillery Command through the coordination lines depicted in Figure 13-4.

(2) The RVNAF Armor is employed as follows:

(a) Each of the Military Regions has one Brigade assigned. The Brigades for MR 1 and MR 2 are alike as each contain an M-48 tank battalion of three tank companies, and four Cav Squadrons. Each Cav Squadron consists of two Troops of M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and one M-41 tank company. The Brigade assigned to MR 3 has the same makeup except that it has five Cav Squadrons. The Brigade assigned to MR 4 has no tanks, and the five organic Cav Squadrons each consist of three troops of APCs.

(b) Each Brigade attaches one Cav Squadron to each Infantry Division assigned within their respective Military Regions (Figure 13-5). The Brigade Commander is a member of the Special Staff to the MR Commander. Support for Armor units within the mission stated in paragraph 1, is provided by the Armor Command through the coordination lines depicted in Figure 13-4.

(3) The Ranger Command is organized and deployed (Figure 13-6) as follows:

(a) There are fifteen Ranger Groups, each Group consists of three standard size battalions.

(b) Twelve of these Groups are assigned to the three northern Military Regions (MR 1 four Groups, MR 2 five Groups and MR 3 three Groups). Each of the

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CAV DEPLOYMENT

DEPLOYED: 8-1-74




Figure 13-5

13-11

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above MR's also have a 30-man Ranger Command/MR assigned. The Commander of this Command is a member of the Special Staff to the Region Commander, advising the commander on all aspects of Ranger operations and deployment.

(c) The remaining three Groups are part of the National Reserve, however, two of the Groups are committed in MR 2 and are OPCON to the MR 2 Commander. Support for Ranger units within the mission stated in paragraph 1b, is provided by the Ranger Command through the coordination lines depicted in (Figure 13-4)

The Ranger Force was recently reorganized into the force structure indicated above. This reorganization was completed during December 1973. Prior to the reorganization the Rangers were more or less a catch-all, shock-troop type organization. Some units were utilized in border defense while others were attached to infantry divisions and still others were committed in Special Military Zones of highly contested areas. Under the old organization there were three different size Ranger Battalions.

The reorganization was ordered by President Thieu on recommendation from the JGS. The organization and new standardized mission of the Rangers is designed to strengthen border defense against infiltration through a series of 27 Border Defense Bases. At present only six of these bases exist at the proposed permanent sites. The installation of the remaining 21 bases depends on a reduction of enemy control along most of the border area of the three northern Regions. Until such time that the enemy's control over the border areas can be reduced, units will operate from temporary bases away from the immediate border area. The two General Reserve Groups OPCON to MR 2 are committed along National Highway 1, to fill the security vacuum created along this major North-South route when Free World Military Forces were pulled out.

Concept of Operations: The new concept of border defense operations is as follows: 1) Each Military Region will maintain one of its assigned Groups in reserve as a defense-rescue force for the border defense bases. This Group will reinforce or come to the aid of any of the border defense bases whenever enemy pressure is such that it cannot be dealt with adequately by the assigned force. Elements

13-14

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of this Group may also occupy vital points on main infiltration axes. 2) The border defense base will have at least one battalion assigned. On a rotating schedule one Company will secure the base, while the remaining two Companies conduct operations. The operations will consist of reconnaissance patrols, ambushes and raids. The border defense base may also be utilized as a fire support base for both border and/or conventional operations. The border operational area will normally consist of a 10 kilometer strip along the border. Eight kilometers of this strip will be on the Vietnam side of the border and the remaining two kilometers will be in the neighboring country. The width of this strip may vary slightly depending on terrain within a given area. The border area of MR 4 is manned by territorial forces and is considered "secure". This border area does not present the problems of the three northern regions as it is open and well-populated instead of dense jungle and sparsely populated as is the case of the border of the three northern regions.

(4) The Airborne and Marine Divisions (Figure 13-7) ordinarily constitute the bulk of the standing National Reserve (Figure 13-8) for the Republic of Vietnam. These two Divisions compose a light and highly mobile strike force. At present, both Divisions are committed in a Tactical Area of Operation (TAOR) in Military Region 1 and are OPCON to the MR 1 Commander.

In their present status both divisions maintain a Main Command Post (CP) at their home bases in Saigon and a Forward CP in their respective TAOR. The Forward CP is manned by the CG, Deputy CG and principal staff officers. The Main CP is manned by the Chief of Staff with only a skeleton staff and is little more than a housekeeping detachment. The bulk of the Divisions logistical requirements are received through the MR's Area Logistic Command (ALC). Special items of equipment pertinent only to each Division is issued by the Division Main, which draws directly from the JGS Central Logistic Command (CLC).

When either Division is not committed to a TAOR or OPCON to the MR Commander, it is separate and independent, and OPCON to the Chief/Joint General Staff. Under these conditions logistical support is directly provided from JGS/CLC. The Marine Division Commander is also the Marine Corps Commandant.

13-15

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AIRBORNE/MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-7

13-17

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GENERAL RESERVE UNIT LOCATIONS




Figure 13-8

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The 31st Airborne Ranger Group is a Special Task Unit and is not a part of the Airborne Division or of the previous mentioned fifteen Ranger Groups. This unit is used primarily for long range reconnaissance and behind the line operations. This Group consists of a Hq & Hq Support Company, four Assault Companies and a Recon Company, and constitutes part of the National Reserve (Figure 13-8).

2. (C) SHORTFALLS AND ASSESSMENT.

Shortfalls enumerated in previous quarterly assessments remain valid. The JGS does not command and control but manages RVNAF resources instead. The Chief/JGS and the JGS organization manage RVNAF and exercise little day-to-day command and control. JGS continues to allocate resources to the MR/Corps commanders and publish and monitor operational, logistical and administrative policy and directives. Lack of timely and accurate reporting from the MRs to the JGS continues, and content remains entirely at the discretion of the MR/Corps Commanders.

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CHAPTER 14

DAO DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

During the period 1 October through 31 December 1973, the following distinguished persons visited DAO:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
25 Sep-1 Oct 73	Mr. Joseph Heiser	GAO Consultant
27-29 Sep 73	GEN John W. Vogt	COMUSSAG/7AF
	MG H. H. Cooksey	
27 Sep-26 Oct 73	Chaplain (COL) William J. Higgins	Dep USARMC Chaplain
29 Sep-20 Oct 73	Mr. C. K. Lammers	Ch, Pacific Audit Div, DASD (Audit)
30 Sep-1 Oct 73	COL V. W. Lang	Dep Cmdr, JCRC
1-2 Oct 73	BG R. C. Kingston	Cmdr, JCRC
3-5 Oct 73	HON Arthur Mendolia	Asst SECDEF (I&L)
	VADM T. R. Weschler	
	RADM T. J. Bigley	
	RADM R. E. Fowler	
	Mr. N. J. Weissman	
5-7 Oct 73	COL Dimitri Tadich	Dep J-2, USSAG
5-9 Oct 73	GEN Donald V. Bennett	CINCUSARPAC
	COL J. E. Greene	
10 Oct 73	Mr. Edward F. Ducey	Dep Commissioner, Honolulu Office, Bureau of Employees Compensation, Dept of Labor

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
10-11 Oct 73	GEN Timothy F. O'Keefe	COMUSSAG/7AF
10-13 Oct 73	MG Stan L. McClellan	ACofS, J-4, USSAG
10-15 Oct 73	COL John W. Arnold	Ch, Materiel Div., Office Comd Surgeon, USARPAC
10-18 Oct 73	Mr. Kenneth L. Riner	Asst Regional Mgr, SF Region, DCAA
15 Oct 73	ADM Noel A. M. Gayler	CINCPAC
	Mr. R. J. Jantzen	
	MG R. H. Spanjer	
	MG E. F. Tighe	
	Mr. M. Abramowitz	
	RADM F. Yates	
	CAPT T. L. Dwyer	
	COL R. L. Wellde	
15-17 Oct 73	CAPT (USN) W. M. Weisskopf	CINCPAC Comptroller
16-20 Oct 73	COL Alvin H. Meredith	CINCPAC, RDT&E Br.
17-18 Oct 73	BG James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret)	Consultant to Adminis- trator, Vets Admin
13 Oct 73	COL Ray L. Burnell	DATT, Phnom Penh
13-24 Oct 73	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	DEPCOMUSSAG
24-28 Oct 73	COL Richard J. Womack	USAPAH
	Mr. F. J. Bollard	

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
28-29 Oct 73	HON Robert W. Berry	Army Gen Counsel
29-31 Oct 73	COL C. W. Boyd	Ch, CINCPAC Force Planning Div
29 Oct-2 Nov 73	COL Michael C. Fiorelli	USSACC-PAC
30 Oct-1 Nov 73	BG R. C. Kingston	Cmdr, JCRC
	COL V. W. Lang	
	COL J. R. Vivaldi	
31 Oct-4 Nov 73	CAPT (USN) William R. Quisenberry	CINCPAC, Dep Dir Intel
30 Oct-4 Nov 73	BG H. L. Jacobson	J-2, USSAG/7AF
2-3 Nov 73	COL C. W. Boyd, Jr.	CINCPAC, Plans Directorate
4 Nov 73	MG Ira A. Hunt	DEPCOMUSSAG
4-6 Nov 73	Mr. Robert W. Garrity	CINCPAC, USIA Advisor
	COL H. F. Bentz, Jr.	
5-6 Nov 73	RADM Henry P. Glindeman, Jr.	Ch, 7th Fleet Coord Group, NKP
7-8 Nov 73	RADM R. E. Fowler, Jr.	CINCPAC, Dir for Log
	RADM A. W. Price	
8-14 Nov 73	MG Chin-Yu Chow	ROC AF
8-9 Nov 73	Mr. Wm C. McLaughlin, Jr.	DIA, Wash, DC
	Mr. J. D. Baldino	
11-12 Nov 73	RADM Charles F. Rauch, Jr.	Asst Ch, Naval Ops for Human Goals
12-13 Nov 73	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	DEPCOMUSSAG

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
10-17 Nov 73	COL W. F. Ulmer, Jr. COL R. S. McGowan	Ch, Anti-Tank Training Team
12-16 Nov 73	COL Gerald D. Rotter	HQ, PACAF/LGM
13-16 Nov 73	Dr. William Warn	CINCPAC, J-2, Advanced Research
20 Nov-1 Dec 73	COL John W. Patrick, Jr.	USARPAC IG
25-28 Nov 73	MG Alton G. Post BG R. H. Thompson Mr. M. I. Hinson COL E. A. Hinojosa, Jr.	USARPAC, DCSLOG
(25 Nov-1 Dec)	COL J. J. Corliss	
26-30 Nov 73	COL Alvin L. Meredith	CINCPAC, RDT&E Br.
29 Nov-3 Dec 73	MG H. L. Price	Dir, Mil Assist & Sales, HQ USAF
30 Nov-1 Dec 73	Mr. Richard H. Dubois CAPT (USN) R. E. Engle	Dir, Area Regional Office, Pacific
30 Nov-6 Dec 73	Mr. Lou Moccia	CINCPAC, Traffic Mgr
1 Dec 73	BG Donald A. Gaylord BG D. L. Burkett Mr. W. Shepherd	Cmdr, PACAF
2-4 Dec 73	Mr. William M. Paz Mr. W. M. Meaut	ROCMM, Pearl Harbor
2-6 Dec 73	COL William E. McNeil	CINCPAC, J-45
4-7 Dec 73	Mr. John A. Goldsmith CAPT (USN) J. E. Kneale	STAFFDEL, Senate Armed Services Committee

14-4

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
4-8 Dec 73	COL Dimitri Tadiach	Dep J- USSAG
7-8 Dec 73	BG R. C. Kingston	Cmdr, JCRC
10-13 Dec 73	Mr. Robert E. Kreps	DSA
12-13 Dec 73	COL P. G. Clifford	CINCPAC, J-2, Staff
15-16 Dec 73	BG R. C. Kingston	Cmdr, JCRC
	COL A. N. J. Weidhas	
17-18 Dec 73	MG Ira A. Hunt	DEPCOMUSSAG

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CHAPTER 15

DEFENSE ATTACHE ASSESSMENT

1. (S) GENERAL. The RVNAF continues to improve. However, progress is fraught with traditional problems (inflation, corruption, ennui) as the military copes with prosecution of the war without U.S. military presence. Intelligence continues to reveal increasing infiltration and expanded enemy logistic and tactical capability.

2. (S) INDICATORS OF IMPROVEMENT.

a. Growing indication is evidenced of increasing RVNAF capability to assess and respond to enemy threats. Effectiveness of military efforts to deny the lowland rice and protect the tactical front to the west has increased in MR-1, though more so north of Hai Van Pass. However, the continued deployment of the Marine and Airborne Divisions on the northernmost front denies the RVNAF from fully exploiting the high degree of readiness of these elite divisions.

b. The relatively rapid deployment of the 22d Division en masse to Pleiku-Kontum to free the 23d Division for deployment to Quang Duc was quick, impressive and professional. The 23d Division stabilized the situation in Quang Duc while the 22d Division maintained the status quo in Pleiku-Kontum. VNAF aircraft, responding to aerial reconnaissance and intelligence, conducted telling strikes against enemy supply convoys entering the country and transiting roads in northern and western Kontum and western Pleiku.

c. The incident level in MR-3 dropped, although heavy fighting took place in southern Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong. The 18th Division was especially effective responding to enemy threats and intelligence. However, the 5th and 25th Divisions require considerable training and combat experience before either can be considered ready to counter an enemy threat to Saigon. Extensive effort has been dedicated to preparing anti-tank defenses, conducting preemptive air strikes and maintaining units in a mobile posture, especially in the 18th Division area of operation.

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d. MR-4 was consistently active. ARVN units maintained control and slowed enemy infiltration. Major ARVN progress was realized when the MR commander directed dismantling of many outposts and oriented RF units to a mobile posture, raising the possibility of detecting infiltration and denying enemy freedom of movement.

3. (S) PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Corruption, long existent, and openly acknowledged in some quarters, is by its very nature and existence, a hindrance to progress. Inflation appears to force leaders at all echelons to condone graft and in fact, corruptive practices seem to be a prerequisite to survival. Consequently, in some cases, units alerted to move have had serious desertion problems, where the possibility of troops being separated from moonlighting opportunities for long periods is real.

b. Maintenance of equipment and availability of repair parts is still far from satisfactory. While supply parts can be identified in depots, the system which should ensure timely provision of required supplies and repair parts at the user level is unresponsive. Distribution is a problem aggravated by lack of LST's. Extensive training and effort is necessary in supply, maintenance and distribution before acceptable equipment readiness is realized.

c. Coordinated employment of infantry and supporting arms (i.e., air, artillery, armor, reconnaissance) is deficient in many units. Armor is not routinely integrated into defensive plans. Rather armor units are often emplaced separately. Similar problems are manifested in offensive planning. The full capability of supporting weapons goes unrealized due to the inability to mass fires with air and exploit the shock-power potential of coordinated tank-infantry operations.

d. Leadership at the highest level appears at times to be perceptive and imaginative. In some instances commanders are orienting away from fixed positions and turning to mobile operations to attrite the enemy rather than attempt to control useless terrain. However, translation of well conceived plans into decisive action remains a significant shortfall. Middle level leadership is inexperienced and often indecisive. Only time, training and confidence might remedy this deficiency.

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Although it may never be remedied as the best leaders continue to be killed or incapacitated.

4. (S) In sum, RVNAF has pressed forward with plans to thwart an anticipated enemy offensive. Some successes have offset early quarter tactical defeats. Preemptive air strikes appear to have upset enemy time schedules for the present. With time, RVNAF gains experience and works toward gaining the confidence necessary to mold their assets into a well-trained, coordinated, multi-service force. However, increased effort must be directed at maintenance at all levels to increase equipment and supply readiness to ensure assets are available, in fighting condition when needed. Last year's 60% inflation drained the soldier's pay and his morale, contributed to corruption, desertion and lessened his will to fight.

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